User:Yerevantsi/sandbox/Azeri clans

Clans in Azerbaijan have dominated the political scene in the country since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

The role of clans in Azerbaijan has been a constant source of debates in the academic literature for the last 20 years. For some, the clan in Azerbaijan is a fantasy constructed by researchers to understand networks based on shared interests and sometimes kinships (Alievaand Torjesen 2007; Andvig 1999). For others, taking into account the clan is essential tounderstand the Azerbaijani society and the dynamics of Azerbaijani politics (Avioutskii2007). In this debate, several points have to be recalled.

According to the Transparency International, Azerbaijan is one of the most currupt countries in the world (139 of 176 in the Corruption Perceptions Index).

The constants in the struggle for political power in modern Azerbaijan are connected, in many cases, with one of a number of regionally associated networks, often referred to as "clans."

The political and economic system in Azerbaijan is largely based on a pyramidal web of patronage. Clans, mainly based on regional origin as well as the ruling elite, keep the system intact to secure their financial and power interests.

Writing in the Harvard International Review in 2011 Alec Rasizade suggested that "Modern Azerbaijan is a typical Middle-Eastern petrostate ruled by a classical Middle-Eastern despotia, where political (and economic) power is concentrated and inherited within the ruling family."



Overview
A turning-point for Azerbaijani history dates back to 1969, when Moscow appointed Heydar Aliyev as secretary general of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, in order to defeat the clientelistic network developed by his predecessors in the public administration. With the support of his KGB colleagues, Aliyev succeeded in replacing the previous patronage system –by “removing approximately 80 percent of the administrative and party apparatus”– with a new one.17 In short, he was able to fill positions of authority with people whose loyalty he absolutely trusted, mainly relying on networks from his home regions of Nakhchivan and Armenia, where his parents resided.18 As a matter of fact, the Nakhchivan and Yeraz –which stands for Yerevan Azerbaijanis– clans still dominate the political life of the country and the governing YAP itself can be considered as representative of political and economic interests of the Nakhchivan and Yeraz clans.19 The system of loyalties based on clan membership has turned out to be the basis for the stability of Aliyev’s regime, and this has been confirmed once again by the YAP’s support to Ilham Aliyev’s nomination after his father Heydar Aliyev’s retirement for health reasons. Thus, rather than a personalistic system of power, Baku can be viewed as a regime that owes its stability to the informal structure based on strong clientelist networks, developed since the Soviet era.

The clans that were in power at the breakup of the Soviet Union are determined not to be pushed aside, the diplomat explained, even if the ideology that propped up their ambitions has fallen out of favor.

In fighting to hold onto wealth and power, ex-Communists downplay their former party ties, all the while insisting that their considerable political experience makes them best suited to lead their unstable nations in this perilous new era.

Meanwhile, rival clans eager to settle old scores use nationalism and religious fervor to rally supporters to their side. Sometimes they receive help from foreign sources. In Tajikistan, for example, Uzbekistan backs the ex-Communists, while Iran and Afghanistan aid the insurgents.

While a few Azerbaijani clans are getting richer and richer, thanks to all the dollars pouring into the country, the rest of the population is barely scraping by. Over 40 percent of the country's inhabitants are living in poverty; the average monthly income is just €24. As Lala Shevkat, the leader of the Liberal Party of Azerbaijan, says: "Oil is our tragedy."

Mocking Azerbaijan is such easy sport that you wonder if it was this Caspian potentate that was Sacha Baron Cohen’s real target when he invented Borat, not Kazakhstan. WikiLeaks did not help. Leaked cables showed US diplomats likening moustachioed despot Aliyev and his ruling clan to the mafia family in the Godfather films, quoting the line: ‘I don’t feel I have to wipe everybody out – just my enemies.’

One day after the removal of the Aliyev brothers—who were accused of plotting a coup d'etat with Rasul Guliyev, the exiled leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Azerbaijan—President Aliyev promptly moved against some influential members of the old guard that had been close to his father, former president Heydar Aliyev. Health Minister Ali Insanov, one of the founders of the YAP, and Akif Muradverdiyev, the powerful chief of Presidential Apparatus responsible for financing the state-run Khalg Gazeti newspaper, were the most notable victims of Aliyev's purge, but also included Social Security Minister Ali Nagiyev, Education Minister Misir Maradanov, and Fikret Sadigov, head of state-owned Azerkimya (the country's largest chemical company). Isanov and Muradverdiyev were the two most prominent members of the Yerazi clan, which, along with Ilham Aliyev's own Nakhichevani clan, has dominated politics in Azerbaijan for several decades. As one of the unofficial leaders of the Yerazi, Insanov presided over the powerful "Ararat" movement, essentially a vehicle to spread the clan's influence at the national level, particularly over the country's health system. All of those removed were viewed by the vast majority of the electorate as being clearly corrupt; by dismissing them, Aliyev and the reformers within the YAP have offered them a sweetener ahead of the vote.

Major clans
Two clans, the Nakhichevanis and Yerazi, have dominated politics for decades. As a result, other clans were excluded from power. Heydar Aliyev had its origin in both clans, which gave him a strong powerbase and an opportunity to build a certain unity between the two clans.

Nakhchivan clan


When Moscow appointed Heydar Aliyev as Secretary General of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in 1969, his mission was to break the influence of clientelist networks in politics and administration. In fact, Aliyev immediately began to purge the party and administrative apparatus, removing 80 percent of the staff. Nevertheless, he similarly recruited new people according to local and personal criteria. Apart from his KGB colleagues, he mainly drew on relatives and friends from his home region Nakhchivan and Armenia, where his parents resided. By doing so, Aliyev became the unchallenged head of a patronage network that pervaded the entire republic. As he incorporated elements of the traditional networks from both regions, the so-called Nakhchivan-clan and the Yeraz-clan (“Yeraz” stands for “Yerevan Azerbaijanis”) also gained political influence. It is disputed to what extent these groupings can be described as clans in the proper meaning of the word, since they do not share traditional common roots. They are rather patronage networks that are not deeply tied by cultural traditions.

Since his death in 2003, competition between the clientelist networks has increased, although the Aliyev family still controls the informal system. While the new president Ilham Aliyev weakened the position of the Yeraz-clan, the Aliyev family is now competing with the Baku-rooted Pashayev family of the president’s wife. However, these competitions are never strong enough to lead to open struggles. The ruling clientelist networks are rather united by their common interest to preserve access to oil rents by authoritarian means of rule.

In 2004, Illham Aliyev has carefully started with appointing new young government officials to implement reforms. It won’t be an easy job for him to open up the system, since he has to balance between interests of domestic oligarchs, of western criticisers and of his clan / family interest.

The Aliyev family stands on the top of the pyramid and makes sure that key-positions in all spheres of society are taken by closely related and like-minded. The father of the current president started well before his resignation as president to replace older people in his surroundings with younger, in order to move his son to the top and secure family interests. This structure has developed into extensive bureaucracy and corruption. Corruption in all spheres of society poses the largest threat to the functioning of the state. Most ministers have bought their jobs and many are directly related to the president. Moreover, membership of the president’s party, YAP, is a precondition for state employment. Furthermore, persons closely related or loyal to the president can be found in key-positions in the judiciary, banks, academic institutes, business sector, state oil companies, diplomatic scene, media as well as security services. It goes without speaking that the top of the pyramid also represents the wealthiest part of society, highly involved in the oil and gas business. However, as a consequence of the corruption it is often difficult to distinguish private wealth from government property.

As in other Transcaucasian states, "clans" or "mafias" are patronage networks. Such networks form around individuals who come to enjoy favorable treatment by higher echelons of the economic or political apparatus. Exchange of favors and privileges provide for acquisition of political influence and upward mobility in the economic entrepreneurship area. In Azerbaijan, the major network centers on the Aliev "clan", which remains in place even after the death of Haidar Aliev. One time rival networks, including led by the former speaker of the parliament, Resul Guliev, and the former foreign minister, Hasan Hasanov, were already eliminated before the elder Aliev handed over the reins to government to his son.

The Nakhichevan factor is often important in the many high government officials originate from there, and regionalism requires that one look after his/her close and distant relatives and those originating from the same region.

A second major network is called Yerazi or Yerazi clan, consisting of Azeris who had moved to Azerbaijan from Armenia during the Soviet rule when both republics increasingly became more homogeneous.

Haidar Aliev belonged to both of these clans at the same time because although he was born in Nakhichevan, his family originated from Zangezur, which became part of Armenia in December 1920. Like the Nakhichevanis, the Yerazi also control a patronage network which promotes nepotism.

Nevertheless, since independence, people not belonging to any of the clans have also become part of the ruling elite due to their loyalty to the president and reputation fro getting the job done. Moreover, those in important governmental positions, that is, powerful officials, might and do create their own networks based on self-interest.

Yeraz clan
But, in terms of population, the Yeraz is the largest clan in Azerbaijan. ‘Yeraz’ is a nickname for ‘Yerevan Azerbaijanis’. The members of this clan are originally from Armenia and their families have immigrated to Azerbaijan in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is importance to note that the last important migration wave from Armenia to Azerbaijan is from the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1988-1990. The Yeraz represent between two and three million people, that is around 30% of the Azerbaijani population (Avioutskii 2007).

The key figures of this clan are the Aliyev brothers notably Farhad and Rafiq ''They have no family links with the ruling power. They are also known as the Alar brotherhood (they are all from the village of Alar in the district of Jalilabad in Azerbaijan)'', and Rasul Guliyev. The latter is now in exile in the United States. Rasul Guliyev was forced to exile in 1996 for very trouble reasons. According to some sources, he used the money he made heading the Baku Oil Refinery to build a small army aiming to seize power. He is the head of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and has several times expresses his desire to come back to Azerbaijan but has not be allowed to by the Azerbaijani presidency. If he does not held anymore day-to-day responsibility within the Yeraz clan, he is still considered as one of its leaders.

Kurdish clan
The last clan – the one of the Kurds – is a bit special. It is a rather new one because the Kurdshave been kept away from Azerbaijani politics during both Russian and Soviet rules. After the collapse of the USSR, they became increasingly important and, nowadays, they wouldoccupy 80% of the high positions within the Azerbaijani public administration (Sidikov2004). This number is very high compared to the total number of Kurds living in Azerbaijan:50-60 000 people, that is less than 1% of the total population of the country. Because of its recent development and of its weak regional identity (its members are originally from variousregions of Armenia and Azerbaijan), the Kurds have sometimes been depicted as a ‘subclan’(International Crisis Group 2004, 21). But this grouping is based on strong kinship relationsand is structured vertically. The leader of the clan is Beylar Eyyubov, who used to be the bodyguard of Heydar Aliyev and is now the head of security of Ilham Aliyev. The clanicnature of the Kurdish grouping is also the result of the construction of the Yeraz. They oftenconsider the Kurds as a rival clan (both are in competition to held power jointly with the Nakhchivanis) and denounce a ‘kurdification’ of Azerbaijan.

Talysh clan
According to Svante Cornell "the southern Talysh networks, they have failed to become a significant force in politics, but instead dominate the religions hierarchy in the country.""