User talk:Trekphiler/Archive 4

Licence to print money
The amount of F1 teams that have gone bankrupt and/or collapsed in the last 20 years has thoroughly disproven any connection between Super licences and financial freedom. A flip question gets a flip answer. You don't want a flip answer, ask the question with greater clarity. --Falcadore (talk) 02:43, 29 October 2010 (UTC)

Re: Talk:Viper_(TV_series)
The series you were thinking of was Street Hawk. --The Fifth Horseman (talk) 14:00, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

WPF1 Newsletter (October)
– Cs-wolves  (talk)  17:10, 1 November 2010 (UTC)

Cosworth
Er, I'm probably missing something, but isn't the Cosworth article written in UK English? And if so, should it be aluminium not aluminum? 4u1e (talk) 18:52, 2 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Status quo is the rule, including under ENGVAR, unless there's a really good reason to change it. It has to apply at the level of the article though, so that only one version of the language is used for consistency in any one article. Cosworth is currently mostly written in British English (judging by the use of units and several other appearances of aluminium), is arguably a British topic, and the first version I can find that is definitely one variant or the other is in UK English (here). I'll change it back, if you don't mind. 4u1e (talk) 21:02, 2 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Ta. Wasn't me in the first place by the way - I think it was just one of those IPs that confuses us all by coming along and trying to improve an article. As opposed to the other, rather more common type of IP ... 4u1e (talk) 21:13, 2 November 2010 (UTC)

de Havilland Comet article for GA submission
Hey, fellow Prairie boy, can you give the article a look-see? I was afraid to load up on too much detail but I think most of the relevant points are dealt with. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 15:03, 6 November 2010 (UTC).

Design studies for the DH Comet 1944-1947
See this image: FWiW Bzuk (talk) 04:03, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

Bob McGreary
Re this, do you intend to create Bob McGreary? I honestly think it will be very difficult to find sources to establish notabilty, but you may know better than me. If you don't intend to create the article, do you mind if I remove the redlink per WP:REDLINK? --John (talk) 00:36, 7 November 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll confess not knowing enough to know if he fails notability. If so, take it out. (I default to leaving redlinks in...)  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  08:22, 7 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks. Normally, so would I, but only if there is a reasonable possibility of someone creating the article, which I just don't think there is in this instance. --John (talk) 08:28, 7 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Suits.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  08:42, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

North_American_P-51_Mustang
In re this Thanks mate. You're absolutely right, & I claim tiredness as the excuse. I'm glad you spotted it. Dick Holman. User:Archolman 19:33, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

Re Fundelementals
Thanks for the reply. I managed to add myself to the project participant list. I would definately welcome your offer of help. I want to start by getting together a list of to dos and your feedback on that would be great. :-) Mutant Raccoon (talk) 14:16, 22 November 2010 (UTC)
 * You're a star. Thank you. Just set up a link to a sandbox. I'll use that new page as you suggested. Mutant Raccoon (talk) 18:07, 22 November 2010 (UTC)
 * I've posted some ideas for the entry in my sandbox. Initial feedback would be welcome. I want to get this right so please be frank. My main concerns are whether to try to put it all on one place or elaborate more notable characters in their own entries elsewhere. For example, someone's already done one for Thor and I would argue there's a good few characters that are more important. Also whether the team should have a separate entry to the comics etc etc. Thanks in advance. Mutant Raccoon (talk) 23:18, 22 November 2010 (UTC)

The Bugle: Issue LVI, October 2010
To stop receiving this newsletter, please list yourself in the appropriate section here. To assist with preparing the newsletter, please visit the newsroom. BrownBot (talk) 23:07, 22 November 2010 (UTC)

Completely biased read
(copied from Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate for continuation)

Article seems good but completely biased. I can't believe you would completely shut-down all of those that have experienced some sort of insight on an incoming attack because of lack of documentation and then procede to come to intellectual assumptions, that itself could be waived false. You should avoid this! For example: Fact: I went to school yesterday. Your perception: "oh.. wait wasn't documented, he therefore might not have gone to school..". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 15:46, 16 October 2010 (UTC)
 * The "conclusions" are based on flat wrong conclusions or flimsy, or nonexistent, evidence. Would you accept a claim "aliens have landed" on the basis of a single eyewitness, with no photographs or physical evidence? As the maxim has it, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence". These claims are contrary to the majority of the published information to date as well as to the expressed aims of the parties involved (namely Churchill & FDR). To overturn this demands more than bald claims. This isn't "The Drudge Report" or Fox News.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  15:58, 16 October 2010 (UTC)
 * But you cannot just fill in gaps with your own personal opinion on such a large scale inquiry. These gaps are key links to uncover history, it must be as precise as possible, non-bias. It is a debate is it not, it should also not be one sided. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 11:14, 13 November 2010 (UTC)
 * "just fill in gaps with your own personal opinion on such a large scale inquiry"? Don't be ridiculous. The verdict of history (to borrow from Prange) is, there was no conspiracy. This isn't my opinion. This is the opinion of every serious historian of the subject. The only ones who think there's something to be "uncovered" are the conspiracy loons who are conveniently ignoring evidence that doesn't fit their preconceptions. Not to mention the underlying racism of the presumption it requires a conspiracy (i.e, the Japanese are too stupid to figure out how to achieve strategic surprise on their own).  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  02:31, 14 November 2010 (UTC)
 * There is no doubt in my mind it was a set-up, and I am not even racist. To make such a large scale attack with no radio communication is almost impossible. It's like being stranded in desert and told to reach an objective with out asking questions and not knowing the where abouts. Remember this is a very precise attack. Also testomonies of Nave, Stinston, etc. What are they, just people gone mad? Give me a break. 216.121.180.165 (talk) 5:34, 18 November 2010
 * ♠"To make such a large scale attack with no radio communication is almost impossible." Really? Why? They know the objective, they've trained extensively & hard in attacking it, they've trained for years in fleet ops (so flag & blinker is 2d nature, eliminating the usual excuse of "need for radio"). Where's the demand for radio comm before the attack?
 * ♠"like being stranded in desert and told to reach an objective with out asking questions and not knowing the where abouts." How? It's not like the Kido Butai had no clue where it was or where it was going. And don't tell me they couldn't find Hawaii without radio! (If you're "not racist", you can't mean IJN navigators can't read charts.)
 * ♠"testomonies of Nave, Stinston, etc." People can be wrong, especially those directly involved. MacArthur & others at the time were sure German pilots led the attack on the P.I., & that it came from an aircraft carrier. They were wrong. It's also easy to want to blame somebody else when there's such a monumental screwup. Fact is, stupidity is much more common than conspiracy, especially conspiracy on such a massive scale.
 * ♠More to the point, you don't address the fundamental contradiction here. Any attack by Japan has the U.S. at war with Japan, which does not benefit Britain, and aiding Britain has been FDR's main priority for over a year. The one country benefitting from this "conspiracy" is Germany, & both Hitler & the supposed author of the "guiding memo" on the subject, Cdr Arthur McCollum, damn well knew it. You can bet Stark & Marshall knew how to read a map, too, & unless you think they wouldn't have told FDR, you can also bet he knew it. Moreover, Winston himself had advised FDR to help avoid war with Japan, knowing Britain had quite enough to deal with already, fighting Germany. Where is the benefit to Britain?  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  02:14, 19 November 2010 (UTC)
 * It still does not make sense, as there have been eavesdropping stations set by Britian in both located cities: Singapore and Hong Kong, to decrypt Military and Navy transmitted messages. They have decrypted succesfully years before hand anyways, but the purpose of these stations were to know if actions set by Japan (During the ar between China and Japan) would let them expand into the global war at the time, which they have done. Why wouldn't they warn America??
 * "Why wouldn't they warn America??" An excellent question. If the Brits had known, they damn sure would have. Since the Brits did not warn the U.S., it's safe to conclude they did not know. (Credibly, for the same reason U.S. intercept stations, & decryption, also in place prewar, didn't offer a warning: there was none in the decrypted traffic. {Leaving aside intercepts not decrypted for lack of manpower, which is a separate issue. Unless you mean to suggest the Great Depression was part of the conspiracy? Or parsimonious Navy Department? Or the very selection of Stimson, who refused to "read other gentlemen's mail"?}) Which undermines your conclusion there was a conspiracy, doesn't it? It depends on there being warning, doesn't it? Hmm... For the Brits not to warn the U.S. if they had known would have been suicidal. More to the point, yet again, you ignore the fundamental contradiction: where is the benefit to Britain? Care to answer that one, instead of throwing up extraneous issues?  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  21:01, 19 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, economics and ego tripping, by demonstrating their naval and military power, is what the American's wanted or more specifically Roosevelt, so it isn't necessarily beneficial for Britain. Note, Roosevelt wanted to go to war, it was just the public's opinion that refused it. After Pearl Harbor the public's opinion obviously changed. Maybe there were warnings sent, but Roosevelt just ignored them, much like the way Roosevelt ignored the rules of Global War and blocked any trade between the two, during pre-war. We can only speculate because the paper shredder has removed all but left a trail. For me, all the suspicions and testimonies just yells out set-up. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 17:33, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Without a reliable, verifiable source, your yelled-out set-up cannot be in the article. Thanks for playing. Binksternet (talk) 18:17, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
 * It is not an article, but a discussion. One of which, your not in. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk • contribs)
 * Per WP:TALK, this page "is to provide space for editors to discuss changes to its associated article". This page is not for general topic discussion. Binksternet (talk) 18:58, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
 * He asked me a question, I answered, it is a simple inquiry of realization, therefore it does pertain to the rules set to this discussion. Realizing that either side of belief is still speculation and maybe should reconsider a revise. Note: Title of topic. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 19:03, 21 November 2010 (UTC)

By the way, I am actually writing an essay on pearl harbor being a set-up, would you by chance help me find good sources lol, yes Binksternet, this would be something that cannot be in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 19:10, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
 * "Roosevelt wanted to go to war" Really? You have a source for that? Beyond the conspiracy nuts who think he arranged the attack on Pearl?
 * "Maybe there were warnings sent" Really? You have actual evidence for that? Because I've been reading in this area for more than 20yrs & I've never seen any.
 * "Roosevelt just ignored them" Same answer.
 * "much like the way Roosevelt ignored the rules of Global War" Same answer.
 * "yells out set up" It may to you. You don't govern. See "extraordinary claims" above.
 * "help me find good sources" It appears to me you want neither good sources nor reasoned argument, since you persistently refuse to engage in actual discussion. Moreover, if anyone is adding "nothing but opionion", it's you. Show me the money.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  20:06, 21 November 2010 (UTC) (P.S. If you read Prange's Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History & still think there's a conspiracy, don't even bother coming back. I'd love to read your essay, tho. I'm pretty sure you wouldn't like your grade.  20:13, 21 November 2010 (UTC))
 * Wow man, harsh. I am debating, no need to belittle. Most claims I have made are from testimonies which you admitted are irrelevant. Nave: states first decryption of Japanese code was 1920, when there was a message sent to the Washington embassy, technology such as PURPLE during MAGIC operation has developed, decoding these diplomatic messages with ease. For the operation the Japanese chose to commence, they would need required radio contact for headings. Since there wasn't any messages sent during the trip, these codes that have been sent had to be decrypted at the start of the mission, giving plenty of time for the American president to react. For why causing war in general, this should be common knowledge, creates jobs for the poor, also fuels economics as money = debt (It gets really technical, but more and willing to elaborate, look into money creation if you wish to investigate yourself). With messages it all comes down to testimones which you ignore anyhow so there is no point of listing it. Also other testimonies about why he ignored, no point of listing. Global War rules, such as blockades (international law), depends on how you look at them, technically it was against the law, but did so to help support the allies, so it is consider "just" even though they were not even in the war yet (suspicious). Also with Japan writing an agreement with Russia that states if Japan starts war with Britain or America, the Russians would "lay-off", in 1941 before the attack. Not being cocky, but I am more then willing to send you my essay when it is done, even though you just might spit at it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 03:48, 22 November 2010 (UTC)
 * ♠My apologies. You were coming off pretty flip to me.
 * ♠"Since there wasn't any messages sent during the trip" That is an astounding concession. Thank you.
 * ♠Nobody AFAIK debates PURPLE was broken. (BTW, the 1920 break was a completely different cypher system predating PURPLE {& the creation of MAGIC IIRC}, so it's irrelevant to this argument.) More to the point, the 1940 breaks in JN-25 (which might actually have revealled IJN ops) were very preliminary; "break" does not equal "reading clear", despite what Stinnett & others would have you believe. (IDK when the movement cypher was broken, so IDK if it was possible to predict the sortie of Kido Butai. I doubt it.) Furthermore, & frequently ignored, neither U.S. Army nor U.S. Navy had the manpower to break, read, & translate every signal they did intercept, which is why they concentrated on PURPLE & JN-25, & not J-19, with unfortunate consequences. Not to mention there was scant actual analysis, which might have uncovered the flaw in that approach.
 * ♠"they would need required radio contact for headings" Why? As noted, it's not like IJN navigators can't read charts.
 * ♠"these codes that have been sent had to be decrypted at the start of the mission, giving plenty of time for the American president to react." That presupposes "bearings" had to be "sent", which suggests IJN navs are incompetent. It also presupposes messages (not "codes") were sent by radio; if they were sent before departure, they would have been sent by land line, so there is no chance they'd have been detected, alone decrypted. So no time to "react". Nor would these supposed bearings have been sent in a cypher the U.S. was reading in any event; they'd have been sent in JN-25 (or the perhaps movement cypher), not PURPLE . Most probably, they'd have been in written orders before Kido Butai ever sortied.
 * ♠"war...creates jobs" Not arguing that. Where is the evidence FDR wanted a war? Rather than wanted to provide aid to Britain, which was at war? There is a very clear distinction.
 * ♠"Global War rules, such as blockades" I'm unaware of FDR (or the U.S.) placing a blockade on anybody. In fact, the U.S. expressly did not impose blockade on Japan because it would have been effectively an act of war, which is why there's all the talk about forcing (or allowing) Japan to "make the first move", which leads to the false impression the attack was arranged. Rather, it was intended to avoid war.
 * ♠"even though they were not even in the war yet (suspicious)." This is suspicious how? Aid to the Brits in the Atlantic connects to conniving for a Japanese attack in the Pacific how? And, more to the point, a Japanese attack in the Pacific benefits Britain how? By taking ships, planes, & equipment away from the Atlantic? (It did.) By diverting ships, planes, & equipment away from Britain, to supply the U.S., which is now at war? (It did.)
 * ♠"With messages it all comes down to testimones which you ignore anyhow so there is no point of listing it" Really? Without knowing exactly what points you think support your case, it's impossible to refute. I'm perfectly willing, even if I think it's nonsense.
 * ♠"Also other testimonies about why he ignored," Same answer.
 * ♠"if Japan starts war with Britain or America, the Russians would 'lay-off'" Huh? The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty (whatever the correct name : was only a guarantee Russia wouldn't attack Japan. It had damn all to do with the U.S. or Britain, except in enabling Japan to attack without fear. (I'm sure IJA wasn't too thrilled, since they'd wanted another war with the Sovs since 1905; as late as August 1845, IJA high command contemplated attacking Siberia!)
 * ♠It comes back to the fundamental question, "Where is the benefit to Britain?", still unanswered. Care to try that one?  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  12:40, 22 November 2010 (UTC)

I am not arguing for the benefit to the Brits, but the Americans. Either Roosevelt arranged a talk with Churchill about his plans and an agreement came abouts. Even if the warnings were sent, which I believe they were, and you are sceptical about, Roosevelt would not claim there would be. This is because, the President will not tell you what they don't want you to know, so for the little amount of alleged knowledge in this area makes it seem sceptical; as a rumor of such can not just come out of the blue. I believe where there is smoke there is fire. So to give you evidence about Roosevelt wanting to go to war will never be found, just speculated with the traces left by testimonies. It is suspicious because the Americans were not in war and they cut off the Japs oil supply, this is clear instigation. For an anology: It would be like say if, Australia was contributing to American's oil supply, then when America goes to war with another country, Austalia then cuts off their supply, that off being Australia had no affilation to the opposing country of America. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 19:19, 22 November 2010 (UTC)


 * "Also testomonies of Nave, Stinston, etc. What are they, just people gone mad? Give me a break. "
 * Betrayal at Pearl Harbor was largely the work of James Rusbridger not Eric Nave. Nave has since stated that he does not agree with many aspects of the claims attributed to him within the book. (see wikipedia entry) He also stated that much of Rusbridger's work was speculation. His memoirs also make no mention of conspiratorial claims. JN-25B was never broken until after Pearl Harbor. The "sinister" messages in Rusbridger's book have decript dates of post 1941 printed on them. A perfect example of why the book is a sloppy fraud.
 * I do not know who Stinston is, but "Stimson's" claims do not show any specific foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack that I am aware of.ScottS (talk) 16:57, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
 * ♠"I am not arguing for the benefit to the Brits, but the Americans." That's the problem. The conspiracy centers on the alleged benefit to Britain. Any benefit to the U.S. wouldn't need a conspiracy, just suitable provocation from Japan. (Which FDR & Co were all hoping Japan would provide, as already noted.) It damn sure wouldn't need the U.S. to allow a devestating attack: presence of the Kido Butai close to Hawaii, or the detection of an IJN submarine in territorial waters, would do nicely.
 * ♠Suggesting FDR came to a deal with Winston to "allow" an attack on Hawaii is even further from reality, since it would be a) unnecssary, b) contrary to what Winston was asking for ("Let's not have any more war."), & c) stupid. I know of nobody who thinks FDR wanted a war as a way to get out of the Depression, which you appear to be suggesting. In fact, the aid being provided to Britain was doing that already, without active U.S. involvement. (The U.S. had sucked up virtually all Britain's gold reserves in new production. Any idea how much that was? I can't put a # on it, but it was a hell of a lot.)
 * ♠"evidence about Roosevelt wanting to go to war will never be found" Because there is none. Believe it, if this was real, somebody would have said so, & somebody would have found documentation. Presidents have a hell of a time doing anything without leaving a paper trail. Suspicion & speculation do not meet the standard of evidence, no matter what I think.
 * ♠"they cut off the Japs oil supply, this is clear instigation" No, it's not. It's clear stupidity. One of the senior advisors at State, a guy who really understood Japan, warned them not to press so hard. FDR didn't want a complete embargo. Sombody (I don't recall who, but maybe Stimson, an inveterate hater of Japanese) cranked up the ban from hi-octane fuels (aviation gas) to all oil, & it bit him. You can't look at the embargo in isolation. It was part of a considered policy. (Perhaps badly-considered, & badly executed, but...) It was not a random act. So you've got to look at the entirety: buildup in P.I., Pac Fleet in Hawaii, steel embargo; in fact, you can go back to the 60% & 70% ratios in the limitation treaties: all were designed to limit or deter Japan. (This was also what Winston expressly asked FDR to do in PTO, & what FDR was trying to achieve.) It was done clumsily, & ended up provoking, rather than deterring, which was most certainly not the intended outcome. It's also a major reason DC was so damn surprised when the blow fell on Hawaii, instead of the P.I.
 * ♠I'm very much afraid you've fallen into a false causality, here. Just because event B follows event A, it doesn't mean event A caused event B. In geopolitics, that's even more likely to be true.
 * ♠BTW, I'd still like to hear your answers to the questions I posed at the start. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  20:43, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
 * As much as this debate is interesting and enlightening, it is obviously going nowhere. Can you by chance change the wiki article to "Pearl Harbor advanced knowledge", instead of including it with debate. For that cheers for such a heated discussion, you basically told me all of which I have to argue against in my essay, surprisingly helpful. But anyways "live long & prosper" :) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.121.180.165 (talk) 06:05, 24 November 2010 (UTC)

Weapon Alpha
Now for a more mundane topic. Was reading the page on Weapon Alpha, which I think you created, and have a couple questions. First, I don't understand the reference to the Soviet subs use Type XXI data. Are you refering to the Type 21 U-boats? Now matter what, it isn't clear how their using any data made Weapon Alpha obsolete. Can you clarify this? Also, in the caption to the Norfolk photo, it says that this is one the few ships to use Weapon Alpha. I don't have an exact count, but Friedman's book on destroyer design makes it seem like quite a few DDE's were armed with Alpha, and more would have been if they could have been procured more quickly. Also, are you sure Hedgehog replaced it? Again, in Friedman's book, it seems like they we contemporaries and that folks weren't too pleased with hedgehog either. Thanks Busaccsb (talk) 06:29, 24 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the reply, I really appreciate it. What I meant to say is that your sentence that has Type XXI is not clear.  The uninformed reader (at least more uninformed than you or I) probably would have no idea what was going on.  I'll take a crack at a revision to show you what I meanBusaccsb (talk) 00:41, 25 November 2010 (UTC)

Kormoran
I've undone your undo of my edit at German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran...I don't have a source at hand, but I strongly remember that this was the term I came across while rewriting this and related articles a few years back. Howeer, I have rephrased it, hopefully to emphasise that Kormoran was pretending to be a Sperrbrecher, not was one. -- saberwyn 22:11, 30 November 2010 (UTC)


 * I came here to leave a note about this (that I've left a note on the Kormoran talk page about it) but having read your discussion with Saberwyn I'm wondering if you've been confused by the Sperrbrecher page. A sperrbrecher isn't primarily a blockade runner, it's a mine warfare ship; basically a low value vessel run ahead of something more valuable to hit any mines that lie in the way. The page doesn't really make it clear, and translating the word as "blockade breaker" might be literal (I don't know), but not very accurate to the role. Xyl 54 (talk) 17:59, 2 December 2010 (UTC)

Infamy date
Hi. I've undone this good-faith edit. Perhaps I'm being pedantic, but it seems to me that it's better to specify the year, as FDR explicitly did. It's not a big deal to me either way, though. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 02:56, 5 December 2010 (UTC)

WPF1 Newsletter (November)
--<font face="Forte"> Midgrid (talk)  21:46, 6 December 2010 (UTC)

The Bugle: Issue LVII, November 2010
To stop receiving this newsletter, please list yourself in the appropriate section here. To assist with preparing the newsletter, please visit the newsroom. BrownBot (talk) 23:29, 8 December 2010 (UTC)

Battle of Britain honors
Copy/edit from my talk page: Re your revert of BoBr: do you disagree "in" suggests the sinking was a byproduct, rather than an aim? It does to me, which is why I changed it at all. "By" suggests it was a direct consequence or objective. I don't feel really strongly about it, tho, so I'll leave it if you do. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  06:02, 23 December 2010 (UTC)
 * The use of conjunctions and interjections is such a minor issue that I also don't have a "horse in the race" just tried to make an awkward statement read a bit better. Saying the battleships were sunk by an air attack would be fine, just as much as ships sunk in an air attack by bombers would also work. As I said, it's a "Comme Ci, Comme Ça" issue. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 06:36, 23 December 2010 (UTC).
 * It's a matter of ear, I guess. Nor a huge deal. Thx. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  14:03, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

Christmas Card


Merry Christmas At this festive time, I would like to say a very special thank you to my fellow editors, and take the time to wish you and your loved ones a very Merry Christmas, and a Happy New Year. And, in case you can't wait until the big day, I've left you each three special presents, click to unwrap :) Acather96 (talk) 10:10, 24 December 2010 (UTC)





Need opinions on photos
Hi. A disagreement has arisen over which of two photos would be better as the main Infobox image for the Ben Templesmith article. Can you participate in this discussion? Thanks, and Happy Holidays. :-) Nightscream (talk) 04:49, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Manfred Von?
See here. Bzuk (talk) 04:25, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

WPF1 Newsletter (December)
– Cs-wolves  (talk)  16:43, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Help needed with a poor quality article
Trekphiler, could you take a look at the last few sections at Talk:United States and state terrorism and maybe recommend sources and examples of how to fix up that article? Jehochman Talk 21:08, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Happy 10th Anniversary of Wikipedia!
<div style="border-style:solid; border-color:#000000; background-color:#aa9944; border-width:1px; text-align:left; padding:8px;" class="plainlinks"> Happy 10th anniversary of Wikipedia! Hey Bzuk  (contribs) has bought you a whisky! Sharing a whisky is a great way to bond with other editors after a day of hard work. Spread the WikiLove by buying someone else a whisky, whether it be someone with whom you have collaborated or had disagreements. Enjoy!

Spread the good cheer and camaraderie by adding to their talk page with a friendly message. Bzuk (talk) 15:24, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

(GMRCE)
Hello- I created page General Motors Rotary Combustion Engine as you suggested with my original full edit. Thanks for giving me the idea!Vegavairbob (talk) 00:46, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Please take a look at this. Any suggestions? Is the animated image ok or not for this page; External Links ok? ThanksVegavairbob (talk) 02:43, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
 * No photos of Vega or Monza with the installed engine. I forgot (GMCE) added to page title. Any way to change (add) it. I don't have a move box for some reason. Thanks. Vegavairbob (talk) 03:18, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I already did those exact redirects "GM Wankel", "GM rotary" Thanks for your help and the compliment. Nice edit of the Wankel for the Vega article.Vegavairbob (talk) 04:43, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I have the May 72 Hot Rod issue on the Vega 302 Aluminum V8 prototype. I don't recall an option code. I'll check the article. There is a paragraph on it in the V8 Vega sub-section. I trimmed the L-10 a bit..it's now the same size as your Wankel edit; also deleted the large Wankel section in the Monza article and substituted your edit.Vegavairbob (talk) 04:42, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

The U.S. planned to go to war even if only the British and Dutch were attacked


This article contains a crucial error--it ignores the fact that the U.S. was indeed committed to fight the Japanese if they attacked the British and Dutch alone.

In April 1941 there was a military conference in Singapore which concluded that action would be taken if the Japan attacked any power. It was exhibit number 50 in the 1946 Pearl Harbor investigation and can be read here. The relevant section:

''26. Our collective military strength can only be developed fully if our Governments agree to act together, should any of them judge that the Japanese have taken action which necessitated active military counter-action. It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action:-''

''(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognised that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.''

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

This document was referred to in a memorandum on 27 November:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that Joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

On 17 August 1941 President roosevelt informed the Japanese government that:

this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States

On 7 November 1941 Roosevelt polled his cabinet to determine whether or not the American people would support if "we struck at Japan down there" According to Stimson's notes :

''President Roosevelt took-"what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a very interesting talk-the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known-and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President-what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)."''

In a war council on 28 November it was agreed to go to war if the British fought (p. 395):

''It was the consensus that the present move-that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere-completely changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.''

"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.

On 29 November they actually drafted a twenty page warning the President was to deliver before Congress. It can be read on page 398.

On 6 December Roosevelt decided to deliver a warning on 9 December according to an Australian telegram (see page 425 .)

It is simply stunning that this information, which has been available since at least 1946, has not beeen included. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 22:58, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Roosevelt's goal was to deter Japan from starting a war, as was made explicit in point number eight of the April agreement: "8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war." Japan ignored all the explicit warnings and decided to attack the United States and Britain and the Netherlands simultaneously on Dec 7/8 1941. That is called aggression. Rjensen (talk) 01:59, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠Well said. Not to mention it was Winston's express goal, too. He knew Britain had her hands full with Germany. He also knew, as Roosevelt did (but as the conspiracy loons seem not to :/), any war between the U.S. & Japan was of sole benefit to Germany.
 * ♠"This article contains a crucial error--it ignores the fact that the U.S. was indeed committed to fight the Japanese if they attacked the British and Dutch alone." No, that was the commitment made by FDR to Churchill. Congress was neither party to nor bound by it. (I continue to be astounded by Americans not recognizing this pertinent little fact...) I'm frankly puzzled Winston bought it. (Grasping at straws?)
 * ♠"(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo." Persuant to 2), therefore, this would constitute grounds for the U.S. to declare war, since a convoy bound for the Kra Isthmus was detected. I notice Congress never even raised the issue of declaring war when this convoy was detected. (It was this very same convoy which helped deceive DC into believing Pearl Harbor must be safe, since Japan was believed, wrongly as it turned out, incapable of mounting more than one major operation at a time.)
 * ♠"In a war council on 28 November...It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines." Notice no mention of Pearl Harbor. I invite you to post this to the loons page. Not that I expect it will change any minds. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  05:13, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * From what I've read, and the document presented by the IP editor above does give some credence to this, there is some conjecture that the US might have declared war on Japan if Japan had attacked only Malaya, Burma, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies but not the Philippines or other American possessions or forces. I have not seen any source, however, which states that this course of action had been definitively decided upon by Roosevelt or Congress. Cla68 (talk) 07:13, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * It does appear (& I confess, I was unaware of it : Cabinet would have supported FDR if he moved to war. Cabinet is not Congress, & Congress blows like a weathervane. Public opinion, tho it had moved in favor of action, was still over 60% opposed to war: there was strong support of "do something" but also strong opposition to "go to war", which is a clear failure to understand the problem...
 * It's also true Japan didn't respond to pressure, which I suggest is as much to do with misreading the situation by the West as "Japanese aggression". As somebody smarter than I once said, you can only send a signal if the other side understands the signal. In this case, the buildup on the P.I. & the Fleet in Hawaii were supposed to deter; instead, they were seen by Japan as threats: same action, very different perspectives. (Ah, what Kurosawa would do with this... :D ) 07:29, 2 February 2011 (UTC)


 * True, it is a different outcome for something than expected. If the Japanese Military had been more under control of cooler heads then it may not have happened at all. Just as if the US Military hadn't been under control then they would have probably attacked Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Deterrence doesn't always work but is better than War at any time.
 * Big Roger (talk) 12:18, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Japan did get the Allied message to the effect that an attack on one would be an attack on all. Therefore it attacked all of them simultaneously.  It is big problem was oil -- it had no oil of its own, but there was plenty of oil in the Dutch East Indies and in British Burma, which therefore became the main target of attack.  As it happened, the oil wells were destroyed by the companies before the Japanese got there, and by the time they got the wells working again the American submarine system was sinking most of their tankers.  Japan had stockpiles of oil that lasted through 1942, but by 1943 that situation was getting desperate.  For example-there was little aviation gasoline to use for training new pilots, and the skill level of the Japanese pilots declined drastically.  The United States at this time was pumping most of the world's oil, with big fields in Texas, Oklahoma, and California. Rjensen (talk) 14:24, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"Japan did get the Allied message to the effect that an attack on one would be an attack on all." That was the most unfortunate effect of the (apparent) Allied solidarity. I'm of the opinion it had less to do with "getting the message" than giving leverage to IJN leadership over IJA. IJN was at risk of having its budget deeply cut, & "need for war" would obviate that; ergo, IJN argued for inseparability for its own reasons, having no attention on reality.
 * ♠"by the time they got the wells working again the American submarine system was sinking most of their tankers" That's rather seriously overstating it... For the first 2 years of the war, tanker tonnage actually increased. Tankers weren't on #1 priority (& unless you really care, I'm not searching Blair to find out when that changed; ;p 1944, IIRC). Japanese usage was well above peacetime, but losses to the Sub Force were within Japanese expectations (thanks to the lousy torpedoes...& in some measure to bad doctrine & stupid basing decisions, leaving boats in Oz, & maybe most of all, contrary to common belief, to a single collossal blunder by a Customs guy prewar, which caused Japan to change the "maru code"--which ONI was reading at the time...).
 * ♠"The United States at this time was pumping most of the world's oil" Funny thing is, the U.S. was also supplying most of Japan's oil prewar... IDK about you, but for Japan to then attack the U.S. seems deeply irrational to me. Then again, Japanese military leadership had such godawful grasp of strategic realities, & the meaning of strategic planning, perhaps it was just plain ignorance.
 * ♠"Deterrence ... is better than War" With that you get no argument. It is also unfortunately true, in some cases, it's necessary. I believe Japan could have been dissuaded, with better diplomacy (the total oil embargo was a mistake, playing off Japan & Germany over the SU would have been a good idea, & a deal between Chiang & Tojo was possible almost any time between '37 & '41). Hitler would not be. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  17:45, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

''Roosevelt's goal was to deter Japan from starting a war, as was made explicit in point number eight of the April agreement: "8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war." Japan ignored all the explicit warnings and decided to attack the United States and Britain and the Netherlands simultaneously on Dec 7/8 1941. That is called aggression.''

The April agreement was made before the July oil embargo, so they didn't know at the time that war would be forced on Japan via the embargo.

''Well said. Not to mention it was Winston's express goal, too. He knew Britain had her hands full with Germany. He also knew, as Roosevelt did (but as the conspiracy loons seem not to :/), any war between the U.S. & Japan was of sole benefit to Germany.''

The U.S. was already committed earlier in 1941 to take on Germany first if there was war with Japan (the Rainbow-5 plan). Obviously, Roosevelt intended to force Japan into a war and then use the war psychosis and the death of the isolationist movement to declare war on Germany sometime later, even if Germany didn't declare war first. He had already started attacking German ships in September, and on 17 November he got Congress to allow U.S. merchant ships to go into war zones which would have created numerous "incidents". You don't have to be a conspiracy nut to figure out Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, by hook or crook, and that Japan was merely a tool being used to that end.

''I notice Congress never even raised the issue of declaring war when this convoy was detected. (It was this very same convoy which helped deceive DC into believing Pearl Harbor must be safe, since Japan was believed, wrongly as it turned out, incapable of mounting more than one major operation at a time.)''

Congress was never consulted in the first place, and Roosevelt didn't plan to consult Congress until the last minute.

''Notice no mention of Pearl Harbor. I invite you to post this to the loons page. Not that I expect it will change any minds.''

I never said FDR knew about Pearl Harbor. All I'm saying is that Japan was 100% correct in assuming that the U.S. would attack it if they tried to conquer the East Indies.

I have not seen any source, however, which states that this course of action had been definitively decided upon by Roosevelt or Congress.

I just showed you that Roosevelt's cabinet made up it's mind on 28 November. Congress was going to be consulted at the last minute.

It does appear (& I confess, I was unaware of it : Cabinet would have supported FDR if he moved to war. Cabinet is not Congress, & Congress blows like a weathervane. Public opinion, tho it had moved in favor of action, was still over 60% opposed to war: there was strong support of "do something" but also strong opposition to "go to war", which is a clear failure to understand the problem...

Yes but FDR intended to only consult Congress either just before or just after Japan struck the British and Dutch, thus putting Congress "on the spot". As you can see in the proposed speech draft of 29 November that I linked to, he intended to present the situation as a direct and urgent threat to American interests. Furthermore, FDR intended to manufacture an incident. On 2 December he personally ordered that the Asiatic fleet in the Philippines charter three small vessels and then put them in the way of the Japanese invasion forces in Indochina. This was ordered in spite of the fact that air reconaissance was already being conducted, and that the Navy didn't ask for it. See page 528, note 1. . 71.65.71.145 (talk) 18:10, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"Obviously, Roosevelt intended to force Japan into a war and then use the war psychosis and the death of the isolationist movement to declare war on Germany sometime later, even if Germany didn't declare war first." Obviously? FDR could count on the public, & more importantly Congress, being willing to declare war on Germany while at war with Japan, which had attacked the U.S. (which Germany had explicitly avoided doing, despite serious provocation) why, exactly?
 * ♠"Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, by hook or crook, and that Japan was merely a tool being used to that end." You're half right. Involving Japan was calculated to benefit Germany, not Britain. You've fallen into the same trap as the conspiracy loons. We know Germany declared war. FDR had no way of knowing an attack by Japan would bring in Germany; in fact, he would know pretty well it would interfere with aid to Britain or war with Germany, since attention would be on Japan. (It was hard enough as it was.) Claiming "war psychosis" is hindsight, & FDR would not have had the benefit of it.
 * ♠"Japan was 100% correct in assuming that the U.S. would attack it if they tried to conquer the East Indies." Well, no. Unless U.S. territory was attacked, there was next to zero chance. It's been suggested even an attack on the P.I. wouldn't get it.
 * ♠"Roosevelt's cabinet made up it's mind on 28 November. Congress was going to be consulted at the last minute." Again, you've missed it: neither FDR nor his Cabinet had independent authority to declare war. He didn't have to "consult Congress", he damn well had to get permission. This is 1941, not 1991. The idea of a President starting a war off his own bat would not occur to anybody, especially the President, in 1941. You seem not to get that. Recall what FDR himself said 8 December: "I ask the Congress delcare a state of war has existed". If he had the authority to do it himself, he would have as soon as the news reached DC the afternoon of 7 December. Notice, he didn't.
 * ♠"he intended to present the situation as a direct and urgent threat to American interests." As opposed to the sinking of a U.S. destroyer in the Atlantic? I suspect Congress already had a pretty good idea Japan was a potential threat. I doubt anyone believed she was an actual threat. I also think the idea was deterrence, not confrontation, since, as noted, FDR & his Cabinet could read a chart (& for those who couldn't, Stark & Marshall damn sure could) & had been asked by Churchill to help avoid a war with Japan, not manufacture one.
 * ♠"FDR intended to manufacture an incident." To what benefit? War with Japan, as already said, does not aid Britain one damn bit. This is the same nonsense as the Pearl Harbor conspiracy loons: it begins from a false premise (war with Japan leads to war with Germany) & therefore comes to a false conclusion. What part of "deter Japan" do you not get?
 * ♠"The April agreement was made before the July oil embargo, so they didn't know at the time that war would be forced on Japan via the embargo." I think that's the only thing you've gotten right. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  19:05, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

''Obviously? FDR could count on the public, & more importantly Congress, being willing to declare war on Germany while at war with Japan, which had attacked the U.S. (which Germany had explicitly avoided doing, despite serious provocation) why, exactly?''

All he would have to do is claim that Japan attacked at Germany's behest and then point to the Tripartite Pact as evidence. The war psychosis and attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic would take care of the rest.

Involving Japan was calculated to benefit Germany, not Britain.

Britain would have benefited most from a U.S. entry into the war, regardless of whether or not that meant some U.S. resources were tied down in the Pacific. Remember. Rainbow-5 concentrated U.S. resources against Germany. There was nothing Roosevelt could do to force Germany to declare war, so he tried the back door with Japan.

Again, you've missed it: neither FDR nor his Cabinet had independent authority to declare war.

This is frivolous. The point is that the Cabinet had decided that it would bring the issue before Congress, which would then proceed to declare war after Japan attacked the British and Dutch. As early as 7 November the Cabinet decided that the American people would support such a move. See my initial post.

I also think the idea was deterrence, not confrontation, since, as noted, FDR & his Cabinet could read a chart (& for those who couldn't, Stark & Marshall damn sure could) & had been asked by Churchill to help avoid a war with Japan, not manufacture one.

Then why on earth did Hull and Roosevelt, without consulting the British, submit a proposal to Japan on 26 November which they knew was totally unacceptable? Why did they do this even though they knew Japan had set a negotiation deadline for 29 November and the previous day they detected a Japanese expedition forming in southern China? 71.65.71.145 (talk) 23:16, 2 February 2011 (UTC)


 * ♠"All he would have to do is claim that Japan attacked at Germany's behest and then point to the Tripartite Pact as evidence. The war psychosis and attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic would take care of the rest." And Congress would believe Japan was a German puppet why? As for the Tripartite Pact, it proves alliance, not conspiracy. And that "war psychosis" was not a blank cheque for FDR to do what he wanted, no matter what you think.
 * ♠"Britain would have benefited most from a U.S. entry into the war" That's the uninformed nonsense that underpins the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory. Britain does not benefit from the U.S. at war with Japan, & Hitler, FDR, & Churchill all damn well knew it. You don't. The conspiracy loons don't. So, some facts. U.S. at war with Japan diverts troops, material, airplanes (VLR Liberators!), & ships (destroyers desperately needed in the Atlantic) to the Pacific. It puts Brit needs below those of the U.S. (You'd expect different?)
 * ♠"There was nothing Roosevelt could do to force Germany to declare war, so he tried the back door with Japan." Not for lack of trying.... It wasn't just Germany: it was Congress, which wasn't yet ready to declare war on Germany, despite German actions. You seem to believe it was all on Hitler (who was going out of his way to avoid war with the U.S., while hoping for a U.S.-Japanese war, for exactly the reasons I mention).
 * ♠"This is frivolous. The point is that the Cabinet had decided that it would bring the issue before Congress, which would then proceed to declare war after Japan attacked the British and Dutch. As early as 7 November the Cabinet decided that the American people would support such a move. See my initial post." Frivolous? Want to bet? Congress wouldn't declare war on Germany after German U-boats sank U.S. destroyers. Do you really beleive Congress would have the U.S. at war for the defense of British colonies in Asia? Don't be ridiculous. There was more sympathy for the Chinese than the Brits, & there hadn't been a declaration of war in their support since 1937, despite Japan sinking a U.S. gunboat in China. And as I said, the "public support" you claim was more than equivocal: the public wanted "something" only slightly more than they wanted "not war". Or did you not notice that little fact?
 * ♠"Then why on earth did Hull and Roosevelt, without consulting the British, submit a proposal to Japan on 26 November which they knew was totally unacceptable?" Because Hull was a nitwit? (He was, to be clear, strongly anti-Japanese.) Or because the Japanese war plan was already underway & it would have made no damn difference? Or because the Army was in charge of Japan's government, so it would have made no damn difference? Or because the U.S. was convinced Japan could actually be reasoned with? Or because, in line with Winston's request, FDR was doing his damndedst to avoid a war with Japan? Or because the U.S. didn't make clear she was willing to grant conquest of Manchuria? (Chiang, too, I'll bet.) Also, how did the U.S. supposedly know this proposal was "totally unacceptable"? I'm unaware of a U.S. agent in Japan's Cabinet. (It was not in PURPLE, so don't go claiming it was.) We know it was, with the benefit of complete information from the Japanese; FDR & Hull could not know. (You've fallen into the conspiracy loons' trap again... You're seeing it with hindsight. FDR didn't have hindsight.) As far as the Japanese "convoy", I fail to see how it matters, since there was no prospect of the U.S. going to war on Britain's behalf. And it's not like she was expecting an attack on the Philippines (let alone Hawaii...). <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  01:08, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Let me remind you both that talk pages are for discussing improvements to the article, not debating on the subject, so unless you discuss how to input fresh material into the article or fix existing stuff, go to some history forum and continue your word play. --Eaglestorm (talk) 02:00, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

All I'm going to say is that there is no way Hull would have dropped his previous "three month truce" proposal and replace it with a proposal that he knew, as the Japanese told him, was totally unacceptable to Japan unless he wanted to provoke Japan.

I have provided more than enough evidence to conclude that the Roosevelt administration made joint defense plans with the British and Dutch, that he planned to consult Congress to give a warning, and that his cabinet believed he had public support if he asked for a declaration of war. The statement in the article "Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly)[15] certain any attack on the British Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into the war" is completely false and must be replaced with the facts. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 22:38, 3 February 2011 (UTC)


 * And "joint defense plans" do not amount to war plans, nor do they amount to Congressional agreement to any part of them. Neither does FDR's Cabinet agreeing. Until, & unless, you can offer evidence Congress agreed, you have nothing. What part of "Congress shall declare war" do you not understand?
 * Moreover, the Japanese refusal could very well have been seen by Hull as nothing more than a negotiating tactic; it's far from unusual for diplomats to say a position is "completely unacceptable". That does not mean he knew it would lead to a Japanese attack, & saying it does is, yet again, hindsight. You're imputing knowledge Hull did not have & could not have had. Hell, the Japanese negotiators didn't know it would mean an attack! How would Hull? Because his chief advisor was Kreskin? Magic 8-Ball? He's part gypsy princess? Be real.
 * Let me make this as clear as I can. FDR agreed to the "joint defense plan", not Congress. (It was not a treaty of alliance nor of mutual defense, & so not binding on the U.S.) FDR wanted to aid the British. (Congress, not so much.) FDR would not go to war over British colonies, not in Asia nor anywhere else. (He was anti-colonialist & wanted the Brits to give up their colonies. It's part of the reason the U.S. got tangled up in Vietnam: not supporting France taking back IndoChina...) FDR knew damn well war against Japan did not aid Britain. The idea was prevent a war with Japan, not start one. (Your evidence of intent to start one is both flimsy & unconvincing, considering FDR's express objectives.) FDR & Hull could not know the Hull Note was a futile gesture. And I invite you to provide actual evidence it was intended as a provocation, which was contrary to FDR's express policy & stated objectives: which is to say, Hull acting contrary to the express instructions of his President, which would get him fired. <font color="#1034A6"> TREKphiler  <font color="#1034A6">any time you're ready, Uhura  23:30, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Strategic bombing
I reverted your reversion of my edits to the above article, but that's as far as I'm going to go, so I'll just drop a line here.

I just lifted those facts from an encyclopedia article on strategic bombing. I don't see how they don't fit or how they are not useful in a section titled "Prehistory". These are not instances of strategic bombing, they are attempts or the kernels of the idea. I didn't mention the earliest incidences of aerial bombing, so I don't see how the section could be accused of just being fluff about early aerial bombing. It was an attempt to discuss the background to the strategic bombing of World War I: early attempts at bombing cities and the development of balloons intended for long-range bombing. (I admit I'm not sure how the bombing of a fort during the Mexican War would qualify, but the article I borrowed it from was terse on details.) As you can see, I recently created an article on Strategic bombing during World War I, also just from other encyclopedias, because it was needed. You removed a link to it from the World War I section of Strategic bombing. Do you have a problem with that article as well? I claim no expertise in the realm of modern military history, only an interest in the First World War and an ability to distinguish strategic bombing from other sorts of aerial bombing, and I don't see how that short section didn't fit exactly where I put it (and under what heading I put it). Srnec (talk) 05:12, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

WPF1 Newsletter (January)
{| class="collapsible collapsed" ! colspan="2" valign="middle" style="width: 60%; background: #CCDDEE; border: 1px solid LightSlateGray; padding: 1em;" | The WikiProject Formula One Newsletter Year IV · Issue 1 · January 1, 2011 – February 7, 2011 Previous month's issue
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 * New users
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 * WikiProject news
 * Check out Apterygial's My Insane Idea userproject, which aims to improve the 2008 Formula One season article and that season's Grands Prix to Featured Topic status.
 * Newsletter news


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 * Failed Good Article Nominees --
 * Indianapolis Motor Speedway


 * Completed Peer Reviews --
 * 2008 Hungarian Grand Prix


 * New articles –
 * Ferrari F150
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 * Hispania F111
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<li>Images needed: Max Mosley, Sakon Yamamoto, Jordan Grand Prix circa 1992-1997, Paddy Lowe, 2008 Turkish Grand Prix more </li> <li>For more work, see this generated list or the Auxiliary list

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Article of the month – 2008 Hungarian Grand Prix, peer-reviewed
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The 2008 Hungarian Grand Prix (formally the XXIII ING Magyar Nagydíj) was a Formula One motor race held on August 3, 2008, at Hungaroring in Mogyoród, near Budapest, Hungary. It was the 11th race of the 2008 Formula One season. Contested over 70 laps, the race was won by Heikki Kovalainen for the McLaren team, from a second position start. Timo Glock finished second in a Toyota car, with Kimi Räikkönen third in a Ferrari. It was Kovalainen's first Formula One victory, which made him the sport's 100th driver to win a World Championship race, and was Glock's first podium finish.

The majority of the race consisted of a duel between Lewis Hamilton and Felipe Massa, who drove for McLaren and Ferrari respectively. Hamilton started from pole position on the starting grid but was beaten at the first corner by Massa, who passed him around the outside. The two championship rivals began a battle for the lead that was resolved when Hamilton sustained a punctured tyre just over half-way through the race, giving Massa a lead of over 20 seconds over Kovalainen. The Ferrari's engine, however, failed with three laps of the race remaining, allowing the McLaren driver to win. Räikkönen set the race's fastest lap in the other Ferrari, but was hampered by a poor qualifying performance and was stuck behind Alonso and Glock in turn for almost all of the race.

As a consequence of the race result, Hamilton extended his lead in the World Drivers' Championship to five points over Räikkönen, with Massa a further three behind. Robert Kubica, who finished eighth after finding his BMW Sauber car to be uncompetitive at the Hungaroring, slipped to 13 points behind Hamilton, ahead of his team-mate Nick Heidfeld and Kovalainen. In the World Constructors' Championship, McLaren vaulted BMW Sauber for second position, 11 points behind Ferrari.

(More...) 2011 Teams and Races From 2011 Formula One season
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