Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/March 2017/Book reviews




 * By Hawkeye7

In 1946, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) decided that it needed to base B-29s carrying atomic bombs in Britain. The B-29s did not have the range to reach targets in the Soviet Union from bases in the United States. The USAAF commander, General Carl Spaatz, could have entered into detailed negotiations with the British government. Or he could have just gone and asked his old friend, Arthur Tedder, now Lord Tedder and Chief of the Air Staff. He chose the latter of course; the two of them had been fighting Nazis together only the year before, and Tedder quickly agreed. Since neither had informed their governments, over the following five years there were a series of negotiations for permission to establish facilities that had already been built and were already operational. In American strategy, the United Kingdom became an unsinkable aircraft carrier anchored off the coast of mainland Europe.

The B-29 was somewhat underpowered, and took a lot of runway to get into the air when fully loaded. Four airfields in East Anglia had been lengthened to take them during the war, and were upgraded with special facilities to handle the Fat Man atom bombs of the day. Gradually, the American presence became more permanent, with the 3rd Air Division becoming active there in 1948. It provided facilities for maintenance and support of Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft on rotational training missions to Europe and for transport aircraft used in the Berlin Airlift. It was redesignated the Third Air Force in 1951, and would remain in the UK throughout the Cold War.

Although part of the United States Air Forces in Europe, Third Air Force's main role was supporting SAC until the mid-1960s, when the advent of intercontinental bombers like the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress and ICBMs brought this to a close. Its commanders were also the first point of contact for dealing with the British. Unfortunately, the SAC generals like Curtis LeMay were not renowned for their diplomatic skills, and had to be reminded occasionally that Britain was not an occupied country. Nor was there, for the longest time, any written agreement with the British regarding financial arrangements or responsibilities.

I have been reading a lot of books on the British nuclear weapons project lately, and this is one of the best, most original and most informative. It may be a bit too detailed for some people's tastes, and the subject somewhat specialised, but it is a very interesting book, and highly recommended.

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 * By Nick-D

Relentless Strike is a history of the US Military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which contains the force's most elite units. It's the latest book by veteran journalist Sean Naylor, who has extensively covered the command for the Army Times.

This may be the most comprehensive history of the highly secretive JSOC to have been published. Naylor has used his contacts and knowledge of the command well, and traces its organisation, doctrine and operations from its establishment in 1980 until the mid-2010s. A key theme is the extent to which JSOC has changed: over this time it evolved from a smallish force focused on large-scale raids to a large force specialising in small-scale operations and intelligence collection. Naylor does a good job in tracing this evolution, with a focus on the difficult transition period in the early 2000s when JSOC's leadership was focused on types of operations which weren't fully relevant to the wars the United States was fighting and didn't make the best of the capabilities of its units. His description of the Command's changing tactics is also well executed, and provides a fascinating insight into what may well be the future of war.

However, the book has some serious flaws. Probably the most significant is that it isn't sufficiently analytical. For instance, Naylor notes at various times that JSOC's contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had mixed results, but never fully fleshes this out. Similarly, he describes frequent civilian casualties that resulted from JSOC's practice of employing heavy firepower against fleeting targets but doesn't discuss the extent to which this could have been avoided or their broader results (is this why regular units tasked with pacifying regions were often unenthusiastic about JSOC operations on their turf?). While the book's final chapters describe a major expansion of JSOC's size and capabilities in the 2010s, Naylor doesn't consider the extent to which this was justified: is it really necessary for the Command to set up its own intelligence brigade, computer hacking unit and various other elements which seem the proper preserve of the US intelligence community? The impact of high intensity operations, including multiple deployments and intensive training, on the members of JSOC also goes undiscussed other than a photo caption noting that many SEALs were permanently injured as a result of fast boat training. In addition, military historians be somewhat frustrated by Naylor's decision to discuss changes in JSOC's organisation and doctrine in passing in the narrative rather than dedicated chapters or sections.

As a result, while this is an important and worthwhile book, it's also a frustrating one. I felt that Naylor could have made much better use of his knowledge and material, but nevertheless it's well worth reading for the insights it provides into modern operations by elite military forces.

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