Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/November 2016/Book reviews




 * By Hawkeye7

This is a history of DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. As this book relates, DARPA was created as a result of the 1957 Sputnik crisis, a period of public fear and anxiety resulting from the perceived technological gap between the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated by the launch of Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite. Put simply, it was a serious reality check to a country that fervently believed that it was the most technologically advanced nation on Earth. To prevent this from recurring, DARPA was created to ensure that the United States would be the leader in game-changing military technologies.

In an easy and fun-to-read narrative, Annie Jacobsen charts the ups and downs of this. DARPA would go on to develop ground-breaking military technologies such as precision-guided munitions and stealth technology. It also pioneered many technologies that we consider part and parcel of the civilian world, such as the Internet, speech recognition and miniature Global Positioning System receivers. On the other hand, it has also been involved in such ill-fated efforts as the McNamara Line. DARPA's involvement in the Vietnam War nearly led to it being abolished. More recent times have seen shemozzles like the Revolution in Military Affairs, network-centric warfare and PRISM.

With such a broad scope, the author can only skim over the various projects that DARPA has been involved with over the years. The reader might want want to follow up by reading through the relevant Wikipedia articles. (I was taken aback by the description of Eric Burhop on p. 232 as a "famed British physics professor". He was, of course, an Australian.)

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 * By Hawkeye7

From the title I thought that this would be a collection of biographies, but instead it is a command history of the first year of the Korean War. It thus contains only biographical sketches, and covers only generals who were commanders, and not staff officers.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the woefully unprepared United States Army found itself lacking in personnel, training and equipment. One thing that it had plenty of was experienced generals, since World War II had ended just five years before. But the leadership of the Army that entered the fight in Korea was staffed on the basis of politics, patronage, policy and seniority. As a result, its division commanders like Laurence B. Keiser (2nd Infantry Division), William B. Kean (25th Infantry Division) and Hobart R. Gay (1st Cavalry Division) had served as chiefs of staff of armies, not division commanders. Only William F. Dean (24th Infantry Division) had commanded a division in action before. None distinguished themselves.

Taafe is reluctant to criticise the US Army's officer training programs, but does find fault with its personnel policies. He is also critical of the manner in which Douglas MacArthur, Lawton Collins and Matthew Ridgway went about removing officers who failed to meet high standards, as they preferred reliefs based on ill-health, routine transfers to other assignments, or promotions. This eliminated hurt feelings and avoided public criticism of the Army, but paved the way for more problems in later wars.

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