Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/September 2016/Op-ed


 * By Hawkeye7

While British commemorations of the Battle of the Somme began on 1 July, Australian ones commenced three weeks later, this being the anniversary of the Australian entry into the fighting. This was not the original plan for the battle, which was that veteran Anzac divisions would spearhead the British effort on the Somme.

It was the intention all along that the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) would fight on the Western Front, but the decision to complete its training in Egypt led to it being diverted to the Gallipoli campaign. After the troops returned from Gallipoli to Egypt in December 1915 and January 1916, there were far more there than were required for the defence of Egypt. Over the following months, ten of the fourteen divisions in Egypt were sent to other theatres. Had an offensive to recapture the Sinai and occupy Palestine been contemplated at this time, or had the shipping crisis struck earlier, it would have been better to have kept the Australians in Egypt and sent British divisions to the Western Front, which would have economised on shipping; but as it was, the only offensive contemplated was on the Western Front, so it made sense to send the veteran divisions thence and leave the most inexperienced behind.

This was disrupted by the concurrent decision to expand the AIF. The New Zealand and Australian Division was broken up and four new divisions created using the reinforcements in Egypt to bring them up to strength: the 4th, 5th, New Zealand and Anzac Mounted Divisions. (Another division, the 3rd was formed in Australia.) New units received half their personnel from existing units of the 1st Division and New Zealand and Australian Division. The sixteen newly-formed infantry battalions (numbered 45 to 60) wore the rectangular patches of their parent battalions, but oriented vertically. An important exception was the artillery. Due to a change in establishment, each infantry division would now have fifteen batteries instead of just nine.

The consequent disorganisation meant that the Australians were given more time to train and prepare in Egypt, and a low priority to depart. I Anzac Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, a British Indian Army officer, with the 1st, 2nd and New Zealand Divisions, departed in April; II Anzac Corps, with the 4th and 5th Divisions, followed in June. (That the "C" in Anzac already stood for "Corps" was not overlooked, but the term had become a generic one by this time.) The Diggers found the Western Front very different from Gallipoli. The lushness of the vegetation in France made the whole country look like a garden. When they asked if materials for making bombs would be made available, they got puzzled looks; Mills bombs were available in enormous quantities. And it quickly became apparent that however formidable an opponent the Turk was, he was no match for the German. The Australians initially manned a sector near Armentières in northern France, not far from the border with Belgium. This was known as a "nursery" sector of the front, because new units were sent thither to familiarise themselves with the conditions before being sent to a more active sector. They soon learnt that the front line could not be manned as densely as at Gallipoli without risking needless casualties from German artillery. In July, I Anzac Corps moved to the Somme sector.

There followed one of the worst débâcles of the war, the Battle of Fromelles. The British First Army decided to launch a diversionary attack near Armentières to divert German reserves from the Somme, where the main attack was scheduled for 21 July. So many things were done wrong it is hard to know where to start. The whole concept of a diversionary attack was flawed; once delivered, the Germans knew that it was just a minor attack. Diversionary attacks are best not delivered at all unless they are against an objective so important that the enemy is forced to react.

The two divisions selected for the attack were both new and inexperienced. The 5th Division had only entered the front line for the first time the week before, and the British 61st (2nd South Midland) Division was a second-line reserve division from which drafts were drawn. It was under-strength and was in no way battle ready. That the use of such a division would damage the reputation of the British Army, and ultimately the relationship between Britain and Australia, did not seem to have occurred to anyone.

At the tactical level, there were many more mistakes. The barrage was insufficiently dense to prevent the Germans from firing through it; Non-man's land was too wide on the right for the 5th Division's 15th Brigade or the 61st Division's 183rd Brigade to cross in the available time; 6 pm was broad daylight and not the best time for an attack. Perhaps most important of all, the objective did not exist; it was a German trench line that was abandoned months before and had filled with water. In just one night, the 5th Australian Division took 5,513 casualties, the 61st Division another 1,547.

As the 1st Division prepared to join the fighting on the Somme, its commander, Major General Harold (Hooky) Walker, a British Army regular, and his chief of staff, Colonel Thomas Blamey, an Australian Army regular, considered the lessons of the recent fighting on the Somme, in which the British Army had lost so heavily. The tactical problem was that in response to British artillery fire, the Germans had dug deep dugouts where they could shelter. When the barrage lifted, they would run out and set up their machine guns. If the diggers could set out from jumping off trenches close to the German positions—an extremely dangerous proposition—they could attempt to reach the dugout entrances after the barrage lifted but before the Germans could emerge.

This tactic worked; the 1st Division captured its objective, the town of Pozieres. Unfortunately, it was the only one of six divisions to do so that day, and became the focus of German attention. German counterattacks were dealt with by the British and Australian artillery, often without the diggers in the front line noticing; but the German artillery caused heavy casualties. This was the next tactical problem that would have to be dealt with, and the solution, techniques for locating and suppressing the German artillery, would not come soon enough for the Australians at Pozieres. The 1st Division suffered 5,285 casualties in the battle. Another hazard was the high command. Although each corps had three divisions, only one was in the line at a time. This invited interference from the impetuous army commander, Sir Hubert Gough, and his incompetent staff. Indeed, the 1st Division went into action before I Anzac Corps headquarters arrived. As a British regular, Walker was able to resist pressure from Gough for a quick attack, insisting on taking the time to dig jumping-off trenches closer to the German lines from which the attack could be launched. The commander of the 2nd Division, Major General Gordon Legge, an Australian regular, was not as experienced as Walker, and did not feel so able to resist orders from Gough. A hasty attack on the Pozieres heights failed with the loss of about 2,000 men. Another 1,500 men were lost just holding Pozieres, but Legge felt that the division was not exhausted, and could still take the heights. This time painstaking but costly preparations were made, ensuring that the jumping-off trenches were dug and the wire in front of the German trenches was cut. Gough was not happy about the attack being delayed, but it was successful, and the high ground was taken. Its tour of Pozieres cost the 2nd Division 6,848 men.

The danger posed by the capture of the Pozieres heights was apparent to the Germans, and a major but unsuccessful effort was made to recapture them, which was defeated by the 4th Division. It then drove to the outskirts of Mouquet Farm. At this point, the wheels fell off the Australian wagon. Each of the three divisions in turn was brought back for a second tour. No ground was gained, and another 6,300 casualties were taken before I Anzac Corps was relieved by the Canadians. In all, the Australian Army suffered 28,000 casualties, about the same as the Gallipoli campaign, but in just seven weeks. The average loss of 7,000 per division was about the same as for the 41 British divisions in the Battle of the Somme. If a division had incompetent generalship, shoddy staff work, poor leadership, or deficient training, it could be wiped out in hours. Several British divisions suffered from some or all these defects, a result of the Army's wartime expansion, which was much faster and much greater than its Australian counterpart. But if not, they would stay in the line until becoming exhausted.

The results of the battle were far from being commensurate with the costs, and Australia could not replace the AIF casualties on this scale on a voluntary enlistment basis. This would create a political crisis back in Australia.