Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/September 2022/Book reviews


 * By Hawkeye7



This book is an overview of Australian wartime leadership by David Horner, one of Australia's more prolific military historians. There are sections of the First and Second World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Each is something of a summary, and probably familiar to readers of other works on Australia's role in these conflicts. Here though, it is stripped of most details, allowing a focus on higher leaders and leadership at the level of cabinet ministers, the permanent heads of government departments, and the most-senior commanders. It chronicles the evolution of wartime Australian defence policy.

The decision to go to war is a major one for any country, and the outcome is unpredictable. The relevance of this study therefore extends well beyond Australia; the problems faced apply to everyone except the three major powers, i.e. the United States, China and Russia. As a country with a small population in a volatile part of the world, Australia has attempted to strengthen its defences through alliances with other countries, principally the US, the United Kingdom, and its South East Asian neighbours. This shores up the defences through access to their much greater resources. The drawback is that it can also involve Australia in their conflicts. During the post-Second World War period, successive governments attempted to do as little as possible to help while still reaping the benefits of the alliance.

That sounds simple enough, but determining the size and composition of a contribution proved to be problematic in practice, even when all that was asked for was flag-waving exercise. Contributing small units or, worse still, individuals, runs the risk of losing all control of them, especially if the government has no say in the conduct of the conflict or the deployment of its troops. Casualties could have an adverse impact on public opinion. Input into strategy is therefore vital, but unlikely to be agreed to unless the contribution is substantial. A larger force gives better control and compliance with policy but may involve a disproportionate involvement in what is not, for Australia at least, a critical concern. The proper management of forces requires the ability to evaluate alternatives, but that requires an indigenous intelligence capability. Micromanagement also holds its dangers: too overtly trying to minimise the national role can alienate the Allies you are trying to curry favour with, thereby defeating the whole purpose of the exercise.

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 * By Nick-D

The First Crusade: The Call From the East covers the role of the Byzantine Empire, and especially its leader Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, in the Crusades. It was written by the British academic historian Peter Frankopan, who is better known for his recent works on Europe-Asia relations.

The book argues that Alexios was the central figure in the First Crusade, and the main beneficiary of its success. Before the crusade the Byzantine Empire was in a perilous position, the Turks having overrun most of Asia Minor and the Normans and a range of other groups frequently attacking the western provinces. After decades of soliciting support from the Catholic Church and key western nobles, the stars aligned for the Empire when Pope Urban II took up an appeal from assistance from Alexios that was rapidly embraced by the main powers in Europe. Frakopan argues that Alexios was then generally able to direct the crusaders, who won back key parts of Asia Minor for the empire and improved the situation it faced in the Near East. He lost control over the Crusaders after the capture of Antioch, but the crusade was clearly a success for the Byzantine cause.

I found this argument to be highly convincing. The narratives in older works about the Byzantines behaving cynically, being bit-players and Urban II exaggerating the threat the empire faced never made much sense. Frankopan demonstrates how Alexios used feudal relationships, the control of supplies and the crusaders' religious convictions to shape the Crusade, and the limits of this strategy. He's less strong through on describing the role the Empire's forces played in the Crusades - they seem to have been attached to the main crusader army, but it's not clear on what they did. The book would have also benefited from greater discussion of the sources that were drawn on.

Overall, this is a very useful and interesting work.

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