Talk:Battle of Khe Sanh/Archive 1

Thanks ERcheck
I guess you missed the point of the exercise. Oh, well. The subpage and in use could be handy. RM Gillespie 18:23, 24 November 2006 (UTC)

Assessment
Looks quite good. The last paragraph in the article seems unnecessarily speculative (of the original research variety), though. Kirill Lokshin 19:16, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Nit-pickin'
Seems to me that the debate over whether to spell it US or U.S. is merely an element of style. I like to conform to the source agency's usage. As for revisionist tendencies by those who edit, but don't write, I would say, make sure you cite your sources if you feel you have better data. I am quoting Lars Olausson's "Lockheed C-130 Production List - 1954-2007", pages 32, 156 for my reference to the KC-130F that burned out on the Khe Sahn runway on 10 February 1968.

Mark Sublette 08:44, 29 November 2006 (UTC)Mark SubletteMark Sublette 08:44, 29 November 2006 (UTC)

Wikipedia standard abbreviation for United States
Per Manual of Style (abbreviations), the abbreviation for the United States is U.S., not US. Please do not revert it back. Thank you. &mdash; ERcheck (talk) 17:05, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

To revert IS to go back - to "revert it back" is redundant.

Mark Sublette 09:32, 29 November 2006 (UTC)Mark SubletteMark Sublette 09:32, 29 November 2006 (UTC)

Is this article done yet? Thank you. RM Gillespie 00:00, 24 November 2006 (UTC)


 * No need to be so defensive all the time. I know you have put a ton of time and effort, researching and writing this article but all of the editors here are also looking to make the best article possible.  Please work with them.  Cheers.--Looper5920 00:05, 24 November 2006 (UTC)

Defensive? You mean the "editors" that have altered cited material to insert factually incorrect information into this article? And when they are caught at it will not admit that they have goofed? You mean the "editors" that (in order to promote their specific agendas) reduce the text to goobldygook? What you do with an article once it is done, I could care less. Make it the Confederate States Army vs. the Tai Ping Rebellion for all I care. But wait until its done. I suggest that you take a look at the history of the Vietnam War article. I would have been willing to continue the work I put into it (including footnoteing that entire monstrosity), but I got so sick of being rode herd on by an "editor" that I simply abandoned it.

All of the major articles that I have produced have gone up for an A-Class review (where US would have become U.S.), so my stylistic eccentricities (shared, by the way, by the US government) would have been removed. Sorry for the rant, but I'm just tired of it. You don't want the work done, just say so. I'm just very curious why some editors, who seemto be so content protective, haven't written the articles themselves. Ah, but that is not going to happen, is it? RM Gillespie 10:12, 24 November 2006 (UTC)
 * Your "rant" (as you termed it) is misdirected in the case of the initial request &mdash; not reverting the U.S. back to US. My edits to this article have not been to insert incorrect information, nor have they been to "reduce the text to goobldygook".  Concerning the use of US versus U.S., please note that the Marine Corps Historical Center Writing Guide, Revised Edition 2004, on page 1, indicates that the abbreviation to be used for United States is U.S.  The USMC publications actual names, as published by the USMC, have U.S., not US, in their titles.


 * Though your feeling "ownership" of the article is understandable, we do not own our contributions to Wikipedia. This article has obviously been a major effort on your part and will be a valuable addition to Wikipedia. Since you seem to feel that you do not want edits by others while you are working on the article, may I suggest that, for future major articles such as this, you create the article in a user subpage/user sandbox and then move it to the mainspace when it is complete.  If you are interested in collaborating with other authors during the creation of the article, you could invite them to edit on your user subpage.


 * As for your comment "Is this article done yet?" &mdash; the template Inuse is available to put at the top of the article. Please note that the intent is not to be a "hands off" notice, but rather while you are online and editing, to prevent those annoying edit conflicts that occur while two editors are working on the article at the same time.  &mdash; ERcheck (talk) 13:58, 24 November 2006 (UTC)

US vs U.S.
Again please refer back to WP:MOS but the most important issues are
 * Consistancy 'within an individual article
 * Consistancy within a project
 * Consistancy within a regional framework.

As this battle conflict is of interest to quite a few particpating nations (USA, Vietnamese, Australian to mention the first that come to mind) - possibly the USMC style guide isn't nessecarily the best one to use? A broader historical style guide may be better to adopt for US vs U.S. WP:MOS indicates U.S. is preferred unless a part of a longer abbreviation it then becomes USN etc. - and in a list of nations it should not be abbreviated at all. HTH. Garrie 03:40, 1 December 2006 (UTC)


 * For the record, the only reason Australians would care about the Battle of Khe Sahn is that Jimmy Barnes sang a song about a battle in which no Australians took part. --203.10.224.58 04:09, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Australians did particpate in the conflict as a whole along with quite a few other nations - but correct re this battle in particular which I guess my words came out as saying.... look, I've fixed it... But my point was regarding WP:MOS and the US vs U.S. and the article it occurs in is almost irrelevant Garrie 04:45, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Image of general giap
General Vo Nguyen Giap (left) and Ho Chi Minh (right)

Probably one of the more official photos to demonstrate that the leaders were "simple people". In the pictures I could find of general Giap he is very often shown in civilian clothing among his troops in uniform. Probably this was a trademark of him and I wonder whether we should possibly include this.

General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1946 among Vietnamese troops.

Photo of Giap from the US Air force. Wandalstouring 13:39, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Possible images for use
Recent photos from Khe Sahn that may be of use. I have a few more from inside the museum as well. First is hills 881 N&S as seen while standing on the airfield and the 2nd is what is left of the runway looking west while standing on it.

--Looper5920 11:10, 21 December 2006 (UTC)

Neutrality of this article
It is my opinion that this article conveys the U.S. (or US or United States, I didn't read the entire discussion about how to spell it,) point of view only. For example the deeds of the special forces are depicted as heroic (which they might very well be, but on the other hand I don't think somebody aligned with north Vietnam would agree). p.s - I'm neither American nor Vietnamese nor from any country connected with this conflict, which I think allows me to have a more neutral point of view. 85.65.215.115 21:56, 3 January 2007 (UTC)


 * That's the usual problem. We hardly have any information from the Vietnamese side. Wandalstouring 22:54, 3 January 2007 (UTC)


 * The only blame that can be laid as to the dearth of Vietnamese sources lies in Hanoi, not with the author. The quotes from Victory in Vietnam are the totality of what that work has to say about the battle and PAVN's participation in it. There are no other works translated into English (as far as the author knows), that describe Vietnamese participation.

As to how PAVN/NLF personnel felt about the Special Forces SOG recon teams that opposed them, let me quote NLF Regimental commander Nguyen Tuong Lai: "They effectively attacked and captured our soldiers and disrupted our supply lines. This weakened our forces and hurt our morale, because we could not stop these attacks. We understood that these American soldiers were very skillful and very brave in their tactics to disrupt infiltration from the North." Al Santoli, To Bear Any Burden. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1985, p. 147. RM Gillespie 16:23, 4 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Put that quote into the article. Wandalstouring 10:47, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Even if it does not pertain to the battle of Khe Sanh? RM Gillespie 15:06, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Sorry, I have been monitoring quite a lot of articles on this Vietnam stuff and didn't realize that I was on Khe San. No, move it to the SOG article. Perhaps quote it there like in the Jeanne d'Arc article with a blue box. Wandalstouring 16:48, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * This is by far the best article in relation to the Vietnam War, the most balanced anyone could expect even with the lack of Vietnamese POV. Cheers for the author!!:D.Canpark 23:51, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

Fall of Lang Vei
This section is factually incorrect. A-101 camp received the members of a fleeing Laotian battalion BV-33 and refugees, and were warned by them about the use of NVA armour. This led to LAW ammunition being delivered to the camp by USAF before the NVA actually closed to assault the camp.--61.68.97.238 07:50, 19 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Fixed the problem. Although forewarned, the SF troops expected that the armour, if used, would only take on a fire support role, not attack the camp directly. As for the LAWs, three-quarters of them misfired. The majority of those PAVN tanks destroyed were knocked out by either recoiless rifle fire or hand grenades. RM Gillespie 16:49, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

water supply
The article says "North Vietnamese troops had never bothered to threaten the Combat Base's sole source of water" - A second view is expressed at THE UNEXPLOITED VULNERABILITY OF THE MARINES AT KHE SANH by Peter Brush, according to Brush "General Giap, who achieved victory at Dien Bien Phu in part due to his meticulous battlefield planning, seems to have not realized the vulnerability of the Marines' water supply." KAM 16:23, 29 April 2007 (UTC)


 * An interesting view which does provide an alternative conclusion. However, it does seem to propagate another fallacy. Unlike the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Giap was not the battlefield commander in the Khe Sanh sector and (as far as is known) never left Hanoi. If Brush wishes to assign blame for the oversight, he should place it on the correct shoulders. RM Gillespie 14:30, 17 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Giap was the overall theater commander. I guess the question would be, how hands-on was he in managing Hai? - Crockspot 14:40, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Regardless of the question regarding Giap in charge or not, the question as to if the water supply was overlooked, I wonder about Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins's statement. Were more details provided to support his statement in the provided source? Perhaps it could be added that reporter Brush believed it had been overlooked but Tompkins believed not. KAM 15:31, 17 May 2007 (UTC)


 * It seems a moot point since the North Vietnamese certainly knew about the existance of the water point. Every day of the siege, Marine water buffalos (large water transporters) were in evidence filling up at the point. Every map of the combat base clearly shows the water point to be outside the American lines. If the North Vietnamese had wanted to contest the water collection activities, they could have. The only question remaining is why they did not. RM Gillespie 05:30, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

100,000 not 30,000
VN:Many American history books about Vietnam estimate the Communist forces at Khe Sanh at about 50,000. Is that your recollection?

Huy:No, that figure is wrong. We had nearly 100,000 at Khe Sanh when your air force arrived with more than 1,000 aircraft and also helicopters bringing in more men. http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3035906.html --HanzoHattori (talk) 19:17, 21 December 2007 (UTC)


 * That is interesting. I had no idea that the North Vietnamese were fielding more than half of their combat forces south of the 17th parallel to oppose Khe Sanh while they were simultaneously launching their largest offensive thus far in the war. Geez, you learn something new every day! Would this total include the 60,000 troops guarding, building, and maintaining the Ho Chi Minh Trail? The 70 to 80,000 troops under discussion would be the equivelent of seven to eight extra divisions. Amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics, and even the U.S. military would have found it difficult to maintain such a large force in such a confined area under constant enemy aerial attack for the period under consideration. Not even the official PAVN history makes such a ludicrous claim. RM Gillespie (talk) 15:01, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

What about Ta Con?
I've seen nothing about the battle at the Ta Con Airbase in this page nor any other website. Is it a PAVN's victory? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 123.16.92.20 (talk) 03:59, 19 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Ta Con is Khe Sanh. It was the title given by PAVN to the "liberation" of the abandoned airstrip after it was "conquered" in 1969. Quite hilarious actually!RM Gillespie (talk) 13:50, 26 June 2008 (UTC)
 * More hilarious is fighting for months defending a "vital" base, and then abandone in the same year. --213.37.71.217 (talk) 10:04, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

Edge of Darkness
I belive one of the US CIA characters in the popular British series "Edge of Darkness" 1985 was called Khe Sanh. It was written by a Scot so there may have been a sly reference..can anyone add the citation? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.119.152.47 (talk) 03:06, 21 January 2009 (UTC)

Khe Sanh
This article contains material that should be in here. the US inaugural address and popular cultural references should either be deleted as cruft or moved into her, because they refer to the battle not the place I would have thought. SGGH ping! 13:42, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

World War 1 ?
Part of the World War 1?? Timeline seems off... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 61.90.10.38 (talk) 09:00, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

War vs. Conflict
Is it really necessary to change the infobox to Conflict? (which happens to be a redirect back to War). The category is Vietnam War, the main article about the conflict is Vietnam War, all of the Vietnam-related articles call it War, all of the Vietnam infoboxes call it War... It's the most common reference to America's involvement in Vietnam. - Crockspot 14:45, 17 May 2007 (UTC)


 * You are quite correct. The US has not legally been at war since 1945. All military operations conducted since have been conducted under the aegis of the UN, congressional resolution, or presidential directive. Wiki, however, follows American public taste, not historical fact. Therefore, all military conflicts are labelled wars. Just as the NLF is described as the "Viet Cong." Official or historical accuracy is junked in favor of popular taste and knowledge. I wonder if they do it in scientific articles?RM Gillespie (talk) 15:37, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

Riddle of Khe Sanh
My knowledge of the facts presented in this article is very limited, but it seems to me that the writing style under this section is not very encyclopedia-like (the inclusion of questions seemingly directed towards the reader). Bockbockchicken 15:43, 18 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Show me, in the qualifications for an A-class article under this project, the appearence of the word "style." RM Gillespie 15:28, 21 July 2007 (UTC)
 * I think you'll find that "style" is a requirement of every article. You ought to know better. This was even picked up at the articles FAC. I've removed the one instance I could find. SGGH ping! 13:43, 9 January 2010 (UTC)


 * Not unless those stipulations were promulgated sine the writing of this article.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:40, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

Time to try FA again?
Gidday RM, (assume you're watching this page). This is an excellent article and easily up to your usual standards. I read the FA review from last year, which was petty and distinctly unhelpful. Would you be interested in trying again? I'd be very happy to help out, if you point me in the right direction. Cheers, Paxse (talk) 05:48, 30 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the offer Paxse, but I've had my belly full. Am vastly tired of re-reading and revising according to the whims of numbskulls. To make this a featured article would mean making it fit the criteria of non-military specialists, who have other agendas. As a matter of fact, it seems as if every other editor seems to have an agenda of his/her own. All I wanted to do was provide as detailed and unbiased an account as possible. I am totally surprised that this article's A rating has not been reduced as have others that I have produced for wiki. You want to try it - good luck mate!RM Gillespie (talk) 12:21, 15 September 2009 (UTC)
 * This can be done easily. The only A-removal was on MACVSOG by some editors who were wondering about some paragraphs with no source, and some flamboyant language, or using "unfortunately" to describe an anti-communist setback. None of which down grades the content.  YellowMonkey  ( bananabucket ) 02:05, 17 September 2009 (UTC)


 * You ought to throw in all of the "unsourced" photos (all of which had government sources) that were thrown out. These were the main reason why the article was demoted.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:45, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

KIA ratio
General Westmoreland sure didn't know how to count.

"The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. The figures of 5,500 NVA dead and 1,000 U.S. dead yield a ratio of 5.5:1."

— in: "Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle's Casualties" Johannjs (talk) 14:19, 18 May 2010 (UTC)


 * It is a little like the old "Doonesbury" cartoon of a meeting between two Vietnam vets. One is counting cupcakes (I forget exactly what he was counting) - "1, 5, 60, 1200". The other says "Hey, you did bodycounts too!" RM Gillespie (talk) 15:50, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

Date Format
Is there any good reason the article uses DD/MM/YY instead of the standard American MM/DD/YY? It looks like most/all other major articles related to the Vietnam War use month-day-year. --CAVincent (talk) 17:13, 19 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Just following the format utilized by the US government and military (and most of the industrialized world). Old habits die hard.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:52, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

Infobox
Information boxes should be short and concise, not verbose or bloated. The information box in its present state is anything but. Moreover, the noted information should be mainstream and quantifiable and not based on theories, speculation or conjecture and the utilized sources should be beyond reproach. Unfortunately, the information box makes use of questionable, cherry-picked sources sources with a dash of original research. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the marines held their ground and inflicted horrendous casualties on the NVA. That makes it an undisputable tactical U.S. victory and the "result" should be limited to that information.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:43, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Info removed on 12 March
I am putting this info here so that it may be edited and then put back in the article in proper context and shortened form.--Looper5920 (talk) 02:57, 13 March 2012 (UTC) However, at 0830 on 27 June 1967, The Marines of Oscar Company, 3rd Platoon, part of the Combined Action Program or CAP) was ordered by the Marine command at Khe Sanh to send a patrol to investigate suspected launch sites (spotted earlier by an aerial observer) of an NVA rocket and mortar attack on the Khe Sanh base which had occurred just after midnight of the night before. Alpha 1 / 13 (an artillery unit) and elements of 3 / 26 (including the Battalion Aid Station) had been hit hard in the attack, incurring a number of casualties.  Although key Alpha 1 / 13 personnel were injured and killed, they managed to mount an effective counter-battery fire and silenced the enemy fire.

The O-3 patrol included Corporals Dennis Alfred O'Connor, James Merrill Shepard, Jr., Lance-Corporals Francisco Alberto Mazariegos, Earl Grissom, and HN Bell, the unit Hospital Corpsman (Navy medic), all of whom were from Oscar-3, and LCPL Charles Aaron Lynch of Oscar-1, who was visiting friends at O-3, as well as indigenous native counterpart troops of the local Bru ("Montagnard") tribe of Popular Force militia.

According to Lance-Corporal Earl Grissom (the only located survivor of the patrol), the CAP personnel uniformly thought this was a bad idea, as the hill was obviously not secured, and indeed was being heavily bombed and strafed by US aircraft at the time they approached its base. However, they obeyed orders, and contacted the FAC who reluctantly called off the attacks.

They reached the top of Hill 689, and discovered "spider traps" (concealed covered fighting positions), and found a large cache of arms. Shortly after, the enemy opened fire with a machine gun, instantly killing the point man (CPL O'Connor), and mortally wounding CPL Shepard.

Lance-Corporal Earl Grissom dove into a nearby bomb crater and took cover, then crawled up to the top of the crater and did what he could with his M-79. He was often firing almost straight up, because the enemy was so close.

Grissom saw Lance-Corporal Mazariegos fighting his way back (in Grissom's words "like John Wayne) and taking out several enemy soldiers before he got to the slight shelter of the crater. Grissom stated that Mazariegos displayed great courage in his fighting retreat. However, Mazariegos was shot in the head a short time later, during his second look over the top to attempt to spot the enemy's position and movements. He died instantly.

After Mazariegos had been hit, the Navy Corpsman came over under fire to try to render aid, despite Grissom telling him that Mazariegos was dead. He also stated that CPL Shepard was lying beside the crater rather than in it. The corpsman rendered first aid to the mortally wounded Shepard, and assisted Grissom in hauling him down the hill. However, despite their gallant efforts, Corporal Shepard died after a hundred yards. They had to leave his body, because the firefight was still intense.

Meanwhile, two other Marines (whose names are unfortunately not available) had survived from the back of the patrol. Although the other CAPs mounted a hasty relief effort, they quickly found the hill was heavily defended by a strong, well-entrenched and armed enemy force (that was later determined to have been a battalion), and were also ejected from the hill without recovering the bodies of their comrades, and one man then believed to be MIA.

Meanwhile, India 3/26, commanded by Captain M. E. Coulter, was returning to KSCB from a patrol, when it was ordered instead to Hill 689 to assist the CAP patrol. It was later joined by Lima 3/26, elements of which had been air-lifted in by chopper.

Nonetheless, these two well-equipped and manned seasoned line infantry companies with supporting arms capabilities, incurred heavy casualties KIA and WIA from the well-entrenched enemy forces (later estimated at two reinforced NVA companies). These losses included two officers and a SNCO KIA at the hill fight, and other casualties at the unit HQ at KSCB from incoming mortar fire.

At the end of the fighting, CAP O-3 had suffered 4 KIA, and 3/26 had lost 14. In addition, one of the 26th Marines WIA (LCPL Charles M. Gattis died of wounds on July 5, raising the KIA toll to 19.

According to the 3/26 Command Chronology, the enemy had sustained an estimated 91 KIAs.

(The information above is based on first-hand reports of the action by participants from Oscar Company, and India and Lima 3/26, including Lieutenant-Colonel [then 2nd Lt.] C. T. ("Tony") Anthony, USMC (Ret.), then leader of 2nd Platoon, India 3/26, and 2nd Lt. Frank McCarthy, leader of 3rd platoon, Lima Company 3/26, and others from those units, and material given in LCDR Ray W. Stubbe's "Battalion of Kings" 2nd ed. pp. 85–88.)

Lack of NVA info in the info box; the section of results seems one-sided
As for the battle of Khe Sanh, overrunning the base was never a main target of North Vietnams Army. In fact, they did however overrun some parts of Khe Sanh base, such as at Lang Vei. NVA's No.1 target was to attract the enemy hence luring his mighty force onto Khe Sanh and the surrounding area to support the Tet Offensive conducted by the NLF in the South. The battle of Khe Sanh broke out just one week before the beginning of Tet Offensive. Abandoning Khe Sanh was a strategy failure to the US, especially to Westmoreland. He wanted to use Khe Sanh as a jumping-off base to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in attempt to block enemy infiltration down to the South and finish the war. Read more at "Strategic Crossroads at Khe Sanh" : As early as 1964 Westmoreland described Khe Sanh's possibilities: 'Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for SOP operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.' — Preceding unsigned comment added by HanLing (talk • contribs) 07:00, 26 November 2011 (UTC)

I noticed that the section of results says that both sided claimed victory, buy only mentions that the US abandoned the base and the termination of the McNamara Line. That seems one-sided (anyone reading that would think that the US/ARVN forces were the only ones who lost anything in the battle). I think that the section should also mention that the NVA failed to overrun the base and that they withdrew from tha area. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.117.249.153 (talk) 17:16, 6 July 2011 (UTC)


 * According to: http://www.historynet.com/the-withdrawal-from-khe-sanh.htm, the US withdraw from Khe Sanh was tactical withdraw, not a forced retreat. And nowhere in the article does it mention that the base was completely destroyed or overrunned by the NVA. According to: http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm, the communists still suffered several times more casualties than the US. I think the info box should also mention this information. Thank you. - Marcaurelix — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.117.249.129 (talk) 10:44, 8 July 2011 (UTC)


 * If noone answers, I will consider that my doubts are valid and change the info box. Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.117.249.153 (talk) 15:01, 7 July 2011 (UTC)


 * According to: http://www.historynet.com/the-withdrawal-from-khe-sanh.htm, the US withdraw from Khe Sanh was tactical withdraw, not a forced retreat. And nowhere in the article does it mention that the base was completely destroyed or overrunned by the NVA. According to: http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm, the communists still suffered several times more casualties than the US. I think the info box should also mention this information. Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.117.249.153 (talk) 16:30, 7 July 2011 (UTC)
 * Might want to consider, too, that the linked historynet article is really a poor piece of work. Prados' book is far better when dealing with Khe Sanh. Intothatdarkness (talk) 16:26, 25 May 2012 (UTC)

POV
"To kill as much American troops as possible" show clearly POV and bias toward the PAVN. It also did not match the content above that stated that the NVA's main goal was to draw in US forces rather than killing them. Anyone who can't notice that can copy the unedited article back to their computer, while leave decent people to improve it--Zeraful (talk) 12:40, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

Well, the VC and the "PAVN" never had restrictions or limits as to when and how many Americans they're permitted to kill. The VC and Northern troops never limited how many Americans to kill, and when and when not to kill them, they would kill AS MANY American troops WHEREVER they see them. The VC can even massacre their own people, innocent civilians, during the war, like in the Hue Massacre, Dak Son Massacre and others, as well as sniper and rocket terrorist attacks on civilian towns and cities in the South throughout the war (especially during the Tet Offensive), so the life of a foreigner would mean less to them and they are even more compelled to kill. So the phrase made above is NOT POV and is NOT biased, and in fact reflects the truth about the "PAVN". As well, you were trying to politically de-legitimize the South by changing the name from "Republic of Viet Nam" (Viet Nam Cong Hoa), to "South Vietnam" (Viet Nam Mien Nam). Yes, the two names mean the same thing, but by trying to change the name already written in the article to another name, you are trying to degrade something. It's like changing the words "beef", "calamari" and "pork", to "cow", "squid" and "pig". THAT type of edit, in itself, is quite ridiculous and is implicitly POV. Nguyen1310 (talk) 04:20, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

As well, having came from Viet Nam, I know VERY WELL about how communists write about themselves and of their adversaries. Communists try to legitimize themselves and mention only positive attributes about them, neglecting to mention of their past immoral actions or trying to downplay them. They also exaggerate, or lie about, flaws of their adversaries. Nguyen1310 (talk) 04:44, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

Conclusion
"US tactical victory", it seem that many people believed to be that way, since the US Army managed to safely evacuate the base in a tactical withdraw and manage to kill many PAVN troops. But does anyone see the total casualties below? The NVA's casualties was "counted" to be around 10,000 and 15,000(through indirect means); while US losses was around 7,500(for many of the wounded would be relieved). So it mean that even the US Army is the one who in defense, having superiority firepower but could only achieve a ratio of 2:1 in casualties. They're also unable to hold Khe Sanh, forced to terminate the McNamara Line, nor exploit the PAVN own losses. What is the point of killing a lot of enemies if you just going to leave the area and let the enemy regained their strength?

So I suggest changing the conclusion to "US tactical withdrawal" at best. A "victory", in this case, does not do the PAVN justice--Zeraful (talk) 12:56, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

The point of killing as many enemies as possible, just like what the North Vietnamese and VC did to South Vietnamese and American troops (even towards innocent civilians in the South, which in itself IS INJUSTICE), is to decimate the number of communist troops and insurgents available, that can be used to fight South Vietnam and the U.S. in other places. As well, if American troops didn't kill as many VC troops as possible, the U.S. soldiers themselves will be killed by the communists - the communists would never let American troops withdrawal peacefully from Khe Sanh. "Tactical victory" in the sense that the withdrawal was successful, and the Americans were able to fend off the VC long enough to fully withdrawl from Khe Sanh. The term "tactical withdrawal" doesn't sound right (in the linguistic sense) in the summary info box. Nguyen1310 (talk) 04:20, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

While the US Army amassed toward Khe Sanh, feared for another "Dienbienphu", elsewhere NLF/PAVN unit are given room to breathe and inflict casualties among ARVN forces, and by abandon the bases, they effectively eliminated the McNamara Line, which could able to inflict many times the damage to PAVN's personnel and equipments than the battle itself, and even worse that they lost their eye and ears in the whole area, which leading to disastrous consequences in Operation Lam Son 719.

To sum it up: Westmoreland has fallen into a trap. His decision have not only cost an strategically important base, but also drawing too many forces from where they could be effective against the enemy. Even that the body count are true, but how many PAVN and NLF's formations escaped the region where US forces stationed there have to withdraw in order to reinforce Khe Sanh?. An "tactical withdrawal" was already justice enough, given that the assault was already stop by the time the base was relieved. The term "tactical victory" was also in clear conflict with the later half "Riddle of Khe Sanh" section.

On a side note: It was strange when you mention that the action done by the PAVN/NVA and NLF/VC was injustice. There was no such thing as "injustice" in war, as both side trying to win, there's no rules about which route to victory they must or must not take. Also as in 2012, there's only 2 action against the populace done by the NVA/VC was recorded, and both are fairly vague and have few evidence, while the collateral damage of US's bombing raid in both the South and the North was confirmed to be over 300,000; not to mention other atrocities... If people still think that they're responsible for most of civilian deaths will have a really hard time to explain why the Vietnamese communist was able to success in both Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the United States failed in Vietnam and Iraq and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Cherchen--Zeraful (talk) 19:06, 20 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I will reiterate what I said earlier about the correctness of the phrase "tactical victory" in this article, so I will not repeat it again. No, VC troops didn't backdown or withdraw from the Khe Sanh area when the US troops were withdrawing, it doesn't make any sense anyways, since the VC already were furiously fighting the Americans at Khe Sanh, when Americans were fiercely attacking and bombing the VC in the area, so they are not deterred from attacking again during this withdrawal. Really, the assault stopped? Why then a BATTLE occur at the place then? The VC were fighting the Americans until the very end, when the Americans left completely from the Khe Sanh area.


 * Yes, both sides of any war eagerly want to win, but all armies and fighters must NOT attack and kill innocent civilians, like what the VC did, which is against international wartime law, and against the fundamental human rights of those civilians - the right to life, liberty and security as declared by the UN Declaration of Human Rights, not to mention against moral values that most people worldwide hold (except for political extremists and authoritarian governments, like the North Vietnamese communist regime and the VC). A route to victory can be achieved by trying to avoid killings of innocent civilians, of course civilians will be killed and its impossible to avoid killing them, but it is possible to TRYING to avoid doing that, where the VC actually tried to INCREASE civilian deaths as shown in the 1968 Tet Offensive, and especially the Hue Massacre and Dak Son Massacre. Trying to win a war doesn't mean that it is permissible, according to international law and morally, to slaughter innocent people en masse. Your claims about VC atrocities vs. US atrocities is biased and simply ridiculous pro-communist propaganda rubbish. 436390 civilians, along with POWs, were killed in South Vietnam alone by the communists during the war. My Lai only had a few hundred killed, and they were suspected communists (explain why US and ARVN troops were attacked when passing by that village), so that settles your "other atrocities". Ironic how you never brought up the 172 000 North Vietnamese that were slaughtered under Ho Chi Minh's land "reform", plus hundreds of thousands more due to political oppression and purges, and the 170 000 South Vietnamese who perished in the "reeducation" camps (gulags), and the 50 000 dead in the "special economic zones" after the VC evicted many people from their homes and stole it for themselves, which even a former VC fighter turned novelist discussed in her books (and she's under house arrest for revealing this to the world), and the 500 000 Boat People that died because of the deplorably horrid political and economic conditions made by the new communist regime, and up to 2 500 000 died due to political oppression and social purges that the regime conducted after the war up to 1987, North to South. Oh, I didn't mention of how many more that died from 2 national famines that occurred in the 70s and 80s. Adding all innocent civilians killed by the communists, excluding the famine, grand total: 3 828 390. I didn't add ARVN, American, Australian, Korean, Thai, Filipino, Lao and Cambodian casualties yet, and already it's that number. Compare THAT to your 300 000. By the way, if American troops didn't withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972-1973 and stop their military aid to South Vietnam, (while to North still had the backing of the Soviets and Chinese until the very end), the war would not end in 1975, and the South wouldn't lose, as the ARVN and it's allies were generally winning the war before 1973, and I quote "Hanoi being exhausted from the war" due to their heavy casualties. Same thing about Iraq, both Iraq and Vietnam had the US withdraw and abandon the war, they didn't fight until the very end and end up losing. Laos and Cambodia were easily winnable, and congratulations for installing a pro-Vietnamese puppet government in Cambodia after toppling the murderous Pol Pot regime. Nguyen1310 (talk) 07:23, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
 * I think it's clear that this conversation has gone off-topic, but why are we assuming the US lost in Iraq? The current Iraqi government is still around, isn't it?  Rummel's "unlikely high" of 2.5 million democides from 1975-87 is including hundreds of thousands killed by the Vietnamese government in Laos and Cambodia (famine killed an additional 500,000 Cambodians by 1981 according to Cambodian scholar Craig Etcheson; see also the CIA's "Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe").  Only a few thousand Iraqis were killed by the US military during the occupation, and perhaps 15,000 in the invasion; all the rest of the 150,000+ died at the hands of the insurgents despite their vastly inferior firepower.  US bombing killed 50,000 North Vietnamese, 40,000 Cambodians, and 20,000 Laotians; I'm not sure about South Vietnam, but that figure is probably the highest of them all.  The Khmer Rouge did not win because they were more humane than Lon Nol's forces; quite the opposite.  The communists were more ruthless and efficient in their use of coercion.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 22:00, 21 July 2012 (UTC)

When you drop an unimaginable amount of ordnance into a small region of land (Indochina was pretty small compare to Eastern Europe and the Pacific, jet receive 3 more the amount of bombardment), back in the day when they're not smart enough to distinguish friend and foe (even until now), that somehow only kill a portion of the populace? While the enemy, who have to relied on the community for intelligence, supplies and recruitment somehow kill the most?. All of the "official" army reports is having a tendency of exaggerated and antagonized their enemies, while hid their own losses and brutal action, therefore sho1uld be taken with a grain of salt.

And before anyone said "But they killed more people", remember that the act of taking people's lives is a sin. It does not matter who kill more, a sin is a sin. And in war, everyone, no matter what their side, are sinner - such is the great equalizer of war.

Most people doesn't recognize this: The Vietnamese Communist Party leaders is not some ruthless warlords or partisan commanders. They are POLITICIANS, and just like your typical Clinton/Bush/Obama, they're fully aware what need to be done in order to get what they wanted. According to "Political Violence In South And South East Asia", the Vietnamese communist political struggle did affect the people (mainly in the Land Reform process), but only in a minor level compare with the violence in the South in the same era. And in all cases, the number of people killed/imprisoned in these event was exaggerated as well.

In military term, a typical NVA/VC regular regiment is having only about 1200-1500 soldiers, nearly the size of an US/ARVN battalion. And by the addition of political officer mean that their soldier will be held on a very tight leash, and their official doctrine forbid any kind of hostile action against the populace. They're also known to have execute their own people for breaking rules and commit action that could hamper the war effort, dating back even before the First Indochina War.(For example, in the case of Sgt.Robert Bales, he would be executed on the spot, rather than shipped back to the US and held in a detention, waiting for a presidential sign which probably never come). An army raised properly based on the above combination will have much less prone to "incidences". Also know that an normal US/ARVN soldier will always fighting far from home where he's supposed to helping complete stranger who could be an enemy in disguise(until Vietnamization), while the common VC "militia" will always be close to home and his/her family, lest called for a major combat action. Who would be more likely to abuse their position and terrorizing the populace?

Let's get back to the main problem: Some people thought the Vietnam War is a war where the righteous "freedom fighter" lost to the ruthless, fanatic "commie". And the image of a faceless enemy begin to show up, where they have no thought, no emotion, no strategy, no tactics, basically just some guy that pop out of a rock in ridiculously number with sole reason of exist is to die horribly at the hand of the "good guys" firepower. That have led to these phases "We won every battle", "If the politicians get some guts, we might have won the war", "The enemy didn't win, they're only outlast us", "without those "anti-war" hippies, we would have won". THAT IS THE INJUSTICE I WAS TALKING ABOUT. They're face hardship, make sacrifices, obtain experience, develop strategy and tactics, and win the war. Yet here, the reason they started the Battle of Khe Sanh is simply "To kill American troops"? Every trained officers in the world will take that as an insult. Yet people simply stamp word like this on them without a second thought, because they are the "bad guys"

Another side note: The common course of action of VC militias/guerillas when facing US "seek and destroy" raid is bury their weapon, then retreat into the jungle (so much for "killing US troop whenever they meet" huh.--Zeraful (talk) 07:36, 22 July 2012 (UTC)
 * I was responding to several points you and Nguyen made. But I'm no longer sure what you want to add to this article.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 07:45, 22 July 2012 (UTC)

I want to change "kill American troop" to "inflict casualties upon US forces", since the former sound like it has been taken from a comic villain rather than an actual military objective, but Nguyen seem determined to his point of view that the Vietnamese communists are nothing but trash. Also that the term "tactical victory" should be change into "tactical withdrawal", since the US losses far outweigh it's gain (a 2:1 casualties ratio didn't sound much for one in defense and having massive firepower), even then they're unable to exploit it. And by amassing forces that should be sent to other areas, many battered PAVN/NLF units can fought their way to safety. I don't think that any battle having this result should be considered as "victory" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Zeraful (talk • contribs) 15:56, 22 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Always remember to sign your comments. I changed the wording per your first request.  With regard to your second, the article has nuanced analysis explaining that "neither side won a resounding victory", and further states that while it was a "tactical US victory" it was also a "strategic North Vietnamese victory".  You seem to be basing your opinion off of your own WP:OR, but feel free to add other reliable sources if you feel they are needed.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 22:35, 22 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I still think the only military objective the US Army managed to accomplished is to withdraw from the area. Also based from previous debate, the term "tactical victory" was based on the kill:death ratio counted by the US Army, and only in Khe Sanh rather than total casualties ratio of the whole battle. So once again I request the "tactical US victory" changed to "successful withdrawal" or "tactical withdrawal". Also notice that should general Abrams not give the order to evacuate the base, a large portion of US forces would have to remain in the area, suffering NVA/PAVN's hit-and-run artillery attack and occasional firefight, which already demonstrated it's ability to effectively nullified US firepower. And the withdrawal only happen 1 month after Phase III of Tet Offensive. In a way, the US Army MAY lost the battle of Khe Sanh, but still able to hold back the tide of the Tet Offensive, which in turn allow them to gain an edge in military over South Vietnam for the next 3 years. That is a better statement than "we won all the battle".--Zeraful (talk) 15:52, 24 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Again, this sounds like your own original research. To be blunt, what you think doesn't matter.  Indeed, "truth" is not the goal of Wikipedia.  We just report (or are supposed to report!) the broad consensus of the most repected mainstream scholars.  If you can find good sources that describe this battle differently, then add them and explain their differences with the sources already cited.  Otherwise, I can't help you.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 07:45, 25 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Well, then I just have to concede--Zeraful (talk) 22:20, 25 July 2012 (UTC)

Lam Son 719
Article fails to mention that Khe Sanh was reopened by US forces to support Lam Son 719. Intothatdarkness (talk) 16:24, 25 May 2012 (UTC)

Khe Sanh was forced to be abandoned again in early April of 1971 consequent upon the disastrous failure of Operation Lam Son 719 — Preceding unsigned comment added by HanLing (talk • contribs) 20:23, 17 February 2013 (UTC)

Army Communications Signal Team at Khe Sanh.
One of our Army communications microwave/tropo teams from the 337th Signal Company of the 37th Signal Battalion was stationed at Khe Sanh in the compound area. The equipment was the state of the art at the time and the Marines didn't have anything like it yet. Everyone but one man from the first team was killed when an artillery round hit their bunker. Another team promptly volunteered to replace them. Their communications signal went to my site in Hue and we relayed it to Da Nang where it could go anywhere in the world. Among other things, I suspect it carried the information for their airstrikes described under the heading of "OPERATION NIAGARA" as "The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at the Combat Base, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. An airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), in the form of a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68Signalvet (talk • contribs) 21:57, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

I was a SP4 Field Krypto repairman sent from Phu Bai to install the krypto equipment for the microwave installation. I arrived on the afternoon of day on which night the Tet Offensive attack began at Khe Sanh. When I arrived I was introduced to the microwave installation team led by a 1st Lieutenant I think his first name was Joe), as all of them, including the lieutenant, were filling sandbags to add to their bunker because they were expecting to be attacked that night. When the munitions began to hit in the compound we all grabbed our gear and dove into the bunker where we remained past daybreak as the ammo dump continued to explode and gas fumes were sent our way by the prevailing wind. It was mid to late morning before it was safe to leave the bunker and look for some food. Late that afternoon a marine major visited us and told me that there were marine krypto repairmen there and that I did not need to stay. He said that I could jump (literally) on a cargo plane as it departed if and when they were able to land and deliver munitions. The aircraft came in just before dusk and I was able to get aboard one for its return to Da Nang. The next morning I learned that the five men I spent the previous day with at Khe Sanh were all killed by two direct rocket hits on their bunker. It was decided the day before that we all would spend the entire night in the bunker. As I jumped onto the "tailgate" of the C-123 or C-130 as it was increasing speed for takeoff, a mortar round impacted the ground about ten yards behind the tail. When we landed and inspected the tail using flashlights, we saw many shrapnel holes, but none of the crew nor I were wounded. I continue to remember that lieutenant who did not pull rank when it came to filling sand bags!Gd12c (talk) 01:05, 14 July 2013 (UTC)

Introductory section
Comparing the current introductory section to WP:MOS, everything beyond the first paragraph (which concicely descibes, what is the Battle of Khe Sanh), should be moved to a section. I think the second to fourth paragraphs could possibly be moved to a subsection inside /*Preliminaries*/ but they should not remain in the introductory section. Garrie 03:32, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Have you ever had an article up for an A-Class review? If you do not have a complete synopsis of the contents of the entire article in the intro, you are going to end up a well-known creek in a well-known improperly designed flotation vehicle. This is to provide a casual reader with a "Cliff's Notes" version of the article. RM Gillespie 14:10, 4 December 2006 (UTC)

In the Commanders and Leaders section of the info box, Robert McNamara is listed as commanding the 3rd Division. Something tells me this is not correct. This source lists two commanders for the Jan-July 1968 period: MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins 28 November 1967 - 20 May 1968 and then MajGen Raymond G. Davis 21 May 1968 - 14 April 1969.DOR (HK) (talk) 03:10, 6 September 2014 (UTC)

"The Riddle of Khe Sanh" ?
This section is a riddle. Why is the PAVN conduct of the battle a "riddle"? The American conduct is highly dubious. There is the riddle. What did Westmoreland and the Commander in Chief in Washington think they were going to accomplish, Dien Bien Phu all over again? How about supplying a different POV here, one that makes more sense. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.35.112.111 (talk) 04:37, 16 May 2016 (UTC)

Casualties of aircrafts/helicopters
Does anybody have data on the loses of aircraft and helicopters the Americans suffered? There seem to have been at least one C-130 hercules lost and three C-123; there is also talk of the hillsides around the hillbases being 'littered with shot-down helicopters' but that is hardly hard information. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.75.207.110 (talk) 03:00, 29 October 2016 (UTC)
 * Any aircraft losses need to be reffed, you can't just add 1 KC-130, 3 C-123s and numerous helicopters to the Infobox. In any case "numerous helicopters" is too vague to be included here. Mztourist (talk) 04:36, 29 October 2016 (UTC)

HistoryNet is unreliable?
I haven't understand yet why you tag an article of HistoryNet as unreliable. Has someone publicly discredited it? Please explain. Dino nam (talk) 16:36, 31 October 2016 (UTC)
 * We can simply do better - no-one said unreliable....I added a better one. See Vietnam War Bibliography by User:Rjensen.....--Moxy (talk) 19:46, 31 October 2016 (UTC)

Referencing
G'day, currently this article is listed as a Milhist A-class article; however, currently there are quite a few areas of the article that appear to be unreferenced. Currently, the project's A-class criteria ask for at a bare minimum, one citation at the end of each paragraph. I have marked a few places where I believe citations are needed to meet the Military History project's current standard for referencing for A-class articles with a "citation needed" tag, but in the interests not tag bombing the article I will stop there. Anyway, is anyone able to help add these citations? If not, unfortunately, I feel the article may have to go through an A-class re-appraisal to see if it still meets the project's criteria (and to potentially try to drum up some interest in finding the missing references). Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 03:50, 8 July 2017 (UTC)
 * I have nominated this article for an A-class reappraisal. Interested editors are invited to take part here: WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Battle of Khe Sanh. Thank you. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 08:58, 2 October 2017 (UTC)

Popular culture entries
The policy regarding popular culture entries in military history articles is outlined here: WP:MILPOP. This provides the following: "In popular culture sections should be avoided unless the subject has had a well-cited and notable impact on popular culture. Any popular culture reference being considered for inclusion must be attributed to a reliable secondary source for the article topic. Items meeting these requirements should typically be worked into the text of the article..a separate section for popular culture items, and in particular the following, should be avoided: compendiums of every trivial appearance of the subject in pop culture (trivia), unsupported speculation about cultural significance or fictional likenesses (original research)". At the article's recent A-class review it was determined that the entries were not strongly referenced and hence they were removed. However, there seems to be a tendency to slowly add these back in. If there is a desire to add these back in, can I please ask that the entries be strongly referenced? The current entry is not well referenced (the references do not talk about the song's significance, just that it exists) and probably should be removed as such, and the one I removed here is not even referenced at all. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:21, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I agree with all of this and more. I've also removed reference to the song as it is trivial per WP:MILPOP. Anotherclown (talk) 11:55, 25 January 2018 (UTC)

Tactical victory for allies?
The battle was a defeat for the U.S. Under concerted pressure and bombardment the U.S. forces and their allies were driven into and confined to the base area of Khe Sanh. The PAVN controlled the entire western third of Quang Tri provence with American forces holding the base trapped, vulnerable, and difficult to resupply. Westmoreland's removal and replacement as commander of U.S. forces in Viet Nam signalled the end of the battle and defeat, as his replacement abandoned Khe Sanh and pulled back to the mountians at the edge of the coastal lowlands. Subsequent attmepts to push inland toward Khe Sanh were checked at Fire Bases Henderson and Holcomb. The brief reoccupation of Khe Sanh in Lom Son 719 was an unmittigated disaster for the U.S. forces, leaving the entire western portion of Quang Tri provence firmly in PAVN hands and set the stage for the Easter Offensive of 1972 which resulted in the loss of the defensive line along the DMZ. Having complete air superiority allowed the U.S. to halt PAVN advances with carpet bombing and intense tactical air strikes giving the illusion of tactical victory. Continued pressure by the PAVN against U.S. ground forces, however, led to a U.S. casualty rate that was unacceptable to the American public. We could hold Khe Sanh, but at what cost? Not one we were willing to continue to pay with no end in sight. Thus, despite the huge advantage of complete air superiority by the U.S., North Viet Nam could turn most so-called tactical victories for the U.S. into strategic defeats in the end. They hoped and guessed correctly that they could outlast us in battle, as the price they were willing to pay and the sacrefices they would make were far greater for far longer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Tonygumbrell (talk • contribs) 23:54, 21 January 2010 (UTC)


 * One battle, not the whole war please. The North Vietnamese abandoned the battlefield, granted, not much by Vietnam standards, but abandon it they did. The base did not fall and the casualties inflicted upon PAVN formations were horrendus by comparison. Tactical victory but strategic defeat, you better believe it.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:46, 21 December 2010 (UTC)


 * It seems this issue has arisen once again—whether one side achieved enough of its goals over the other side so it could rightly be said it had achieved a victory.

People have argued a number of factors to evaluate victory: Using this fourth criterion, in my opinion the most sound argument is that the NVA instigated the battle, their primary objective was to take the base and kill or capture its occupants ala Dien Bien Phu (publicly stated by North Vietnamese I believe, and evidenced by the fact the NVA endured huge losses to come very near to the base), and they eventually withdrew and ended the siege failing to achieve their objective.
 * Eventual U.S. withdrawal. Using this logic, the Allies lost WWII because they eventually withdrew from Germany; it makes no sense to me. In addition, as RM_Gillespie argues above, the article covers this one battle not the entire war.
 * The casualty or kill ratio was not high enough in favor of the U.S. and South Vietnam. Obviously this makes no sense; battles have been won by the side with higher losses (e.g., Iwo Jima).
 * Neither side can be proclaimed victor because both sides claim victory. This also makes no sense; losing leaders sometimes claim victory (e.g., Saddam Hussein, 1991).
 * In a siege battle, evaluating whether the attacker achieved his objectives. This is the only criterion that makes sense IMHO.

I am open to discussions and would love to hear any rational arguments as to how the battle's result could be no more definitive than "Both sides claimed victory" which strikes me as disingenuous and weasel wording at best. I am reverting my previous edit and will be happy to take it down if someone can make a rational argument why this reasoning is faulty. By the way, the claimed citation to a publication by Peter Brush is a dead link and I could not find it after a quick search on the web. IMHO a citation to an author claiming one side achieved a victory or not is not very relevant in this case as there is no problem finding biased authors especially ones biased against the U.S.' involvement in Vietnam. However I will add one since *Treker requested it. —MBbjv (talk) 10:06, 4 September 2016 (UTC)


 * As to your first argument, it would fit better if the Allies had left Germany in the face of German troops at war with them occupying the ground immediatly after they left.

The other problem i have with your argument is that you assume vietnamese intentions and base victory/defeat on that; obviously a force can win a strategic victory even if they do not achieve their intended objective but instead another that supersedes it or another after changing strategic considerations made the first obsolete, etc. I would argue by observing what happened and how the different sides profited. In the end the Vietnamese were left in possession of the site, free to bring supplies through the surrounding valleys (the base had been part of a programm to cut off supply via the Ho Chi Minh path by a series of heavily fortified bases), free to operate in the surrounding country site (the CIDG programm also ended with the evacuation as far as i can tell), etc. As far as i can score it would make it a tactical USA/AVRN victory (casualties inflicted, objective held, no second Bien Dien Phu), an operational draw leaning towards the North Vietnamese (they ended up in command of the site and the province, took pressure of their supply routes while expnading significant assets), but a clear cut North Vietnamese strategic victory (no more American troops in Khe Sahn). In my opinion this is a classic example of a excellent strategic consideration, since the North Vietnamese established circumstances where they were highly likely to benefit no matter how things turned out: If they stormed Khe Sanh outright this repeat of Bien Dien Phu would most likely break American morale, if they could not, they would still bind significant forces (and attention) as well as support assets (the airpower used to ensure resupply alone and therefore not available elsewhere was probably enough to make it worthwhile) and thereby facilitate operations else. In other words: They fought a battle that would profit them on way or the other. The Americans did not. Either Khe Sahn was obsolete, in which case it should have been evacuated even before the siege started or it was worthwhile to have in which case it should not have been abandoned after the battle had been 'won'. The attritional concept espoused by top brass at the time and some times still today was obsolete by 1918, let alone 1968.212.100.51.120 (talk) 00:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
 * While the US abandoned the base at Khe Sanh, they did not just surrender control of the Khe Sanh plateau or western Quang Tri Province as they maintained mobile operations there (Operation Scotland II and others) until the drawdown of US forces. US forces had no difficulty in reoccupying Khe Sanh in February 1971 to support Operation Lam Son 719, however they soon encountered the same difficulties they had in 1968 - a large fixed base vulnerable to well concealed long-range PAVN artillery fire and sapper attacks. The Marines and later MACV-SOG occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971.Mztourist (talk) 03:16, 23 October 2016 (UTC)

This again goes to the heart of the problem of US strategy in Vietnam. This was a guerilla war with parallel state structures being established by the enemy. Airmobile operations or even mobile operations can under such circumstances not maintain control over a territory. The troops roll in during the day and everybody who cooperates with them gets the axe at night when they are back at base. In the same vein it is no surprise that the US was able to reoccupy the base. That was never in question. To reoccupy you can use that foremost characteristic of American military though which is indiscriminate firepower. But they lost the ability to exercise control over the province or the population. Tactical superiority of the American forces in Vietnam was never in question as far as firepower and standup fights were concerned, but strategically they failed to secure the center of gravity (the population) and instead alienated them by what today is known as 'colleteral damage'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5.10.44.116 (talk) 17:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
 * As 212.100.51.120 correctly pointed out above, whatever happened the North Vietnamese would claim victory. Some writers regard the fact that the US abandoned the base and the PAVN "captured" it on 9 July 1968 as evidence that the PAVN won the battle, but as this was not a conventional war holding territory wasn't conclusive. The problem for the Americans in Quang Tri Province was that they had to try to keep the PAVN out of artillery and rocket range of the population centres where they were conducting pacification, which meant engaging the PAVN in the remote and sparsely populated areas along the DMZ. Couple this with Westmoreland's big unit attrition strategy and the need for large bases to support such operations and that led to Khe Sanh. The Marines wanted to conduct small unit operations and pacification, Westmoreland wanted them to seek out and fight the PAVN. Mztourist (talk) 03:23, 24 October 2016 (UTC)
 * Re: "Using this logic, the Allies lost WWII because they eventually withdrew from Germany;" I call your attention to the fact that the allies won World War II, and, get this, the U.S. lost the Vietnam War, and the lost battle of Khe Sanh during the war was a harbinger of further woes in Northern I Corps and moreover a significant defeat that marked a turning point in the war. The Commander-in-Chief after a disastrous meeting of his war cabinet (top and closest war advisors), announced he would not seek nor accept his party's renomination for President. Shortly thereafter he announced a troop level freeze and a bombing halt, presumably to pave the way for his successor to get us out. Nixon on taking office in Jan '69 announced no major changes at first, but under increasing pressure called for the Vietnamization of the war and sought 'peace' talks with North Vietnam. Fierce fighting continued sporadically but the war was a foregone conclusion the U.S. had had enough as more and more sickening, bad news from Vietnam bombarded the American public. The war was a lame duck war from the time of Johnson announcement that he was 'jumping ship'. Nixon tried to wind down the war slowly until peace agreement could be reached. The 'peace' agreement got the bulk of our forces out and the POWs returned. As soon as North Vietnam could build up its strength it rapidly overran the South, after Nixon had left office in disgrace, and Ford was President. 75.172.127.176 (talk) 02:29, 28 June 2022 (UTC)
 * You make it sound like that is cheating ot something. That is actually genius and the very essence of strategy: Get, if you can, the other side in a double bind.

Either the Americans commit ever more ressource to a garrison that has already been cut off by land and basically feed men and machines and materiel in an attrition scenario with an enemy who regards an exchange rate of 1:10 as acceptable (and achieved much better) and can force the Americans to expand extraordinary levels of supply alone for the resupply runs, that is only keeping their troops alive inflicts a considerably heightened cost in supplies (Petroluem, Oil, lubricants, spare parts, ammunition for the combat aircrafts, etc.) and more attrition (a helicopter or aircraft only has so many hours until it breaks down) or evacuate the basis, weakening both the CIDG programm and the possibilities of intercepting supply through the DMZ as well giving the Vietcong/North Vietnamese breathing space and control over the local population. It is the ideal battle: How ever it turns out the North Vietnamese will get something for their commitment. 94.229.145.154 (talk) 15:51, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
 * I'm not making any judgment at all and said that as 212.100.51.120 correctly pointed out above, whatever happened at Khe Sanh the North Vietnamese would claim victory. They did this in every battle, even ones they just invented... Mztourist (talk) 18:46, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
 * Actually that is not what i said in that post. What i said was that however it would turn out the North Vietnamese WOULD HAVE WON SOMETHING. Either they would straight up take Khe Sahn, in which case the advantages would be obvious. Or they would be able to create a situation where their opponent could not withdraw without losing face and would be forced to feed evermore supplies into the battle which won him nothing while it was conducted, would only keep the status quo if won and where in defeat only the ever ephemeral 'body count' figures could be cited as victory. The North Vietnamese won something at Khe Sahn and would have no matter what happened independently of any propaganda annoucenments. The US however won nothing but dead enemies and even there it is doubtful whether the comparativly light North Vietnamese casualties were worth what had to be done in menhours, supplies, oil and flight hours to inflict them.77.75.203.108 (talk) 00:10, 29 October 2016 (UTC)
 * As user:Mztourist doesn't make any further argument, I think this discussion already has a result. Furthermore, unless he could give any RS which proves that the North Vietnam did confess that it lost the battle, or any RS that discredits the two sources I tagged in the article, it would be best appropriate to claim this battle as indecisive. Dino nam (talk) 02:57, 31 October 2016 (UTC)
 * Dino nam you can't just claim that because I haven't immediately responded to you that therefore I concede to your position and you can go and make a substantial change to the Infobox. The Infobox presents a nuanced view of all aspects of the outcome of the battle which has been developed by many users over time. The page also contains an entire section on the riddle of Khe Sanh presenting different views of what the North Vietnamese were actually trying to acheive there and the wider strategic impact of the battle. The fact is that from a conventional war viewpoint the US were in no way defeated at Khe Sanh and left the battlefield on their own terms, they continued to conduct mobile operations in the area for the next 3 years, occuppied Hill 950 and reoccuppied the base unopposed in February 1971. Mztourist (talk) 04:26, 31 October 2016 (UTC)
 * By your failure to discuss with the others on the talk page, you have violated the WP:COMMUNICATE regulation, which might lead to question of whether you have good faith while making such reverts.
 * The section about the riddle of Khe Sanh even further proves that the battle result can hardly be considered an Allied victory. How can you know the other side has been defeated when you haven't even know their purposes during the campaign?
 * "The fact is that from a conventional war viewpoint the US were in no way defeated at Khe Sanh..." → Provide RS to support what you say please. And also, don't try to defy me, but those RS that I've cited. Dino nam (talk) 08:53, 31 October 2016 (UTC)
 * There has been no failure to communicate by me, but you seem to believe that I am obliged to respond to you immediately which is not the case. As has been discussed above, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would always claim victory no matter what occurred and would change their explanation of their strategy to suit the outcome. "Don't try to defy me" is a laughable comment and I do not intend to engage with you further pending the outcome of the Edit Warring complaint I have made. Mztourist (talk) 03:30, 1 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Yes, of course, you aren't obliged to respond to me immediately. You're obliged to "start a discussion on the talk page if you want to restore your change, following our Bold, Revert, Discuss (BRD) cycle." (WP:COMMUNICATE).
 * You know why I have to say "don't defy me"? Because you're keep making chunks of OR like you're talking on the streets instead of on the talk page of WP. Again, provide RS to defy the RS someone has provided you next time, please. Good luck with your complaint. Dino nam (talk) 02:17, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Dino nam there was consensus on the outcome of the battle which User: 14.177.199.124 and you decided to change. You made the change without discussing it here first and ignoring the consensus and so I was perfectly justified in reverting it based on that consensus. Its hilarious how you pick and choose policies to try to justify your position while completely ignoring consensus. I have only stopped reverting your change to avoid Edit-warring and will await the outcome of my Edit-warring and SPI complaints against you.Mztourist (talk) 03:18, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * You have a very good sense of humor when you cite an IP that doesn't even appear on this talk page and call it "consensus". The only thing I can see is that IP 77.75.203.108 has had the same opinion as I've had, so I don't need to say anything else. You had a different opinion, made a totally different editing but didn't say a word for 2 days on the talk page about what you had edited, and that's not my responsibility. Dino nam (talk) 04:46, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * 14.177.199.124 made this change: . Your lack of respect for consensus and preference for edit warring has already been amply demonstrated as anyone can see by looking at your talk page and block log. Mztourist (talk) 09:26, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * What is the evidence of your so-called "consensus" on this talk page?
 * Sounds like you've violated WP:NPA, but I'd kindly advise you to look at your own talk page before making any judgement. Dino nam (talk) 10:54, 2 November 2016 (UTC)