Talk:Ernest J. King

Definitely grade "C" entry
This is definitely a grade "C" article. It it chock full of revisionism and opinion which is inconsistent with the majority of learn'ed research and literature on the subject. A lot of it, especially the "Analysis" is little more than shameless King-boosting (e.g. the folksy, but entirely irrelevant 'quips' by King and others - seriously, who cares what Joe Stilwell thought of King vs. Brits??). Even parts which may be factual must be viewed with suspicion given the obvious slant of large sections of the entry.

vice-admiral versus vice admiral
Both styles--with and without hyphen--are used in this article. Either style can be correct, but consistency should be followed. I would recommend no hyphen. Milesnfowler (talk) 17:14, 30 September 2023 (UTC)

Anglophobia
I don't know if people are intending to re-add this stuff later, but I'd like to remind people that even if people have their misgivings about Gannon etc's criticism of King, it's not NPOV to omit it altogether, especially if we are using King's autobiography as a source. (Also be careful you don't stray into OR) Fangz (talk) 12:11, 25 May 2024 (UTC)


 * In case Hawkeye7 is unclear about this, this issue is why the current article, especially the Atlantic war section is unacceptably POV. Much earlier there was a comment from Dukeford wherein:
 * > I have serious objections to using Gannon's book as the sole reference arbitrator of King's performance in the U-boat war. Perhaps some American historians are too sympathetic to King's image, but Gannon's book is overly biased in the other direction. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.
 * But now the article has gone completely the other way. Now only pro-King books are cited, all critique of King is completely removed, which is absurd because even articles defending King do it in the context of "most historical interpretations use King as a scapegoat" (example: ). As per WP:CRIT the commonly held viewpoint about King's alleged anglophobia need to be AT LEAST mentioned, and rebutted with reliable sources (sources 'addressing' those critiques, not editor-synthesised OR rebuttals) if you want. In terms of sources criticising King there's a number that have gotten removed in the recent edits, plus more that can be easily found. Fangz (talk) 00:22, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * This is covered in the Pacific war section. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  20:44, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Gannon's critique that holds King mainly responsible for the success of operation drumbeat because of an Anglophobia that made him and other senior officers unwilling to learn and cooperate with the British is covered in the Pacific war section? When Miller etc al writes "The Navy Department and Admiral King are the most common scapegoats for historians studying America’s Drumbeat failures" do you think that comes across in the article right now? I don't mean to say the article needs to compel you to believe it, but this is a pretty substantial critique that you have completely removed.
 * There's Pacific war stuff about allocation of resources but even a cursory look at material on King would indicate that the extent of and reasons behind King's responsibility for drumbeat is the biggest issue. The present article works extremely hard in claiming King was not anglophobic while not even explaining why his detractors consider him anglophobic in the first place! Fangz (talk) 21:43, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I am also not a fan of turning "It is indeed possible that King was anglophobic, although it is hard to reconcile such a general antipathy with his British ancestry, the pleasure he took in his visits to England, and the respectful and often warm relations he developed with many of his wartime British colleagues. More likely he was, as one contemporary commented, pro-American rather than anti-British [...] None of this is meant to imply that King's resistance to a British presence in the Pacific was entirely objective. Anglo-American naval relations were burdened with considerable history, much of it adversarial, going back to the War of 1812 and beyond. There was, within the U.S. Navy officer corps, a long held institutional jealousy of the Royal Navy, and King was very much a product of the institution." into its current form. Cole is less interested in rebutting King's anglophobia than saying that there were other factors as well. Fangz (talk) 22:12, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I am away at present and will not be able to consult my books until next week. If you have a source explicitly explaining why he was considered anglophobic, that would be most useful. Failing that, I can simply list allegations. Like Cole I am less interested in rebutting arguments than in presenting facts. I have only worked on one a few US naval biographies before (William D. Leahy and Thomas C. Kinkaid were the main ones) and Leahy has received much better coverage than King. Would you find quoting or paraphrasing Cole acceptable? I can also quote King himself.  Hawkeye7   (discuss)  20:42, 1 June 2024 (UTC)


 * Regarding Drumbeat, I followed Morison, who pointed the finger at the Navy Department. The shortage was of escorts, particularly destroyers. That is hard to blame on King, because he never worked in the Bureau of Ships, or Roosevelt, who advocated their construction, or Congress, who were never even asked. The Navy's priority was big ships. More generally, US Navy doctrine focused on decisive fleet encounters, and at the Naval War College they studied Trafalgar, Tsushima and Jutland rather than the U-boat offensive of World War I. King was very much a product of the institution in this regard. The reluctance to learn from British experience is a principle that the United States was founded upon. The other factor is that the United States was totally unprepared for war in 1942, and so many things that could have been done before the war were not. My biggest concern was that people will say that the detail devoted to Drumbeat is WP:UNDUE. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  20:42, 1 June 2024 (UTC)
 * The escorts are an issue, but there's some points here:
 * 1. There's an issue of confused timing. This I think is the fault of Buell, who talks about a number of conversations but not the dates when they happen, and does not give the history in chronological order. For example, King's request for a thousand DEs actually came around in June 1942, which is irrelevant for Drumbeat. It's similarly not clear at all when he had the conversation with Andrews about convoys (to which Andrews claimed a lack of escorts). Given King's actions it probably happened in April at the earliest (he wrote the memo demanding ASW construction in May, and had the interlocking convoy plan recommended to him at the end of march). Maybe some other source could give the date for this but I don't think there's a basis for making an implication here he was calling for convoys all along.
 * 2. I think the section references Buell but if you look at Buell's language he is actually very skeptical about the "not enough escorts" line. He describes the initial efforts as "haphazard" and "flailing", and when the navy said to the complaining civilians they didn't have enough escorts he describes it as "the usual excuses". He responds to the claim "everything possible was being done" with, in his own words "but was this true?" He makes a fair amount of weight in suggesting here that it was outside criticism that pushed the navy to start taking things seriously and consider convoys even in the absence of the desired amount of escorts, including the board King later convened. Other authors go a lot further with this.
 * 3. Buell talk about disorganisation, especially between Ingersoll and Andrews. King appointed his successors and delegated responsibility to them, so he has some responsibility for their mistakes.
 * So I think the historical consensus is something like (this is paraphrasing but I think you can find refs that say this more or less directly):
 * 1. The USN was both materially and mentally unprepared for ASW going up to Drumbeat. The material issues won't really be solved until 1943 (i.e. well after the end of the campaign), this was hampered by priorities but realistically because of how late the issue was identified (may to july 43) the delay was in the order of a couple of months.
 * 2. On a mental level the navy demonstrated a lack of initiative. It took a lot of outside pressure to get the navy to explore all options, which only really began after March 42 (two events here, the visit of Roger Winn and the group of oil execs). The key part is the thorough exploration of the convoy system, the bucket brigade etc, getting the army to order blackouts etc. The point made is that it was large losses that led to these measures, when these measures could have been pushed harder in anticipation of these losses. So I think most historians would agree that there's a number of factors at play but the question is the weight placed on them.
 * 3. The Atlantic war was not King's highest priority on a personal level at the early point in the war. The war against Japan took his personal attention and he was happy to let Andrews and the British etc figure it out. In terms of resources he was in favour of conducting a limited offensive (Guadalcanal) in the Pacific, at a point where all acknowledged that destroyer availability was stretched. As Guadalcanal etc was his idea, he does have some role in the resource problem. He wanted to build ships to solve the escort problem, but at the same time he was happy to send ships out west. I'm not saying this was a mistake but it does indicate priorities.
 * So I think that's the core facts everyone agrees on. The more contentious questions are King's blame for this. Gannon and a few others are mad as hell at King, making a big point out of warnings the British sent to the Americans before drumbeat began. There's a British book I saw that spoke of the British anger that the Americans seemed to be "trying every approach except convoys". I think a more equivocal response (which I'd probably go with) is that King was overworked and had to juggle too many plates. Personality wise I think a lot has been written on King's preference for people to just work without interference. Eisenhower called him the "antithesis of cooperation" in March.
 * Then there's the Anglophobia question, and I think the centre viewpoint is a sort of "light" anglophobia - as you say, an institutional jealousy and mistrust of the royal navy and British goals that is neither completely irrational nor completely objective. I think Cole is a fine source on this but I guess I wouldn't use him to "disprove" Anglophobia, rather I feel the issue here is that different authors use Anglophobia to mean different things. What Cole called a lack of objectivity and instutional/historical mistrust of the British *is* what other authors call Anglophobia, so honestly I don't find his "he's not anti British because he liked visiting Britain" to be awfully persuasive. I think there's some talking past each other there.
 * So like, I totally get what you say about undue criticism but I think the article should represent this stuff. I want to make these points clear and try to avoid an edit war on the matter. Fangz (talk) 05:41, 2 June 2024 (UTC)
 * We are in agreement. I will adjust the wording to correct the timing issues, and add a bit more about the institutional anglophobia. I agree about the Navy's mental preparation, but will have to dig up some sources. You have an interesting point about command structures. King was not averse to complicated structures. He appointed Ingersoll as deputy cominch and deputy cincpac, making him both senior and subordinate to Nimitz; the Tenth Fleet added further complexity to the Atlantic Fleet-Eastern Sea Frontier; and in Overlord, Hall and Kirk were each other's superior. I will make the changes next week, after I get back. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:12, 2 June 2024 (UTC)

Did you know nomination
I don't think the information in the hook is really found in the article at present. The War College source is in accordance with the hook (though it links it straight to an NPS site), but the article only mentions blowtorches in the context of the Arthur Walsh anecdote, and doesn't describe a "popular myth" anywhere. I'm also not sure it's appropriate to call King "so tough" in Wikipedia's voice. I think the article needs to be reworked a little, and perhaps the hook should be tweaked. Let me know what you think. —Ganesha811 (talk) 21:37, 28 June 2024 (UTC)


 * I have tweaked the article to be a bit more like the online source. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  23:39, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks. What are your thoughts on the other issue (calling him "so tough" in Wikipedia's voice)? —Ganesha811 (talk) 02:53, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
 * It matches the source. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  05:53, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Well, not quite. The source states that the popular myth was that he was so tough he shaved with a blowtorch, i.e., a joke. I don't think that's license for us to use the descriptor in Wikipedia's voice. Jeromi mentioned the same issue on the nomination page. It's a subtle difference but I think an important one. What does the article actually say? It has Ismay calling him "tough as nails" - it also, in Wikipedia's voice, calls him "notoriously abrasive", plus a couple references to personality clashes with Forrestal and Wilson. But that's not enough for us as an encyclopedia to call him "so tough". We could rephrase to ... that it was said that Admiral Ernest J. King was so tough he shaved with a blowtorch? or similar, which avoids the problem. "popular myth held" is also a borrowed phrase from the source, which is a different issue. —Ganesha811 (talk) 06:06, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I've tweaked the hook to address this. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  06:28, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
 * And I've adjusted the hook in Queue 7 to match. Thanks for your responsiveness! I know it seems like a minor point but as it is the lead hook, with a picture, I wanted to make sure we were shipshape (pun intended). —Ganesha811 (talk) 06:35, 29 June 2024 (UTC)

Citation format
I has been suggested at WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Ernest J. King that the citation format be altered to use the sfn template. This would have multiple advantages, in that the software would then check that all the references are satisfied, and their manipulation would be much less cumbersome. Hawkeye7  (discuss)  20:40, 11 June 2024 (UTC)


 * Support changing to sfns. I don't think anyone would be against this. Matarisvan (talk) 07:57, 13 June 2024 (UTC)