Talk:Greek government-debt crisis/Archive 3

1. Eurozone Entry. Cheat or not cheat. 2. I dispute the OR.

 * 1.I've added more references. I really hate citing these @#@#$%@#% people (Semites, Stournaras) and the @#%@%@@% pro-Memorandum flagship, Kathemerine, but we have to be precise, factual and objective! So Lokalkosmopolit, please stop the edit-war! For God's sake, there is even a dedicated article on this! As you could have seen being linked to at the top of the section... P.S. My personal opinion: Did Greece cheat and cook books in order to to enter? Sure, yes; but so did many others... And the cheat was not in the way it has been widely (mis)reported. P.P.S. On a sidenote, although citing another such figure (Alogoskouphes), the current account addition Lokalkosmopolit has made at another section is positive, imo. I'm btw of the balance-of-payments, currency, external debt, crisis view, not of the public, fiscal, etc BS... ;-)
 * 2.On the OR tag addition: Sorry but it's ridiculous. I most emphatically dispute it. The section is fully cited. And it's also common knowledge among the ones who have actually, really, seriously, studied the subject... Thanatos|talk|contributions 17:05, 6 March 2014 (UTC)


 * I've been reading Kathimerini for years and I never noticed it's pro-Memorandum flagship. Second, the whole paragraph is written in a partisan manner (e.g. the wording ″This is a surprisingly widespread erroneous statement″ is not neutral). You are claiming based on one source that the figures were correct and not falsified and that this is a generally accepted belief. Wrong! First, Greek government itself accepted that the figures were falsified . Second, this is widely held to be true by the public . Costas Simitis can justify himself, but being responsible for the Greek government policies from 1996-2004 he's a partisan source here. You may call it a myth but reliable sources say that [Greece under Simitis] ″only adhered to the three percent deficit ceiling with the help of blatant balance sheet cosmetics″ . The fact that Simitis government falsified the statistics is also reflected in scholarly sources. Chrysoloras (2013:15) writes that we now know with certainty that Greece managed to get into the eurozone with false data (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48254/1/GreeSE%20No66.pdf). You can't discard those like that because you don't like those views. Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 18:23, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Nonsense! This is exactly what the section and the articles and all the relevant stuff explain. I !@#$#!@$ hate Semites and Stournaras (and Alogoskouphes and the whole bunch of them)!!!! I'm not in any way defending any of them. I have to be objective, rational and empirical. Or put in another way, in other words, I want to hate them based on what they've actually done, not on what is commonly, yet erroneously claimed they've done. And the alleged cheating, be it the GS swap or the 2004 audit, ESA methodology, does not make sense, is irrelevant in the case of the Greek entry into the EZ. Period! I -and the editors that have written the aforementioned sections and articles- have fully substantiated the claim that said alleged cheating is wrong; with primary, secondary and tertiary sources. So now, you have the onus probandi to substantiate your claim. Repeating a widely circulating, lacking any substantiation, falsehood, does not an argument, a truth, make... For god's sake, I repeat, the whole point of this section and of other articles is to show that this widely repeated claim is wrong, or at least unsubstantiated... P.S. What we do have is e.g. the Benford's law deviation paper. We could incorporate this into the text. But this is a different kind of beast... P.P.S. Your "source" on this issue reads (pg 19): "After succesive revisions to its budget deficits, we now know with certainy that it managed to get in the Eurozone with false data". That's it. Where is the evidence supporting this claim?? No evidence, nor any source provided therein... P.P.P.S. I would be very very very happy to be proven wrong on this. I will be very happy, glad, to change my mind. I will edit then myself the article(s) accordingly. I will have one more offical reason to hate said people. But I need evidence. Not hearsay. I have seen none of it refutting Semites et al on this issue. So, if you know of any such evidence, please, kindly, share it with us... Thanatos|talk|contributions 19:30, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Would you please desist from emotional language like 'nonsense', 'period!' in bold font weight and random characters like !@#$#!@$. It's like teenagers' way of expressing themselves one would think. Now, as I pointed out the view that data were falsified is widely accepted, rather than being unequivocally refuted as you claim. I agree that a specialist source would be better than the random articles I found. However, even this suffices to prove that the article as it is violates WP:NPOV in that one view is presented as universally accepted and the only valid one ('true') and other view - though in fact prevalent - is presented as invalid and 'erroneous'. Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 20:13, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * 1.Acting like such a teenager is someone who consistently in his/her comments, edits (including deletions), and edit summaries acts ex cathedra and projects onto the other side one's own problems, someone who repeats the hearsay he/she deeply believes in, however common, and demands from others to accept it as the truth. I've just described you, btw, if you haven't realised it yet, on your own... 2.No, it's not violating NPOV; the whole section lists and cites, for example articles about debunking x,y,z common myths about Greece. On the contrary, you've actually provided no data, no analysis, no serious source that provides us with a real argumentation or counterargumentation, breakdown of the logic and the data, other than of the type of repeating Greece cheated its entry into the EZ, nah nah nah. I've now added even more serious refs. So now, please, either put up, or shut up!!! ;-) P.S.OK let's assume as a working hypothesis that the present state of teh section is not so NPOV. How about OR?? Or have you fallen back now to the former? Are you willing to remove the latter?? Could we talk more seriously and to the point, about the essense of the issue before us and not about mindless legalisms? Could we rephrase the section into a more acceptable form? I've already e.g. mentioned the Benford's law deviation paper... To other editors out there, reading this: For god's sake, is there no editor out there reading this who has written or contributed to this section (or relevant articles), willing to step in?!? I've hardly touched this article (excluding its talk page) since its breakaway from the Economy of Greece article, long, long, long, long ago; am I the one who has to defend it? Need I go to 3O?? Thanatos|talk|contributions 20:59, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * With the exception of Simitis, none of the sources support the preposterous claim that "it actually fulfilled all criteria for admission including the 1999 budget deficit (even with all later corrections) according to the accounting method in force at the time (ESA79).". Now, Greece received in 2004 a formal warning from the European Commission for publishing false data about its public finances. The article reports that "The Commission found that Greece had hugely underreported its budget deficit between 1997 and 1999.". Furthermore, the article says "Eurostat has also revised upwards Greece's deficit figures for 1998 and 1999. In both years, Greece's deficit was above the 3% cap which the EU imposes on states wanting to join the euro." It is an accepted fact, according to the relevant European Commission ″Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics″ (2010) that"Following evidence of widespread misreporting of deficit and debt data by the Greek authorities during the previous years, in November 2004 a Report on the revision of Greek government deficit and debt figures was released by Eurostat, which showed that figures had been misreported in the years preceding 2004 involving no less than 11 separate issues"It is also the Hellenic Statistical Authority that admitted in 2013, that "In 2004, Eurostat produced a comprehensive report on the revision of the Greek government deficit and debt figures, showing how the Greek statistical authorities had""misrepresented figures on deficit and debt in the years between 1997 and 2003"The 2004 report  emphasizes, that ″this latest revision between the March 2004 and the September 2004 notifications rest on a more faithful application of the ESA 95 and on the availability of new data.″ The report explains that the real deficit figures for 1999 are "1999: 3,4 % of GDP instead of 1,8 %" If we leave details aside, the reasons for this new revision included: a) ″Increase of recording for military expenditures of equipment goods″; and b) ″Correct recording of capital injections and EU grants″ - thus, according to the report, it was not the revision that used incorrect methodology, as Simitis seems to claim, but rather the unrevised numbers were the result of methodological shortcomings.Lokalkosmopolit (talk)
 * PS. An article entitled Eurostat takes issue with former Greek PM on reasons for the revision of economic data says that ″Eurostat cannot agree with a number of other statements made by Mr Simitis, and in particular that the revision of the Greek data is due to the retroactive application of new rules.″.Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 23:17, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * There was in various periods underreporting due to various reasons. There were audits. There was back forth communication and arguments. There were accusations. There were revisions. The official record of the deficit for 1999 indeed reads a bit more than 3%. Is the article section or I claiming otherwise?!? Have you alredy forgotten what I wrote to you at the  when I was first undoing your deletion? Do you understand what you're citing? Have you forgotten what exactly is the issue at hand?!? Have you forgotten which claims must be verified/refuted? Go back to the added refs and sections and articles and reread. In general, read and think again... P.S.Unless something significant, of essence is to be added, I'm done. Refs, etc been have specifically added to the section to address any good- or bad-willed, bureaucratic, legalistic, absent-minded or other objections. Goodwilled, constructive suggestions and efforts have been made by me from the beginning. There is this discussion, standing as a record of the minor edit war (along with your uw-ew at my talk page) and the issue at hand (including the OR accusation). So there in no more need for me to waste my time... At least for now... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 11:13, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Glad that you understand that Simitis's view is only supported by a minority whilst Eurostat and the media argue that Greece indeed got into the Eurozone due to the false data. Consequently, the section as it now stands, has to be removed as inaccurate/reflecting only minority POV. Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 17:00, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Glad to see you put words in my mouth; never expected of you anything different. You're -possibly, if not probably; provided that you're Greek, that is- such a nice ND boy/girl, right?!?!? Or is it Drasi-DX?!?! Such a waste of my time... P.S. A propos, why aren't you so insistent and persistent about the other claims?!? Why don't you also go about removing/deleting/tagging-OR-not-NPOV/editing parts or the whole of the relevant dedicated articles, i.e. Controversy about media coverage of the 2009 Greek debt crisis and Greek Financial Audit, 2004 and sections of other articles, e.g. Economy of Greece?!? Following the same line of logic, myriads of media et al have reported and are still reporting that Greeks are lazy, retire at their 30s,40s,50s, take half of the year off in holidays, vacationing, etc, etc. Isn't claiming that that isn't true against NPOV?!?!? ;-) P.P.S. I would try to be more constructive, as I have already proposed us to do (e.g. by expressing views in a different context, showing let's say a controversy), but I can't do this anymore. You have shown no evidence of being worthy of this. Thanatos|talk|contributions 19:18, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * I'm not Greek, but have followed the situation since 2011. Also, the only time I've supported ND was the time of its (admittedly hypocritical) opposition to Papandreu government. I'm generally an opponent of the euro currency (in the Thilo Sarrazin tradition) and am more inclined to the view of the people who think Greece should re-introduce Drachma (and default, which would be unavoidable in that case). The fact that you did not notice my real POV just underscores the fact that I'm for neutrality and verifiability in the articles and that's why it wasn't evident. So, as we've seen, the current claim in the article is wrong. Apparently, Greece did not meet the criteria for 1999. So, the controversy should be treated in the special article Greek Financial Audit, 2004, but the way it is worded right now, it does not belong to the article at hand.Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 22:43, 8 March 2014 (UTC)
 * 1.Well I can and I do take back said characterisation of you (ND and indirectly pro-memorandum). Done. Easy for me to do so. 2.On the issue at hand though, nothing has changed; you've done nothing to substantiate the supposed needed change... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions
 * Sigh... If all the sources I added for the claim that according to Eurostat and lots of other sources, Greece really did not fulfill the target in 1999, still do not substantiate the needed change, then I don't know what does. I'll ask for 3rd opinion on this.Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 11:52, 9 March 2014 (UTC)
 * 1. Sigh squared, cubed... This is exactly the problem, why don' you get it?!? This is a meta-issue: A great deal of people and sources, including the usually regarded herein as serious, respectable and reliable, have perpetuated the claim without actually doing any analysis, any real work, etc. Same thing with the GS currency swap, something evidently, until at least someone proves otherwise, antedated, yet something from which you seem to have retreated much earlier, quite early... Same thing with Greeks being lazy, etc, etc...
 * 1.a. To my knowledge, no-one has actually disproven/refuted Semites and Strournaras' 2012 Guardian article; note that post said Guardian article, no great deal of, to put it mildy, such, considered as reliable, sources, repeating said cheating claim, seem -to my knowledge- to exist...
 * 2. Anyway, I've now done a great deal of more work on the section. Does it satisfy you?? All this time, I've been bending over backwards without, to say the least, any reciprocity...
 * 3. And finally let us return -lest you forget, again and again and again- to the initial and central objection found at the @#$@#$% title of this talk-page section, i.e. OR; what the hell does or was constituting OR at said article-section?!?!?!!?!?!?!
 * P.S. I've been asking loudly, directly or indirectly, for 3rd party opinions, since 2 pages up ago... Thanatos|talk|contributions 14:59, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

Please tone down the discussion. Thanatos666, I have to be honest and state that I do not like the media section. First of all because I think it is too long for the importance within the article. Secondly, your effort to refute the claim one by one sound like coming up with excuses from the Greek side. It would be much stronger to make it much shorter and say something along the lines: "The media accused Greece of many shortcomings compared to agreements and overspending compared to other countries. This has caused problems for Greece negotiations and reform; and may have unduly damaged Greek reports since in several cases the reporting was biases (NAME CASES HERE)" Or something similar. What I know of the Greek crisis, it is indeed not about Greeks not working hard etc, but it is about government (and other) corruption, bad tax discipline as well as a restrictive economical system. Overturning this hurts many people in the short term, and sadly many hardworking honest Greeks (the vast majority) suffer heavily from this. But this is not the EU's fault, but that of a succession of many Greek governments. Arnoutf (talk) 18:46, 9 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Please tone down the discussion. I would tone it done, in fact I wouldn't have toned it up at all, had there been reciprocity or constructiveness, will to discuss, etc. There has been no such thing, starting from practically Lokalkosmopolit's first edit; against my many pleads; starting from (relevant, of this episode) edit 1 of mine.
 * Thanatos666, I have to be honest and state that I do not like the media section. OK, no problem, let's see why.
 * First of all because I think it is too long for the importance within the article. Disagree. It is important; at least imo. But this could and should be discussed, postponed, after the real disagreement has been resolved. So let's move on.
 * Secondly, your effort to refute the claim one by one sound like coming up with excuses from the Greek side. Disagree. Moreover, following the same logic, the existence of a whole article (or 2 or...) on this topic would probably constitute indisputable proof of Greeks being cheats and cry-babies or whatever... ;-) But even if it were indeed thus, it's irrelevant. So again, let's please move on.
 * It would be much ... of many Greek governments. Appreciate your feelings and kind words. Thank you very much. The problem is that they are irrelevant. You might as well be a die-hard mishellen (translation: Greek-hater); it would make no real difference in this case (OK, perhaps it could, but that would then probably be a different story). So let's again move on. Oops, end of comment... :)
 * A very simple two-part question:
 * 1. Which part(s) of this section of the article constitute(s) OR?
 * 2. Which part(s) of this section of the article constitute(s) breach of NPOV?
 * So many thanx for your input Arnoutf, it'd gotten, to say the least, boring, talking only to Lokalkosmopolit, but sorry, you haven't commented, even fleetingly, on the issue, the essence of the dispute... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 21:57, 9 March 2014 (UTC)


 * I think you misunderstood my second point. The point-by-point effort to refute this media coverage implies to the casual reader that the Greeks DO have something to defend and thus that there is some truth to the media coverage after all. A much shorter statement saying the Greeks have been unjustifiably vilified in many media (with a reference to the larger media article), would in my opinion be a much stronger statement in favor of the Greek position.


 * PS re tone down, that was meant for both of you, not only you ;-) Arnoutf (talk) 18:16, 10 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Point by point seems to me to be if not the, then at least a standard way to do a rational and factual presentation of x, the analytical way of analysis. Others ways, styles, stuff, etc, can and in many cases should be there also (such are present here btw; section lead and end), but an analysis seems to be a-the standard factual way to go when examining and reporting such complex issues. Think Encyclopaedia; not Op-ed or poem...
 * a. In any case, imo, even if some people might get from this that Greeks DO have something to hide, it would be practically inescapable or irrelevant, as wikipedia isn't a PR campaign in which case we would be interested more
 * a1. in the form, the medium than than essence; I don't won't to be misunderstood; form matters, form in many cases is closely interwoven with essense, I'm just saying that essence, content, info, facts and arguments, matter more, at least in such cases and media,
 * a2. in the end result of persuation for its own sake (information or disinformation power politics); even if there are ulterior motives, on top -or not- of contributing just for its own sake or for the spreading of knowledge etc, wikipedia isn't here to mainly serve Greek or other interests, or
 * a2a. even if it were here to do this, such interests are imo much more served in present form, not yours, whatever you might have in mind more extensively (c. below is of relevance to this in this case).
 * b. Putting it in the opposite way, arguing conversely, the point by point form seems to be a very user-friendly way to go when dealing with info, cases and events, especially when there are many of them, as in this case; again, this doesn't mean that other means or ways of thinking and writing can't or shouldn't be present also; in fact many-a-times they are necessary sometimes to the point of being sine qua non.
 * c. Other people, including me, would take your said modus operandi as the exact opposite of what you say it would be doing; see, people's minds are not all the same and we can't satisfy all of them.
 * d. This controversy constitutes directly and indirectly an important part of the crisis, so I don't understand why it should be only fleetingly mentioned pointing elsewhere in order to get the actual info which would make the actual learning, actual acquisition of factual knowledge dependent, contingent on the reader actually browsing to and reading the other article (reader's attention/interest retention problem).
 * e. The section isn't anyway that large and
 * e1. I can't exactly understand what would be the point of having at all such a section, if it were so short;at least that is, according to my possibly erroneous undestanding of your preference.
 * PS: I had initially written this reply as a long continuous passage. I then decided to change its form to the one of a list, a point by point reply; to say the least, it seems much more readable this way...
 * PPS: Toned up conversations and arguments don't trouble me; in fact I prefer them this way, provided they are real, of essence; which brings me for the nth time to the next post scriptum.
 * PPPS: Still waiting for someone to point me to what constitutes OR and/or breach of NPOV... Thanatos|talk|contributions 22:57, 10 March 2014 (UTC)
 * OK, very short. What constitutes breach of NPOV? The fact that the view supported by Eurostat, European Commission and numerous authors that Greece 1999 deficit figures were initially incorrect and later revised to over 3% is presented as unequivocally rejected 'widespread error' in the article. Wrong statement is presented as an unequivocal fact! That's what the problem is.Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 12:22, 11 March 2014 (UTC)
 * I see you've edited the article in the meantime, removing some of the claims and adding others . The paragraph that is unsourced at the moment and the most controversial, needs changing: "it has been argued that it actually fulfilled all criteria for admission including the 1999 budget deficit (even with all later corrections, within a margin of about 0.07% of GDP, as per the most recent AMECO -the official Annual Macroeconomic database of the EU commission- data) according to the accounting method in force at the time (ESA79). Even the highest ever alternative estimate for the 1999 budget deficit (in 2004, using an unorthodox accounting for military orders, later corrected, coupled with retroactive application of the current EU accounting method, i.e., ESA95) did not exceed 3.38%.". First, who is the author 'arguing' that, as the para claims? Second, I've summarized the Eurostat view above and that is: the revision was not due to retroactive use of other methodology. The revision didn't use ″an unorthodox accounting for military orders″ but rather correct methodology the Simitis government initially didn't use. Lokalkosmopolit (talk) 12:35, 11 March 2014 (UTC)
 * 1. Who has argued this is found inside refs: Ref No.432 Kathimerini (November 27, 2011), No.433 Guardian (2012; Semites and Stournaras), No.434 OECD (2005); refs cited at the end of relevant paragraph.
 * 2. Part of deficit exceeding 3%GDP mark != Δ(Deficit) = Revised (whichever) - Initially recorded-stated. See OECD (2005), pg.48; getting, hopefully any time soon, the difference between those two, might really prove helpful... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 17:42, 11 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Still waiting for justification of the OR tag. Enough time has passed; much more than enough explaining has been done and discussion taken place; if none is to be provided, I will forthwith remove said tag from said section of the article... Thanatos|talk|contributions 16:54, 15 March 2014 (UTC)

April 2014 - 8.3 billion euro loan for Greece
I think this should go in the article but I am unsure where to put it. I think it is part of the February 2012 package, not a third rescue package. Biscuittin (talk) 08:58, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
 * I think TV news stations are getting bored with Greece because it has had far less publicity than earlier loans. Biscuittin (talk) 09:01, 3 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Thank goodness TV news is bored with Greece. The Greeks have done a good (if not brilliant) job to get this under control, sad for the media as good news tends to be no news, but very hopeful for the country. Arnoutf (talk) 19:50, 3 April 2014 (UTC)

government-debt vs government debt, move?
Why is this article titled Greek government-debt crisis? Should we move it to Greek government debt crisis? I see no reason for the construction "government-debt" when it can be "government debt". Sofia Koutsouveli (talk) 21:36, 11 April 2014 (UTC)

Overtaxation
The article focuses mainly on the austerity measures but makes no mention of the overtaxation, which, according to media coverage, is a major contributor to the public crisis. A possible source on the overtaxation issue can be found here. I don't know if the particular site can count as a valid source, but it's easy to find one. How can this topic be incorporated in the article? And in which section? Γαλαδριήλ (talk) 15:56, 23 August 2014 (UTC)

Edit-warring to add unsourced original research
Edit-warring to add unsourced original research is unacceptable editing behaviour. The edit which I reverted had a misleading citation at the end of the sentence: The sentence is not supported by the reference. This is misleading use of references, but I see that it was subsequently corrected, so that's an encouraging first step. The rest of the paragraph: was completely unsourced. Such practices are unacceptable in any article, but especially in this one, which is on a topic uniquely susceptible to speculation and original research. Edit-warring to include this unsourced content is even more so. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 11:16, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Your complaint about potential edit-warring is completely unjustified. After you first removed the second part of my added unsourced paragraph, I returned to reinstate it while adjusting it to meet your concerns: 1) By reformulating the first line not to be assorted (as you noted above) and 2) By adding a CN-tag for the last unsourced part. The last part is basically an unbiased uncontroversial contextual observation, which I think we soon will find a reference for if leaving it with a CN-tag. I therefor asked you not to remove it, and if you had any problems/concerns about it, I invited you for a debate about it here at the talkpage. Now you instead responded by posting me a warning about potential edit-war, which I consider to be of offensive nature. Please cool your jets. I already agreed with you that we need to find a source for the unsourced part of the paragraph, but just argued it was best to keep it temporarily as part of the article with a CN-tag, in order to invite for a collaborative work for any Wikipedia-editor to help finding the needed source. Citation needed, proof this is an instrument that we are allowed temporarily to use at Wikipedia - until we succeed finding the needed additional reference for the material (and if this is not the case - you are allowed to remove it after 1 month). Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 11:43, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * I have explained to you multiple times now that the WP:BURDEN is upon you to supply the references for the original research material you are attempting to add to this article through edit-warring. I have also explained to you in your talkpage that original research and synthesis are unacceptable, but you seem bent on readding this unsourced original research into the article through reverting my reversions of your unacceptable original research. You also have a tendency to attribute blame to other people, cf. your personal attacks about "offensive" warnings and "cooling my jets". You also conveniently forget that you did not wait for my reply on your talkpage, but instead you reverted me, without knowing if I agree with you or not. Talking about "cooling my jets". You were on full flight with your jets at full blast coming to this article to revert me, while I was still writing my reply to you on your talk before I even had the chance to hit the "Save" button. I find this attitude disingenuous. The speed of your edit-warring, without waiting for my response, and your insistence in repeatedly adding this unsourced original research into the article fully warranted my messages to you. Your behaviour shows a rather serious case of POV-pushing. Personal attacks accompanied by edit-warring to push unsourced original research into articles, are never a good sign. Please modify your approach to editing. If the material is so "uncontroversial" as you say it is, there should be no difficulty in finding sources to support it. But the fact that you still haven't found these sources shows that your original research is not as obvious as you think and that is why it has to stay out of the article until you find the supporting sources. I repeat again, this is an area which is very susceptible to speculation and original research. We don't need more of that in the article. This article is not a parking lot, where we park our original research and unsourced speculation until or if we find sources to support it. We need verifiable facts. Per WP:BURDEN, you have to supply the sourced facts if you want them in the article. And you don't have to ping me. I watch this page. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις  12:16, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Before you shoot me completely down into multiple fragmented pieces, please focus on the facts. On 10:05, I first reinstated your removal of the disputed paragraph in a reformulated version with addition of a CN-tag, in the attempt to add it in a way that fully met all of your concerns. You then responded that it did not, and I replied on 11:15 by reinstating it once (along with some argued argumentation - why it was OK to keep in this format according to the Citation needed policy). Breaking the 3 revert rule is only possible, if you revert something unchanged thrice. I only did so once - and therefor any administrator would consider me to be miles away from breaking the 3 revert rule. But you completely neglect this fact, and decided instead to respond to me, by posting me an edit-warring, instead of opening up a fact based discussion here at the talkpage. That's a far more offensive behavior of you, compared to the degree of offensiveness you claim I am guilty off through my so-called bad edit behavior.
 * All along I have responded to you in a good friendly constructive tone. This is why I asked you to cool down your jets, because I really think I deserve a friendly constructive response. Moreover, I am doing other important stuff right now than working on Wikipedia articles. So I prioritized for a starting point just to post my additional "contextual line" along with a CN-tag, because I am out of time to do the search myself for an appropriate reference right now for this extra addition, while I at the same time also genuinely consider the contextual written lines both to be factual correct and quiet uncontroversial observations - which it will be fully possible soon to find a reference for (either by me or other editors). What part of the lines do you think is incorrect - and why? You still haven't presented me for any valid arguments, why its a bad idea to keep the disputed lines in the article along with a CN-tag temporarily for 1 month (which is possible according to the Citation needed policy) - so that we can invite all WP-editors to start searching for the needed reference for the factual lines. In this light, please reconsider my posted compromise proposal, that we now keep the disputed paragraph in the article with the CN-tag - temporarily for just 1 month. Within 1 month, I expect the CN-tag will be replaced by a valid reference, and if the CN-tag has not been replaced within 1 month you are of course welcome to remove it by then. I hope you are willing to accept this temporary solution, because I really do not have time to work more on it now. Danish Expert (talk) 13:12, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * Breaking the 3 revert rule is only possible, if you revert something unchanged thrice. I only did so once - and therefor any administrator would consider me to be miles away from breaking the 3 revert rule. Wrong you reverted me twice: First time, second time. You don't even know how to count the reverts, that's really worrying. You then responded that it did not, and I replied on 11:15 by reinstating it once Also wrong. At 11:06 UTC you gave me your reply on your talk, and at 11:10 you had already reverted me, not at 11:15 as you claim. You gave me 4 minutes to reply to you, an obviously impossible task. I liked also that you pinged me during your 11:06 reply, and then you went ahead to revert me at 11:10, without waiting for my answer. Nice touch. For the record, I replied to you at 11:15 UTC. But you had already reverted me by then for the second time at 11:10. Please get your edit-warring facts straight. I'll AGF you are not doing it on purpose. Finally, and for the nth time, this piece of unsourced original research will only go into the article if it gets supporting sources. You simply cannot park this piece of original research into the article while it is unsourced. How difficult is it for you to understand this matter of policy? That you don't have time to do a proper search for sources is no justification or reason to bypass the central policies of WP:VERIFICATION or WP:NOR. And I am not going to discuss the merits or lack thereof of the piece you are attempting to add to the article. I am simply asking that you comply with the relevant policies of Wikipedia, something that I have done many times so far, but you choose to ignore every single one of them. This is a very disturbing editing approach on your part. Plus, in addition to being original research, your piece tries to predict what will happen in the future and this is also a case of WP:CRYSTALBALL. It's just mere conjecture and speculation, and unsourced at that. Clearly unacceptable for entry into the article. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις  13:55, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * Also read the 3RR policy again. A revert is every time you change the edit of someone in whole or in part whether involving the same or different material each time. It does not apply to "unchanged" edits only. Read it again, before you get blocked because of a misunderstanding. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 14:43, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * I politely invite you once again, to step back and stop shooting at me for absolutely no reason. Its a waste of precious time for both you and me. I have to repeat, that your approach to accuse another friendly editor for "edit war" as a first response, was both disruptive and unproductive. Because in this particular case, we are dealing with a situation where I at first just made 1 bold reinstatement of material in the form of "attempting a new solution addressing your concerns" ( which does not count as a legal revert under the 3RR policy ), followed by 1 single legal revert claiming that your continued removal did not make sense according to the recent added solution (the CN-tag and reformulation) - while noting in the edit summary that if you still insisted for whatever reason that it still had not fully dealt with your concerns - then you should respond to me by posting an argued reply at the talkpage. How can it ever be appropriate to respond to such a constructive editor, by starting out to warn him about 3RR breach and accuse him of disruptive editing at the talkpage? I AFG on you in regards of your intention just to protect the article against inappropriate material. But I just think you were way too aggressive and too quick on the trigger towards me (which most people will agree with me also many times can constitute offensive behavior by an opponent, for the single purpose of wanting to win a discussion without argumentation, just by being bullish and threatening other editors of a potential block by an administrator). If you had started instead to respond more friendly here at the talkpage, instead of bombing me down with 3RR warnings, I would not have felt offended at all, and we would both have saved a lot of precious time!
 * If you want proof for my claim, that "reinstatement of material in the form of attempting a new solution addressing previous concerns" does not constitute a legal revert under the 3RR policy, I can refer you to BOLD,_revert,_discuss_cycle.
 * As for the disputed material, I will now use 15 minutes to search for the reference you called for. You already stole more than 15 minutes of my precious time by insisting on using time to conduct this ridiculous 3RR debat, and I see absolutely no point in wasting more precious time. Going forward, I hope you will consider engaging with other editors here at the talkpage of the article as a first response, before you start accusing/warning them of conducting edit wars - which they never did. Danish Expert (talk) 18:43, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * where I at first just made 1 bold reinstatement of material in the form of attempting a new solution addressing your concerns (which does not count as a legal revert under the 3RR policy This is obviously absolute nonsense. You reinstated the same chunk of unsourced material which I had objected to in the first place. That did not address any of my concerns, because you did not provide any source to support it. But don't take my word for it. Go to another editor and ask him about that claim of yours that it does not count as a legal revert under the 3RR policy.
 * You already stole more than 15 minutes of my precious time by insisting on using time to conduct this ridiculous 3RR debat, and I see absolutely no point in wasting more precious time. I find this nasty personal attack insulting and a sign of egocentric thinking. Your obstinate refusal to comply with core Wikipedia policies has also stolen my time.
 * Going forward, I hope you will consider engaging with other editors here at the talkpage of the article as a first response This is another sign of your disingenuous and self-serving behaviour. At 11:06 UTC you gave me your reply on your talk, so I first went to your talk to reply instead of opening a section here. I was also the one who started this section at 11:16 UTC and I would have started it earlier, save for your rapid-fire edit-warring and for engaging with me on two separate places. Your bad-faith accusations are way beyond the pale.
 * But I just think you were way too aggressive and too quick on the trigger towards me (which most people will agree with me also many times can constitute offensive behavior by an opponent, for the single purpose of wanting to win a discussion without argumentation, just by being bullish and threatening other editors of a potential block by an administrator). You kept edit-warring at a fast pace, reinserting original research into the article. You replied to me on your talk but you only gave me four minutes to respond, which is impossible to do. Your obtuse personal attacks lead me to believe that you did not read any of my replies that I gave you above in your rush to personally atack me with disingenuous and self-serving claims. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις  19:43, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

Solution
I now found the needed reference that you requested me earlier today to find. It is the EC Autumn 2014 forecast for Greece, basically saying the exact same as my previous added unsourced observational line did. I see absolutely no problem with WP:CRYSTALBALL, by adding this forecast info to the article, because it is based on content from a published official science-based forecast report - meaning you can not rightfully claim this to be "crystalball speculation". Therefor I will now boldly re-add the material again based on this reference, as I genuinely believe all of your concerns now have been fully met. Feel free (however) to remove it again, if you for whatever reason continue to disagree with me, and still think its inappropriate to list some referenced economic forecast data. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 19:05, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * You just added a complete OR note to justify your conclusions: which will help ensure that Greece will be labeled "debt sustainable" and fully regain complete access to private lending markets in 2015. while there is no mention of debt sustainability in the source, or for that matter regaining access to the markets in 2015. Finally your claim
 * is another heavy dose of original research, because the source makes no mention of "negative repercussions" or that "are forecast still to be felt during many of the subsequent years.". First, "many" is a weasel word and it is not in the source. In your first version of your original research you had claimed "several years". Now you changed it to "many years". So basically you are adding whatever comes to your mind. You did the same with "private consumption": In your first edit you had "forecast" "subdued private consumption". After you got the source which talks about "private consumption growth", you quietly dropped any mention of "private consumption" in your new edit. Yet you vehemently insisted to add that edit with citation needed tags to the article. This is very disruptive and unconstructive. And again with your new edit, none of these estimates are supported by the reference you provided. And you did not wait for consensus before yet again you edit-warred to add this synthesis in the article. It is an absolute waste of time talking to you. You have no grasp of WP:CONSENSUS as well as WP:OR and all the other policies you keep violating. You have not gained any consensus for your latest edit and you are at 3RR now. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 20:15, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * The source actually mentions:
 * Yet you added to the article:
 * The information you added is not in the source. The source only includes the top quote. The bottom quote is your invention. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 20:31, 19 November 2014 (UTC)
 * First of all, sorry if I offended you yesterday. Second, I am one of those editors who always contribute with correct and high quality content and sources. Sometimes, yes, I might be a little to fast. I admit being guilty of forgetting to add the CN-tag in first place behind the disputed contextual line. This being said, you have to admit, that the written contextual line was not incorrect. Some of it needed a better formulation, so that it matched the content of the later found reference, but nothing of its content was incorrect. For the rest of your posted concerns, I feel you are now starting to be a little overly concerned. However, I will now take time to respond to each of them, in the hope we can reach some kind of mutual acceptance for the lines.
 * About your concern of the OR-note: The so-called "OR-note", which is ECB's definition of when a sovereign state regain complete access to financial markets, is 100% factual correct, and something we can find a reference for at ECB's website (if one of us have time to start dig for it - I positively know it exist and can be extracted from their website as I remember reading the content approximately 1 year ago at their website - but I just do not remember where I found it). If you insist, we can for a start add a CN-tag behind the note, and hereby invite all readers soon to replace the CN-tag with the reference you call for.
 * About your concern that "there is no mention of debt sustainability in the source, or for that matter regaining access to the markets in 2015": Yes correct, this line is a contextual remark made on basis of the previous paragraph in the Wikipedia article - in which we have referenced sources pointing to the fact, that Greece now plan to issue ten-year bonds in 2015 (which will be equal to a regain of complete market access per ECB's definition). I also have to remind you, that the basic idea behind the first "Overview" chapter was to present the readers for a short summary of the articles following content (more or less functioning as an extended lead). This is why, I was keen not to go into exact details, but just wanted to end the chapter with a contextual conclusion. So yes, the intermediate line is not supported by the EC Forecast reference, but its presence is still supported for the purpose of providing a neutral unbiased linkage between how this last paragraph of the chapter is connected to the previous one. I see no fundamental problem about that.
 * About your concern that the last line is also WP:OR: Yes, the last written line: "While the Greek government-debt crisis hereby is forecast officially to end in 2015, many of its negative repercussions (i.e. a high unemployment rate) are forecast still to be felt during many of the subsequent years.", was (just like I argued above as response to your 2nd concern) also a mix of some new info being referenced (the persisting problem with a higher than normal unemployment rate in the years following the end of the Greek government-debt crisis) and a contextual conclusion of the "Overview chapter" (putting it all into context and rounding it off). The last line you are concerned about, is 100% factual correct, and I see no reason to go into full details about the exact figures of the unemployment rate in the summary chapter. The factual point here, is that the posted reference tells us, that the unemployment rate in the pre-crisis period 1995-2010 in average was 10.1% in Greece, and that Greece therefor still will suffer from higher than normal unemployment rates in 2015+2016 (despite that it will start to fall in those years) - which is equal to a negative repercussion from the Greek government-debt crisis. In US they are still in 2014 referring to their 6% unemployment rate as a negative repercussion from the Great Recession which ended for them in Q2-2009 (because their normal average is an average unemployment rate below 6%). So to speak in those "repercussion" terms and using those exact formulated words, is a factually correct observation which anybody can extract from reading the data in the posted reference. This observation is so crystal clear and factual correct as anything can be. Again, the purpose of the "Overview" chapter is not to go into multiple details, but to feature the summary of some more detailed info, that readers then can read more about later down in the article if they desire, which is why I opted in first place not to write a long paragraph explaining the unemployment situation in the "overview chapter". If you think we should add more clarifying details about this further down in the article, I will be supportive about that, but I really think we should attempt keeping the "overview chapter" as much as a "summary chapter" as possible.
 * These reasons above, is why I suggest to keep the lines in the last paragraph, as they are currently formulated. When the EC in a couple of weeks publish their updated review of the "bailout programme", I am positively certain they also will leave a comment about the "debt sustainability" status for Greece. When this happen, I will return and add this additional source as extra support for the story told by the pre-existing previous paragraph in the overview chapter, that Greece is now finally following its correct path to regain "debt sustainability" and as a result also plan to "regaining complete market access in 2015" by issuing a new series of 10-year government bonds. With all these reasons now listed and fully explained, I hope you can accept to keep the lines as they are currently formulated and displayed. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 08:45, 20 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Thank you for your apology. I accept it in good faith. I am also sorry if you thought some of my messages may have been strong. Your presentation in this new section in the context of an overview for the whole article and in the presence of the added source looks much more reasonable. Your new package of information addresses my unsourced OR concerns. Thank you and best regards. Δρ.Κ. λόγοςπράξις 19:44, 20 November 2014 (UTC)

End of the Greek recession in Q4-2013 ?
This is just to bump a note slightly in advance. In Europe recessions per definition ends, whenever the country's seasonally adjusted real GDP no longer contracts quarter-on-quarter. The challenge for our Wikipedia article however is, that ELSTAT currently is unable to calculate accurate quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted real GDP figures, and thus only publish unadjusted quarterly data displaying the relative changes of "quarters compared with same quarter of last year" for the Greek real GDP. Due to the delayed accumulation effect of the "quarter compared with same quarter of last year" figure, this figure however normally stays negative for 2 additional quarters after the real end of any recession.

ELSTAT announced in May 2014, that they are still not able to calculate accurate qoq seasonally adjusted real GDP figures, but I think we can expect them to start doing it, when they launch their new updated calculation method in September 2014. Only at that point of time, it will be known when exactly the Greek recession ended. So I ask all editors to avoid adding premature speculation lines into the article, claiming that the Greek recession has ended, until we at least can proof it with the soon to be released seasonally adjusted qoq real GDP data from ELSTAT. Until we have this data in our hands, nobody really knows for sure. We can only guess if it ended already by the end of Q4-2013 - or perhaps only will end a few quarters later. The latest EC spring forecast 2014 published in May 2014, suggest Greece will experience a positive 0.6% year-on-year real GDP growth in 2014, which under the assumption of gradually arriving improvements of the growth climate, imply that a seasonally adjusted real GDP growth indeed could have arrived as early as Q1-2014. But if the improvements are sudden rather than gradual, or if the forecast is wrong, then the end of the recession could arrive a little later. Personally I speculate the Greek recession indeed already ended by the end of Q4-2013. But we have to wait for the first hard data to arrive in September 2014, before we can check if my speculation is correct, and report anything about it in the Wikipedia article. Danish Expert (talk) 12:35, 16 May 2014 (UTC)
 * For those who excited wait for the first seasonally corrected quarterly real GDP data, I will -as a first prognosis- share that my own simplified calculation show that the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP started to rise already in Q1-2014:
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2013: €37,281 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,841 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2013: €40,788 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,441 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q3-2013: €42,905 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,046 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q4-2013: €40,008 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €39,654 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2014: €36,934 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,069 million.
 * To arrive at the above "simplified seaonsally adjusted real GDP for Q1-2014", I first calculated the adjusted forecasted quarterly GDP share for the four quarters in 2014 under the assumption the growth is evenly distributed throughout the year. If this is true - under the forcast that GDP will grow 0.6% in 2014, then we can expect this following seasonally adjusted percentage share between the four quarters in 2014: Q1share=24.944%, Q2share=24.981%, Q3share=25.019%, Q4share=25.056%. My formula for the "simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP" for Q1 then is: Q1share / (unadjusted Q1GDP/(unadjusted Q2GDP+Q3GDP+Q4GDP+Q1GDP)) * unadjusted Q1GDP. The simplified seasonally adjusted real GDPs for 2013 of course were calculated based on the same formula, with the only change that the "seasonally adjusted quarterly percentage shares" now were calculated based on the recorded final 2013 GDP growth rate (resulting in: Q1share=25.370%, Q2share=25.122%, Q3share=24.876%, Q4share=24.633%) . Of course it is only a simplified prognosis model, so we still need to wait for the September data to arrive, before concluding for sure that the adjusted quarterly real GDP started to grow in Q1-2014. Based on my model it indeed did, already starting from Q1-2014, at least we can be almost certain about this conclusion, if the unadjusted Q2-2014 real GDP is reported to be above €40,550 million; because if this happen it will mean the "simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP" will be above €40,069 million in Q2-2014. We shall see. Danish Expert (talk) 09:06, 8 June 2014 (UTC)
 * According to a Greek statistical note, the long awaited seasonal adjusted quarterly GDP figures will be published on 10 October 2014. In the mean time, ELSTAT now released their 2nd quarter provisional figures, which confirmed (when being subject to my homemade very simple seasonal adjustment) that the Greek economy indeed left its long recession as of 31 December 2013 - and now delivered positive growth for 2 consequtive "seasonally adjusted" quarters.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2013: €37,281 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,841 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2013: €40,788 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,441 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q3-2013: €42,905 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,046 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q4-2013: €40,008 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €39,654 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2014: €36,866 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,052 million.
 * GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2014: €40,667 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,081 million.
 * Again this finding of course still needs first to be confirmed by the official seasonally adjusted figures before we report anything, but so far the outlook looks positive. Danish Expert (talk) 15:00, 9 September 2014 (UTC)
 * Elstat has now finally released the long awaited seasonal adjusted quarterly GDP figures for the period Q1-1995 until Q3-2014. As expected, the latest recession indeed ended in Q4-2013. The new much more trustworthy data also show, that the Greek economy in the turmoil of the Financial Crisis was hit by a total of 3 separate recessions (and not one long):
 * Q3-2007 until Q4-2007 (duration = 2 quarters)
 * Q2-2008 until Q1-2009 (duration = 4 quarters)
 * Q3-2009 until Q4-2013 (duration = 18 quarters)
 * Today I have updated the article with the above data. Danish Expert (talk) 07:49, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

Greece hit by a 4th recession (+ ESA2010 figures for 1995-2005 will soon become available)
This is just a reminder for some future update work to be conducted. First of all, it is evident Greece risk (as soon as 13 May 2015) to be officially declared being hit by a new 4th recession starting in Q4-2014, as a result of the renewed political uncertainty about its will/intention to stay on the outlined path of the current bailout-programme (which is the premise for ensuring continued flow of the much needed financial Troika support). On 13 May 2015, ELSTAT will publish data for the seasonally adjusted real GDP in Q1-2015, and if it is negative again (as it was in Q4-2014), the appearance of two consecutive quarters with negative seasonally-adjusted growth satisfy the European definition for when states are declared to be "in recession".

Another development to keep an eye with, which will require us to update all 1995-2005 data in the wikitable about Greek financial accounts, is when ELSTAT release its ESA2010 transmission figures for those years. ELSTAT last year informed, they expected to have those data available already in April 2015, but they have not been released as of 8 May 2015. According to their latest schedule, it is a bit unclear when it will happen exactly, and could happen as late as October 2015 (as part of the ordinary revision of annual national account data being reported to Eurostat). Currently the wikitable lack references for the old ESA-1995 data, as I due to time constraints had to skip the part of digging up references for the old data (no longer available at AMECO). The problem with the missing ESA-1995 references will be resolved, once the ESA-2010 updated figures gets released, as they will replace all ESA-1995 figures. If I have failed to remember update the wikitable in October 2015, then please remind me of doing it, by posting a reminder at my talkpage. :-) Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 12:38, 9 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Greece indeed back in recession, with a seasonally adjusted (constant price) GDP shrinking by -0.4% in Q4-2014 and -0.2% in Q1-2015. I will update the article with this sad info, within one hour from this post. Of course it was kind of expected this would happen, when the new-elect Greek government chose a path to refuse complying with the terms of its current bailout programme along with enforcing a prolonged negotiation phase without any movement (which triggered its current harmful liquidity crisis). But still a very sad story, for me to see this play out in real life. I sincerely hope for Greece, that this current self-imposed fourth recession will be short. For this new fourth recession to be short (i.e. ending by the end of Q2-2015), it will require the immediate signing by Greece of a new agreement with its creditors - so that the liquidity crisis vanish again - while investors return as part of being calmed to learn what path Greece now opt to walk on in the future. Danish Expert (talk) 17:24, 13 May 2015 (UTC)

Notability of non-events (the waiting game)
This is just to bump a short note, explaining why no detailed news is reported in the article about the current negotiations between Greece and the Troika in 2015. The simple reason is, that nothing notable really happened since the Syriza-government won the election. A lot of posturing and comments were made by the new Greek government, but no notable movement/action took place. Hopefully we can soon write a subchapter explaining the contents of some new re-negotiated and implemented terms for the current Troika bailout programme, but until that happens everything is pretty much up in the air.

After having followed the topic quiet intense, I am a bit concerned about the recent political statements made by various Greek government spokesmen, as it appear they either "say something which they know is not possible/true" (as part of attempting to score easy political points and/or appear more responsible than they actually are)" or suffer from a complete unawareness of the fundamental rules of the eurozone. In example, Varoufakis continue to suggest, as of 14 May 2015, that ECB through a debt-swap should reschedule the Greek government repayments of earlier issued ECB-bonds (suggesting Draghi is willing to do it - if the Bundesbank did not restrain his maneuver options) - although all of us having passed the basic course in EU politics know that both the letter of the founding Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union and the ECB statute strictly prohibit ECB from conducting fiscal policy and/or offer debt-finance or debt-relief to some of its members (which is something that only the Eurogroup can make political decisions about). Asking ECB to unease liquidity constraints and/or reschedule debt repayments is simply equal to ask for something which is not an available tool in the tool box (they can not do something which the treaty prohibit them to do - and therefor solely base their liquidity offers to the Greek financial system based on observations for their specific needs - and not the potential need for funds subsequently to get transferred from the Greek banks to the Greek government - and if the Greek government at some point of time is incapable of repaying what they owe to ECB then ECB will keep their repayment claims unaltered - leaving a scenario of either a sovereign default or the Eurogroup+IMF to come to the rescue by offering a new third bailout programme so that Greece can honor its repayment commitments). Likewise, it is pretty clear that all locked bailout funds in the current bailout programme, can only be unlocked the moment the Troika review find that Greece actually has implemented all of the original payment terms - or alternatively some mutually agreed substituting terms - before this happen the Eurogroup (which it made absolutely clear through various statements issued since February 2015), will not approve the unlocking of any remaining frozen bailout pledges in the current programme - and they even clarified that before the current programme had been successfully completed by Greece "no negotiations would start about a potential third follow-up programmme for covering the Greek needs after 1 July 2015". Despite of this very clear fact, the Greek government repeatedly suggest towards the media, that an extraordinary Eurogroup will soon be called to approve a new deal, which is direct (intended/unintended) misinformation, as we all know (except apparently the Greek government) that the Troika needs both: (1) First to strike a mutually agreed deal with the Greek government about some renewed payment terms and (2) then publish an updated review-report concluding such terms have actually been implemented by the Greek government (through laws in parliament), before (3) The Eurogroup then finally can approve releasing the remaining funds in the current bailout-programme (which in best case - because of all the work before then still needed to be done - now only is possible at the earliest in the second half of June 2015). To conclude, this extra topic about potential "unawareness of fundamental rules of the eurozone", is also something I currently hesitate to write a sub-chapter about, at least for the moment, as it might too be a temporary non-notable event and/or just a "political game".

As we are all right now in a waiting game to learn what exactly happens, this is also the explanation why no specific "negotiation news" so far has been added to the article. We are all waiting for specific substantial news, which hopefully soon will arrive. Danish Expert (talk) 11:48, 15 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Please abstain from such commentaries and stick to the facts as much as possible; let me just say that your views on the EU/€Ζ Power Game - cause that's what it is in short - are not universally accepted... ;-) PS1. It would be fun to a have a fight conversation with you here on the issue at hand but others might not approve; these talk pages are not supposed to be a forum. PS2. Describing the present state of affairs though, is indeed hard because among other things it's hard to write about leaks and counterleaks, about statements, counterstatements and denials thereof without knowing exactly what's going on behind the curtain... Thanatos|talk|contributions 14:34, 15 May 2015 (UTC)
 * @Thanatos: Sorry if my post above developed into being a bit too long and forum-style commentarish. It started out as an attempt to figure out, when it would be appropriate to add a sub-chapter about the current negotiations. My own conclusion after elaborating a bit on the topic, was the same as yours, that we have to wait until the negotiations have ended, and then report the results by a fact-styled manor. Perhaps my post just in the process got a bit polluted by my personal growing frustration, that even the negotiation process itself (and what role ECB can possibly play), is something the current Greek government fails to understand (or at least spin false tales about to the media).
 * For sure I do not claim to know the outcome of negotiations, but the negotiation framework and ECB's role, were both matters being fixed before negotiations started (regulated by treaty agreements, ECB statue, ESM statute, and the Eurogroup decision issued "Feb.20" not to start negotiations about a follow-up programme before negotiations and implementation of the current programme had been completed successfully), and this negotiation framework can not be changed in any possible way - meaning the process is limited to be all about whether or not a mutual agreement about adjusted payment terms can be settled between the Greek government at one side and with IMF and the Commission's working staff group at the other (and if this is achieved, the process will then move to the next step, being the "implementation of terms by passing laws in the greek parliament", and then thirdly the final review report will be published by the Commission's working staff group, and fourthly the Eurogroup will then convene and approve the transfer(s) of bailout funds to Greece, and fifthly the Eurogroup at the same time will start a negotiation process for starting up a follow-up programme supposed to cover the time period after the current programme end on 30 June) . This outlined process is a fact, which already now can be sourced by various previous statements issued by the Eurogroup, and will at least be clear to all of us when (and if) the negotiations someday will complete successfully. I send my apology for posting such a long comment about it though, my bad. I agree with you, it is appropriate in all circumstances, now to await the final outcome of negotiations before we add a subchapter about it in the article. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 18:29, 15 May 2015 (UTC)
 * 1. Rules, deals, agreements, laws and treaties are commonly interpreted at will and/or bypassed/bent and/or broken outright, e.g. 1, 2. Especially by those who have the power to do so and who are often the ones who set the rules in the first place. This is hardly a novel phaenomenon... 2. Sure, let's take something that at the very least isn't working (need I say that this is a huge understatement?) and most probably isn't supposed to work in the way it's been declared to do so (or equivalently it's working fine, perfectly, but not in the stated manner; 3), and let's extend and pretend (after all these Greek guys are relatively far far away at a place few people see and for those who do see it, it's when they are on summer holidays partying); pretend it's working then when fail, goto start. Because after all rules are rules... PS In short, it's probably meaningless to argue over this, however fun it would be were it not for the problem that this is not a forum; our view on the...universe is a bit different... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions
 * @Thanatos: Yes, some of the operating rules can be interpreted to a certain degree by the political institutions (i.e. the Eurogroup). But nobody has the power to change the fundamental rules and procedures. In example, ECB can never accept writing-off debt that a Member State directly owe to ECB (as such a thing would be equal to a breach of the fundamental "no government financing"-rule) . Just like it is written in stone in a similar way, how the negotiation process is conducted for Accession of new EU Member States, where the candidates always are required first to complete a specific outlined process of having 36 chapters opened and successfully closed before an accession treaty subsequently can be signed to let them into the club as a new EU member. Your referral to the example of slack historic governance of the Stability and Growth Pact (which is something the Eurogroup solely was responsible for), can not be used to conclude its now possible for ECB freely to interpret and change its "fundamental rules" of operating. It is a complete no-go if ECB breaches its fundamental mandate and start acting politically, as such a move would inevitably shortly afterwards end up in constitutional courts and be declared illegal. By the way the European institutions are constructed, no political negotiation (or rule bending) is allowed in ECB, which is required to operate strictly within its inflation-mandate, while all sorts of "political negotiation" and/or approval of new negotiated bailout deals is a matter solely for the Eurogroup to approve (because they have the democratic mandate of actually representing the political will and judgement of voters in the eurozone member states, which is something the central bank governors never can do).
 * When the current Greek government point a blaming finger towards ECB, this can either be because they lack understanding of how the "fundamental rules" work or some political spin fired-off for the sole purpose of running a political game of "lets blame the institutions for something which they are not responsible for - just to alleviate the political pressure/opposition that we otherwise would face on home soil from Greek voters - because of our poor way of running the negotiations".
 * All this fuss put aside, I think we (at least for now) should avoid to debate this issue further. We both agree on the conclusion, namely that it is now appropriate to await conclusion of the negotiations before writing a subchapter about it. When the dust settles, everything will be much more clear. I can guarantee you in advance, that none of the fundamental rules will be broken (i.e. ECB will keep playing a political neutral game and not in any way directly interfere in the political process) . Perhaps the Eurogroup might reverse their "Feb.20-decision" about keeping negotiations separate for respectively "completion of the current programme" and the expected "follow-up programme starting on 1 July" (because they have the political power to do so if they find it appropriate), but it would be very irresponsible for the Greek government to cling its hope and negotiation position at such a dangerous bet.
 * In any case, the only story the wikipedia article currently can depict (to avoid speculative content and crystal balling), is the one describing the negotiation timeline and negotiation process approved by the Eurogroup on 20 February. I also think, you agree with me on this strictly limited editorial point, which btw imply no need for changes to the current content of the article. Danish Expert (talk) 05:33, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
 * 1. I won't comment on the views you've again expressed so that we stop debating this as we both evidently agree we should. This doesn't mean I agree with what you've said; it just means I'm stopping and I'm expecting from you to stop too. OK? ;-) 2. Yes as I've said in my first reply it's hard to present in a reasonable fashion what's going on; therefore it'd probably be better to wait for actual clear changes and events; minor edits would be fine but for drastic ones my view is that it'd be better to wait. I don't know whether third parties will agree though... Thanatos|talk|contributions 16:29, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Glad that we fully agree about the proposed editorial line - to await commenting the negotiations before they conclude. This has now indeed been established, by the posts by all three of us. :-) All that we have up until now, is only secondary reports, of what the central negotiators allegedly said/proposed/compromised:
 * IMF negotiation chief informed on 14 May: ''IMF wont pay any of its remaining frozen bailout transfers (initially scheduled for transfer in 2015 and 2016) before Greece both (1) Sign a new bailout agreement for the follow-up period stretching from July 2015 until March 2016 with the Eurogroup to ensure this period is fully funded, and (2) IMF's upcoming review report shall on that basis at the same time conclude that Greece implemented all of the agreed conditional terms while the IMF debt-sustainability analysis at the same time conclude existence of debt-sustainability in the medium-term.
 * Eurogroup President clarified in a Q/A on 11 May (watch from the 18 min mark and forward) : The Eurogroup can not (which was repeatedly communicated to Greece since Feb.20) release any of the remaining frozen bailout tranches of its current programme to Greece, on the same day a potential renegotiated agreement is signed between the Troika and Greece. The unlocking of frozen transfers require in addition to the signing of a mutual agreement for some renegotiated terms, that a review report subsequently gets published by the Commission's technical staff team which shall find the agreed renegotiated terms actually have been implemented by the Greek government (i.e. through passing of specific legislation in the Greek parliament) . Only when such a thing happen, then the Eurogroup will finally approve payment of the remaining tranche, but this being said - the final tranche might be divided into several smaller tranches (to ensure Greece receive a constant flow of transfers for the remaining period until 30 June, based on a splitting up of conditional terms into smaller packages, rather than having to await complying with all terms before a single penny is paid) . Finally, negotiations for establishment of a follow-up programme being envisaged for the period following the end of the current programme on 30 June, is something the Eurogroup agreed should not begin (which was repeatedly communicated to Greece since Feb.20) before the "current programme has been successfully completed" (which is something the Eurogroup first await receiving a finding of - by its "5th programme review report", effectively meaning negotiations for a potential 3rd programme will only begin, once the final transfer of the remaining conditional bailout tranche of the 2nd programme has been conducted) .
 * Tsipras wrote a letter to the Troika on 8 May: Informing them he had ran out of liquidity to pay his scheduled debt-tranche to IMF on 12 May - suggesting them to approve one of four proposed initiatives to solve his problem - which subsequently caused the IMF to approve a 5th solution which was that Greece instead could pay with money from its "IMF reserve fund" (feeding the dog by its own tale - as a temporary solution).
 * Negotiation status as of 16 May was: (1) Agreement to introduce a new VAT-rate (increasing revenues) in form of a high (18%-20%) standard rate and a low (8%-9%) rate for "special categories", (2) Agreement to lower the previous requirement for a 3.0% primary surplus in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016 - now to be only 1.0%-1.5% in 2015 rising to 1.5%-2.0% in 2016 and 3.5% for all following years (for the purpose to avoid excessive austerity), (3) Disagreement about "pension reforms" and "labor market reforms".
 * Varoufakis outlined his five-point proposal for a new 3rd-programme on 18 May: (1) A proposed debt-restructuring. After finally realizing ECB-debt can not be rescheduled, he now propose Greece instead should be allowed to conduct all scheduled ECB-debt repayments through establishment of a new ESM-funded 3rd bailout agreement (entering into force starting from 1 July). Moreover, he clarified Greece does not call for "implementation of haircuts or dramatic changes" towards the amount of debt it is obliged someday to repay to the Troika, but simply propose the timing for repayment of all the bailout funds Greece receive(d) from IMF and ESM+EFSF, now instead should be decided by a variable fluctuating maturity date depending on the observed real GDP growth rate in Greece. (2) Privatization of public assets (partly for the reason to cover the government's liquidity needs and partly to ensure an increased private investment takes place in the country), but only to the extent that the government retain a significant owner-share, because those remaining public assets could then subsequently be used as "government guaranteed assets" to raise additional private liquidity as part of funding upcoming growth initiative projects launched under the auspices of the new EBRD development bank and the Commission's new multi-billion "European Fund for Strategic Investments". (3) Establishment of a Non-Performing-Loan (NPL) public management company funded directly by ESM, to which Greek banks are allowed to transfer all their existing toxic NPLs, for the purpose of freeing up liquidity otherwise needed to cover their losses - so this liquidity instead can be lend-out again to private projects which will help boost economic growth. (if using the ESM-language, such an initiative would equal a new second "bank recapitalization and restructuring package", which would be transferred to the already existing HFSF under the same strict conditionality as written for its first bank recapitalisation package - that such funds can only be used for bank recapitalization or liquidation of created "bad banks" ~ i.e. a NPL public management company). (4) Program to combat poverty. (5) The new third programme agreement should move away from using the "language and logic of the IMF" being used when formulating the conditionality in its expiring second bailout programme, so that the language become more reminiscent of a "World Bank development type program", which require all negotiating parties to agree on a joint conditionality - meaning a new package of reforms which effectively will close the previous second bailout programme and start the new Metamnimoniaki era.
 * Negotiation strategy of the Greek government, revealed on 20 May: Despite repetitive messages issued by the Eurogroup at its monthly meetings since Feb.20, that "negotiations for some updated conditional terms ensuring a full conclusion of the 2nd programme - needs first successfully to conclude - before negotiations for a potential follow-up 3rd bailout programme can begin", the Greek government still as late as 20 May has opted to refuse accepting this negotiation framework! So they will not strive towards completing negotiations with the Troika by the end of May 2015, if this is understood to mean a final agreement introducing a complete update of all terms in the remaining part of the second bailout programme. They claim this is impossible for them now to do (either for political reasons or time constraints), and will on the "EU partnership (enlargement) summit" in Riga (scheduled to take place 20-21 May) , now ask for the Eurogroup to be reconvened for an extraordinary meeting in early next week, with the sole agenda of approving Greece can receive half of their remaining frozen bailout tranche (€3.9bn) in return of Greece then signing an "interim agreement", in which only half of the terms in the remaining part of the 2nd bailout programme is being updated and agreed upon, while the Eurogroup at the same time will be asked to accept negotiations for the 3rd bailout programme now can be allowed to begin (dealing with the continued disagreement about the remaining old batch of "non-complied terms", along with setting up extended additional financial support for Greece throughout at least the period from July 2015 to March 2016) . The Greek hope is, that if this special revised negotiation framework will be accepted by the Eurogroup, then this will lead ECB subseqently to accept at the same time allowing Greek banks to increase their holdings of short-term government T-bills, to an extend making it possibile for the Greek state to uphold its financial obligations towards all parties also in June 2015, so that one extra month of precious time can be bought for completing negotiations for a new 3rd (more permanent) bailout programme - of which the first conditional tranche is envisaged then ultimately can be received by the Greek state in early July 2015.
 * The above secondary sources are - as we seem to agree about - not good/important enough in an encyclopedic context (because they are either based solely on secondary sources or might reflect an intermediate not final negotiation result, remembering that Wikipedia is not a newspaper). This is the argument, why we now need to await primary sources about the final negotiation deal, before writing something which is notable, official and accurate. Danish Expert (talk) 11:30, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Negotiation status as of 16 May was: (1) Agreement to introduce a new VAT-rate (increasing revenues) in form of a high (18%-20%) standard rate and a low (8%-9%) rate for "special categories", (2) Agreement to lower the previous requirement for a 3.0% primary surplus in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016 - now to be only 1.0%-1.5% in 2015 rising to 1.5%-2.0% in 2016 and 3.5% for all following years (for the purpose to avoid excessive austerity), (3) Disagreement about "pension reforms" and "labor market reforms".
 * Varoufakis outlined his five-point proposal for a new 3rd-programme on 18 May: (1) A proposed debt-restructuring. After finally realizing ECB-debt can not be rescheduled, he now propose Greece instead should be allowed to conduct all scheduled ECB-debt repayments through establishment of a new ESM-funded 3rd bailout agreement (entering into force starting from 1 July). Moreover, he clarified Greece does not call for "implementation of haircuts or dramatic changes" towards the amount of debt it is obliged someday to repay to the Troika, but simply propose the timing for repayment of all the bailout funds Greece receive(d) from IMF and ESM+EFSF, now instead should be decided by a variable fluctuating maturity date depending on the observed real GDP growth rate in Greece. (2) Privatization of public assets (partly for the reason to cover the government's liquidity needs and partly to ensure an increased private investment takes place in the country), but only to the extent that the government retain a significant owner-share, because those remaining public assets could then subsequently be used as "government guaranteed assets" to raise additional private liquidity as part of funding upcoming growth initiative projects launched under the auspices of the new EBRD development bank and the Commission's new multi-billion "European Fund for Strategic Investments". (3) Establishment of a Non-Performing-Loan (NPL) public management company funded directly by ESM, to which Greek banks are allowed to transfer all their existing toxic NPLs, for the purpose of freeing up liquidity otherwise needed to cover their losses - so this liquidity instead can be lend-out again to private projects which will help boost economic growth. (if using the ESM-language, such an initiative would equal a new second "bank recapitalization and restructuring package", which would be transferred to the already existing HFSF under the same strict conditionality as written for its first bank recapitalisation package - that such funds can only be used for bank recapitalization or liquidation of created "bad banks" ~ i.e. a NPL public management company). (4) Program to combat poverty. (5) The new third programme agreement should move away from using the "language and logic of the IMF" being used when formulating the conditionality in its expiring second bailout programme, so that the language become more reminiscent of a "World Bank development type program", which require all negotiating parties to agree on a joint conditionality - meaning a new package of reforms which effectively will close the previous second bailout programme and start the new Metamnimoniaki era.
 * Negotiation strategy of the Greek government, revealed on 20 May: Despite repetitive messages issued by the Eurogroup at its monthly meetings since Feb.20, that "negotiations for some updated conditional terms ensuring a full conclusion of the 2nd programme - needs first successfully to conclude - before negotiations for a potential follow-up 3rd bailout programme can begin", the Greek government still as late as 20 May has opted to refuse accepting this negotiation framework! So they will not strive towards completing negotiations with the Troika by the end of May 2015, if this is understood to mean a final agreement introducing a complete update of all terms in the remaining part of the second bailout programme. They claim this is impossible for them now to do (either for political reasons or time constraints), and will on the "EU partnership (enlargement) summit" in Riga (scheduled to take place 20-21 May) , now ask for the Eurogroup to be reconvened for an extraordinary meeting in early next week, with the sole agenda of approving Greece can receive half of their remaining frozen bailout tranche (€3.9bn) in return of Greece then signing an "interim agreement", in which only half of the terms in the remaining part of the 2nd bailout programme is being updated and agreed upon, while the Eurogroup at the same time will be asked to accept negotiations for the 3rd bailout programme now can be allowed to begin (dealing with the continued disagreement about the remaining old batch of "non-complied terms", along with setting up extended additional financial support for Greece throughout at least the period from July 2015 to March 2016) . The Greek hope is, that if this special revised negotiation framework will be accepted by the Eurogroup, then this will lead ECB subseqently to accept at the same time allowing Greek banks to increase their holdings of short-term government T-bills, to an extend making it possibile for the Greek state to uphold its financial obligations towards all parties also in June 2015, so that one extra month of precious time can be bought for completing negotiations for a new 3rd (more permanent) bailout programme - of which the first conditional tranche is envisaged then ultimately can be received by the Greek state in early July 2015.
 * The above secondary sources are - as we seem to agree about - not good/important enough in an encyclopedic context (because they are either based solely on secondary sources or might reflect an intermediate not final negotiation result, remembering that Wikipedia is not a newspaper). This is the argument, why we now need to await primary sources about the final negotiation deal, before writing something which is notable, official and accurate. Danish Expert (talk) 11:30, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Negotiation strategy of the Greek government, revealed on 20 May: Despite repetitive messages issued by the Eurogroup at its monthly meetings since Feb.20, that "negotiations for some updated conditional terms ensuring a full conclusion of the 2nd programme - needs first successfully to conclude - before negotiations for a potential follow-up 3rd bailout programme can begin", the Greek government still as late as 20 May has opted to refuse accepting this negotiation framework! So they will not strive towards completing negotiations with the Troika by the end of May 2015, if this is understood to mean a final agreement introducing a complete update of all terms in the remaining part of the second bailout programme. They claim this is impossible for them now to do (either for political reasons or time constraints), and will on the "EU partnership (enlargement) summit" in Riga (scheduled to take place 20-21 May) , now ask for the Eurogroup to be reconvened for an extraordinary meeting in early next week, with the sole agenda of approving Greece can receive half of their remaining frozen bailout tranche (€3.9bn) in return of Greece then signing an "interim agreement", in which only half of the terms in the remaining part of the 2nd bailout programme is being updated and agreed upon, while the Eurogroup at the same time will be asked to accept negotiations for the 3rd bailout programme now can be allowed to begin (dealing with the continued disagreement about the remaining old batch of "non-complied terms", along with setting up extended additional financial support for Greece throughout at least the period from July 2015 to March 2016) . The Greek hope is, that if this special revised negotiation framework will be accepted by the Eurogroup, then this will lead ECB subseqently to accept at the same time allowing Greek banks to increase their holdings of short-term government T-bills, to an extend making it possibile for the Greek state to uphold its financial obligations towards all parties also in June 2015, so that one extra month of precious time can be bought for completing negotiations for a new 3rd (more permanent) bailout programme - of which the first conditional tranche is envisaged then ultimately can be received by the Greek state in early July 2015.
 * The above secondary sources are - as we seem to agree about - not good/important enough in an encyclopedic context (because they are either based solely on secondary sources or might reflect an intermediate not final negotiation result, remembering that Wikipedia is not a newspaper). This is the argument, why we now need to await primary sources about the final negotiation deal, before writing something which is notable, official and accurate. Danish Expert (talk) 11:30, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * The above secondary sources are - as we seem to agree about - not good/important enough in an encyclopedic context (because they are either based solely on secondary sources or might reflect an intermediate not final negotiation result, remembering that Wikipedia is not a newspaper). This is the argument, why we now need to await primary sources about the final negotiation deal, before writing something which is notable, official and accurate. Danish Expert (talk) 11:30, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

Summary of reached consensus in the above debate
There is no way to follow this with any reasonable effort. Clear example of WP:TLDNR Arnoutf (talk) 20:09, 15 May 2015 (UTC)
 * People, talk pages are about discussing concrete proposals for page improvement. Unless someone can make such a proposal in less than 400 characters (so that people may actually read it), I suggest we stop this as it seems more an opinion piece than anything else right now. Arnoutf (talk) 17:13, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I agree with Arnoutf. The sheer volume of text, in the article and on the talkpage, is making it very difficult for others to resolve problems and suggest improvements. bobrayner (talk) 17:20, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I already posted my unconditional apology, for having written the initial long post in this debate. My last reply (updated 20 May), summarize the debate and conclusion of it (and featured six sourced bullet point examples - which if we utilized as material in the article in my opinion only would generate non-notable content) . My proposal was, to formulate it more short and clearly, that we right now shall refrain to create a subchapter describing the "negotiation process on updated terms for conclusion of the 2nd programme", actually so we avoid walls of text in the article describing non-notable events. My argument is, the outcome of the negotiations posses encyclopedic value (so eventually we can create a subchapter under the 2nd programme entitled "Agreement on updated terms for conclusion of the programme"), but featuring a chapter about the negotiation process itself (describing its present current state) in my opinion conflict with WP:NOTABLE and WP:NOTNEWS - and therefor should be avoided. Thanatos replied above, that he agreed with me on this proposed editorial line, to await the final outcome of negotiations before creating a subchapter about it. Other editors are of course welcome to chime in, if they have any arguments against this proposed "wait and see - only report conclusive final facts" editorial line. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 06:25, 21 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Simply providing endless rambling texts to which nobody responds does not constitute any kind of consensus. To be more clear, I object all suggestions in this post until the proposal including the proposed line for the text (verbatim) is presented in less than 1,000 characters. For comparison, your above post is over 1,500 characters long. Arnoutf (talk) 17:08, 21 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Bulletpoints in my Feb.20 post only added as examples of what shall NOT be added and explaining WHY. The proposal which Thanatos and I reached agreement on:
 * NOT to add text about "current ongoing negotiations", due to concerns it would conflict WP:NOTABLE and WP:NOTNEWS.
 * Only when negotiations conclude, we agreed to describe their outcome in this 3.4.4 subchapter: Agreement on updated terms.
 * If nobody disagree, this consensus will stand. Danish Expert (talk) 07:20, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Cross Currency Swap is not the same as Credit Default Swap
Article says " a cross currency swap, " and links it to CDS article. This is wrong. 46.186.80.192 (talk) 11:34, 22 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Thanks for reporting the error. I have now corrected the link to the correct cross currency swap article. Danish Expert (talk) 13:16, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

"meaning an accept for the payment terms attached to its last tranche to be renegotiated"??
This sentence is very confusing. "Accept" is not a noun in Engish. I suggest the whole sentence is rewritten in a clearer manner. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.43.48.145 (talk) 14:39, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
 * OK, just solved the problem by rephrasing it to: "accepting the payment terms attached to its last tranche to be renegotiated". Thanks. Danish Expert (talk) 14:55, 2 June 2015 (UTC)

Why did Greece need fiscal austerity in the midst of its crisis?
The article already briefly mention the reason, why "fiscal austerity" was a necessary evil to implement in the midst of the Greek government-debt crisis:
 * The initial position of the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio and structural balance being in unsafe territory, thus leaving no room for utilizing traditional Keynesian policy, where government's traditionally combat an economic crisis by increasing its public investment spending during such times (the opposite of austerity).

My proposal is, that we create a technical subchapter dedicated to highlight this issue more in-depth, as it seems to be a subtopic of the crisis with high media notability (but often suffering from a pure technical understanding amongst non-experts).

In the first early part of the crisis (2009), the Greek government apparently (despite of its initially screwed fiscal position), attempted to utilize Keynesian policy to combat the Great Recession while hiding its true fiscal problems by publishing false statistics. The attempt was only partly successful, as this move indeed succeeded to put a brief end to its second recession in Q2-2009, but at the same time the statistical fraud (serving the purpose for the government to keep the private lending market alive as a cheap refinancing source by telling them the incorrect fiscal figures) was discovered. When the statistical fraud had been revealed, it caused a double penalty for Greece: (1) Financial market trust fell deeply into negative territory (twice as deep as if the Government only had reported correct statistics straight from the start), (2) Economic sentiments in Greece (both among consumers and companies) were nuked deep down into negative territory, which caused the third Greek recession to start already in Q3-2009, as everybody suddenly realized how bad a state the current Greek economy actually was in.

This early 2009-context is important to note, as it represent the explanation why "implementation of austerity" subsequently was needed for the Greek government to implement (as a main condition when the Troika arrived to rescue Greece in May 2010). In a perfect theoretical world, where both the private lending market and public creditors still possessed 100% fiscal trust, that it was possible to continue unconditional lending to Greece of cheap (low-interest-rate) money during a long lasting Greek government debt-crisis, and then be certain the Greek government subsequently - when strong growth had been revived - then by-it-self at this later point of time then would start to implement heavy doses of needed austerity to fix the problem of still having operated a screwed "structural balance and debt-to-GDP ratio", then YES all experts agree this path would have been far better for Greece (compared to implementing fiscal austerity straight away). As Greece had a ten-year historic record, of not being able to implement the needed austerity to fix its existing "fiscal sustainability issues" during the good times with strong economic growth from 1999-2008, it was however evident (and not a surprise), that such trust had evaporated from both the private lending market and public creditors. Only way to rebuild this trust - and ensure continued flow of cheap lending money to Greece in this situation, was for the public creditors to attach the conditionality for Greece straight away to implement fiscal austerity, despite that all economic experts perfectly were aware this by-itself in the short-term would deepen and prolong the Greek crisis. If money had been offered at first for free, without this austerity condition being attached, it was a historical proven fact, that Greece subsequently would not honor this trust by subsequently implementing the needed austerity by-itself once strong economic growth had re-emerged.

The subchapter dealing with this issue, would also benefit, if it made a context comparison of how the UK opted to combat its country-specific Great Recession, as they because of having a healthy strong initial fiscal position, actually had maneuver room enough to implement Keynesian policies (active fiscal loosening) for many years in a row, resulting in the UK structural balance and debt-to-GDP ratio deteriorating to the extend that its debt-ratio now only will start to decline again in 2016 (after having risen from 44% in 2007 to 90% in 2016). This implementation of Keynesian policy (fiscal support during bad times followed by austerity implementation in good times) was only possible in the UK, because it possessed both a positive structural balance track record and a healthy debt-to-GDP ratio ahead of eruption of its Great Recession. Most economic experts agree, that what UK did was the best thing to do, but this said, it was at the same time not a viable thing for Greece to do, because it did not benefit from the same strong fiscal position and trust level at financial markets that the UK benefited from before the Great Recession erupted.

A final point (perhaps being the most important) also to mention, is that the Stability and Growth Pact required Greece not only to ensure respect of the rule about a maximum 3% actual deficit, but also required straight since its entry into force in 1999, that the Greek government should strive towards ensuring its structural budget was in "balance or positive". When the pact was reformed, also to take country-specific implicit liabilities of debt (long-term sustainability issues related to ageing costs and heavy debt service costs) into account, the SGP's calculation of the Minimum MTO in 2009 even revealed that the MTO-target for the Greek structural balance should be improved to be minimum +2.75% (because of the heavy future costs associated by its pension and health care system, along with increasing costs generated by its high amount of debt). Reason why the MTO details are also important to highlight, is because they help explain why financial creditors also lost trust (or interest) to continue lending cheap money to Greece - without at the same time requiring heavy doses of austerity to be implemented. These austerity doses were objectively needed (a necessary evil), simply to restore the long-term fiscal sustainability of Greece. Moreover they were unfortunately needed to be implemented immediately, because of the Greek government's poor track record with "no structural balance improvements being achieved across 1999-2008", meaning that nobody trusted such improvements could be achieved by the Greek government without the creditors forcing them to do it as conditions to be met before their lending payments were made. If the S2-LTC value was still unchanged at +11.4% in 2012, the Calculated Min.MTO show that Greece now needed a structural balance of +4.75% to be achieved in average over its current medium-term, to ensure presence of long-term fiscal sustainability of the government's budget balance. This high structural balance requirement can only be lowered, if the "costs of ageing" and "costs of debt" are lowered by the Greek government, which also helps explain why Greece needed to accept such radical reforms to their pension system (extended retirement age + lower benefits). In relation to this, its important to stress that any positive S2-LTC value is only related to presence of too heavy long-term ageing costs (not to debt), and that this figure should be lowered towards 0.0% (to ensure inter-generational equal treatment) even if Greece had absolutely no debt at all. So this need for pension reform, would have been there to ensure long-term sustainability of the public finances, even in the absence of the current heavy debt load for the Greek government.

These above additional technical facts and fundamental reasons explaining why, despite that economic experts were aware each 1% GDP of austerity would cause economic growth to be between 0.5-0.8% lower, that this fiscal austerity was a necessary evil to implement as a pre-condition to be met for delivering financial rescue help. Finally, the call for implementation of structural reforms (pension-reforms and labor-market reforms) to solve problems the Greek economy actually suffered from before its economic crisis erupted in 2009, actually helped to lower the demand for implementation of otherwise needed additional austerity. While its save to say from a scientific point of view, that the reluctancy of the Greek government to pass such structural reforms rapidly during its crisis, only made its crisis more severe and prolonged, not only because of the additional liquidity crisis erupting each time its bailout programme got frozen because of non-compliance, but also because the earlier implementation of these needed reforms would have ensured the reaping much earlier of positive fiscal results stemming from these reforms (i.e. its an academic view shared by most experts that implementing reform changes fast - rather the slowly drip by drip - is much better not only because direct positive results will arrive faster - but also as it will help indirectly to restore consumer+company confidence much faster if they facing all negative changes straight from day one so that they subsequently can start look forward only to positive things happening in the following bright future). So the "austerity trap" (each year bringing demands for a new extra austerity effort to be implemented during the bailout programme), was also heavily related to the delayed implementation by the Greek government of the much needed structural reforms. When Greece achieved a government structural budget balance surplus in 2013 (for the first time since 1973), it was actually out of the woods, in regards of the need to implement austerity demands (if everything else had been equal and implementation of the required structural reforms had followed the initial plan), a fact that has been confirmed by official statements made by IMF's chief negotiator Poul Thomsen.

All in all, it can be a quiet complex technical issue to explain "why austerity was needed straight away" and "why Greece kept falling into extra new unexpected austerity demands - when each fiscal year of its crisis had passed". By this post, I have attempted to explain it in short. I do not have time during the next six months to write this technical "austerity chapter". If somebody else has time to do it, I think the article would be heavily improved by adding such a chapter (presuming of course it is build upon an appropriate amount of technical references - of which the Troika's review reports are a great starting point). Danish Expert (talk) 08:06, 29 May 2015 (UTC)


 * If you want to add such a lengthy section, please cut down the article by more than 300,000 characters first to make it readable. Arnoutf (talk) 12:04, 29 May 2015 (UTC)


 * I said I wouldn't but you keep writing lengthy essays so...
 * Your analyses keep missing


 * that Greece does not have its own currency, unlike e.g. the UK
 * that the Greek debt problem is predominantly of an external nature, unlike e.g. the one of the UK, having been financed through capital inflows from abroad which stopped and/or reversed after a major recent global event
 * that a very common step, if not the historical norm, in such cases is simply to default, i.e. that sovereign defaults are very common historically, that they aren't a negligible exception
 * that there is also the other historical precedent and analogue of countries exiting currency unions (and/or pegs, i.e. currency nions of whichever form, e.g. the Gold Standard).
 * Your analyses keep assuming


 * that the Greek crisis is just a severe case of liquidity problem/crisis and not of an insolvency one
 * that other countries or organisations actually tried to help save Greece and not just themselves and/or the system (they're not oblided to do so but let's say that lying about it is also not obligatory)
 * that many austerity policies taken by the Greek Governments during the crisis were taken in order to indeed save Greece and not the interests of the people in power.
 * Your analyses keep presenting


 * the actions taken by other countries and/or international organisations as having been indeed taken indeed in order to save Greece and as being indeed objectively necessary for Greece, i.e. that TINA
 * misrepreseting thus major steps or order of events that took place and ommitting the advice of


 * many economomists, analysts,... who've claimed that other steps should have be taken instead of or in a different order than the ones actually taken
 * and also misrepresenting actual beliefs of many people and/or groups of power


 * e.g. that in the broader context beyond Greeece, the confidence fairy and expansionary austerity in a time of crisis was/is thought to actually be a law of nature (e.g. in the aforementioned UK),
 * e.g. that many people and organisations actually believe(d), focusing this time in the narrower context, that Greece would actually be saved if only it did austerity and/or structural reforms.
 * A very clear example of this is that


 * even if we assume Greece remaining in the EZ as being objectivelly necessary, which we shouldn't, and
 * even if we assume that Greece not defaulting unilaterally as being a necessary fact of live/history, which we shouldn't, and
 * even if we assume that structural reforms an/or austerity would indeed be a solution and/or necessary and/or not actually bad, counterproductive for the actual economy and interests of Greece, of the Greek people, which we shouldn't
 * that there are tons of people that have claimed that the commonly, mutually agreed upon haircut should have come first (and be of a major magnitude) when in reality it came much later (twice or 1 point something times) and either by itself and/or as a consequence of the delay it was of an inadequate magnitude worsening thus even more, much more, the already unbelievable mess and conundrum. And it has also been claimed thus, that this happened in order to save the foreign banks etc. and/or countries, NOT @#%@% Greece, that in reality other countries were extending and pretending, kicking the can down the road so that they could firewall and ringfence themselves and their banks, saving the lenders that shouldn't have lent Greece such huge loans in the first place. It has also been claimed that the politicians of these countries sold, presented, portrayed saving these banks, funds etc. to their citizens as a magnanimous and benevolent action, solution, as saving (unworthy) Greece and Greeks from destruction because otherwise they couldn't have persuaded their taxpayers/citizens (or anyway would have a very difficult task before them trying to do this) to save the banks and the rest of the financial system one/two... more time(s) after the global crisis.
 * Thanatos|talk|contributions 13:11, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
 * If you want my personal opinion on the causes. I think there are three parties to blame for the initial mess. Goldman Sachs for its amoral trick (and grabbed payment) to present Greece's situation as better than it was. The European (especially North Western European) banks for loaning Greece for interest rates not taking account of the actual risks (which they knew - and considered secured by their too big too fail status ). And the 2000-2008 Greek governments that showed lack of self control in borrowing far too much, for unrealistic interest rates. The first two agents being amoral, the third being mainly naïve the response from many European governments utterly fits the current dominance of the "objective" neoliberal view that naivety is a sin and amorality a virtue. Hence we save the banks and sacrifice the Greeks.


 * My ironic view on neoliberalism here is probably not the most neutral point of view but not intended for article space anyway ;-) Arnoutf (talk) 18:32, 29 May 2015 (UTC)


 * @Thanatos: Perhaps to your surprise, I can agree with you on your point, that we also had presence of most of your objectionable points. Although only to the extend, that they exist as supplementary (less important) points/views in addition to the ones reflected by my initial post. Here you have my reply in short:
 * Greece had its maneuver room restricted by being a eurozone-member: Yes of course - saying goodbye to the devaluation tool and default option, is the price you pay for receiving lower interest rates, ECB liquidity support and become a member of financial support mechanisms. Still the EU+Eurogroup in fact issued a common response when the Great Recession had erupted, allowing all its members (who could afford it) to respond with supportive Keynesian economics during the first two years of the Great Recession (2008+2009) - due to the severity of this global recession, so that active fiscal support initially was injected into all healthy economies. My point was, that UK could afford it and actually did it (as stated in their 2008-09 Convergence report). While Greece could not afford it, but despite of this did it anyway in 2009, while pretending it could afford it by hiding its correct statistical figures for its true fiscal position. Of course this "hiding the truth" was only possible for a limited amount of time, and it only made the subsequent Greek crisis much more worse. A display of correct figures from the start, could have triggered a much more rapid bailout support package already in early 2009, and if the needed structural reforms had been implemented already in the first crisis year rather than 3-6 years later - this would also have been very helpful for Greece.
 * UK as a non-eurozone state can not be used as a 1:1 crisis-combat example to Greece: Of course not, this was never my point. If you want a more direct 1:1 example for other eurozone-states performing a similar "internal devaluation" as Greece did, then you can however compare with Estonia+Latvia+Lithuania. They actually implemented the same package of "internal devaluation" structural reforms and "fiscal austerity" in 2009, while operating a fixed euro peg. The common point for all these 3 Baltic states, was that they did all their needed tough and hurtful reforms rapidly, and subsequently also reaped all the positive fruits from their reforms rapidly, to the extend they since 2011 were the states in EU with biggest economic growth. If Greece had implemented its needed reforms in a similar fast and committed way already by-itself in 2009 (and in addition avoided additional liquidity crisis erupting from the freeze of subsequently established bailout transfers), most experts agree this could have shortened its crisis only to have had a 3-year duration in total (meaning the bailout programme - envisaged to have started one year earlier in 2009 - could have expired by the end of 2011 - followed by strong levels of positive economic growth for all subsequent years in 2012-2020). It is evident the slow crisis response and political opposition to implement needed countermeasures rapidly, also prolonged the Greek sovereign-debt crisis.
 * A market failure by "external lenders" to price country-specific risks correctly, existed ahead of the crisis eruption: Yes I agree. But only to the extend, that half of the problem was due to incorrect credit ratings, while the other half of the problem for Greece was the failure to submit correct statistics revealing the true extend of fundamental economic challenges that the Greek government faced during 1999-2008. The true challenges only became revealed in late 2009 and early 2010.
 * Organisations only helped Greece for the purpose of helping themselves, and when they did, the debt-haircut arrived much to late: Yes, I agree with you the initial crisis response in May 2010 apparently got "polluted" by some "mixed intentions" also reflecting external worries about adverse contagion spreading to other southern European states and the eurozone could have broken down into multiple pieces. I also agree with you, that from a technical point of view the most appropriate thing to do by the "international organisations" would have been to require the debt-haircut should have been done already in May 2010 rather than in March 2012. However, such simple thing, could not have prevented the Greek sovereign debt-crisis to erupt. Needs to implement austerity and structural reforms would still have co-existed. Only difference would have been, that the debt-pile for Greece could have been somewhat lower, while the fundamental problems would still have needed a fix. Unfortunately its impossible to rewrite history, and impossible to predict if private creditors would have accepted their haircut two years earlier in May 2010 (we can only speculate, as arguments can also be made that the outlook needed first to be as bad as it became in 2012, before they finally would accept a haircut). Anyway, the argument can also be listed, that the public creditors (tax payers in other eurozone states) are now paying the price for this "delayed haircut" mistake and not Greece, as the bailout-loans in return now are given to Greece with a 0% interest rate from 2010-2020 (with all interest rate payments being reimbursed) to make up for this mistake.
 * Alternative options like "sovereign default" and "leaving the currency union" were also available to Greece: Yes, but only in theory. Most experts agree the costs of such things (devaluation which initially will cause a huge decline of GDP, losing financial stability support mechanisms like ECB liquidity + ESM support, and losing "trust of financial markets" because you failed to qualify for continued membership of a strong euro club) would far exceed the short-term benefits for doing such a thing, and moreover it would not have served to solve the deeper economic problems Greece suffered from (Balance of Payments, Competitiveness issues, too high public structural deficits, and finally also a long-term unsustainable health care system and pension system) . Once again, the long-term sustainability challenges for the Greek economy, were already revealed by the 2009 Fiscal Sustainability Report, and needed a solid response anyway, even before the Greek sovereign-debt crisis erupted in May 2010.
 * In other words, if we pretend Greece tomorrow defaults and return to use a devalued Drachma instead of the euro, this would not at all solve any fundamental economic problems, but only make the situation much more worse for Greece. Main point is, that Greece currently service its debt pile to public creditors almost at a 0% interest rate, but despite of this huge help, still has problems both with its daily liquidity situation and continued presence of a remaining need still to reform its pension and health care system, so that it finally become long-term sustainable.
 * The main point of my initial post, was to explain why austerity and structural reforms were needed as a crisis response. Both instruments help to restore "fiscal long-term sustainability", and due to "political concerns" the creditors asked for an immediate "austerity implementation", as they did not trust this needed additional "austerity requirement" could be delivered by the Greek government post-crisis (but only could be delivered if it was forced to happen as a condition of transferring bailout funds). I think its evident to say, that all 5 elements of the Troika's programme (austerity + structural reforms + bank recapitalization + debt restructuring + privatization programme) are/were needed. Elements of "bank recapitalization" and "privatization programme" were both important to spur a subsequent "private investment" to boost/ignite economic growth. The condition to implement structural reforms, actually helped to lower the amount of "austerity" otherwise needed to implement, while also solving those fundamental fiscal long-term sustainability problems that Greece already suffered from before her debt-level spiked in 2009.
 * To summarize, I still think the article would benefit from featuring a short subchapter providing info about these technical economic details (i.e. the Greek S2-LTC value called for reforms of the pension system and health care system already in 2009, that the structural balance in the medium-term needed to respect the country-specific calculated "minimum MTO" - which had been calculated to a whopping min. +2.75% requirement already back in 2009, and that creditors lost trust Greece would correct such issues by itself - therefor setting them up as attached conditions to be met in order for Greece to receive bailout help), to explain why implementation of painful fiscal austerity was needed as a crisis response straight from the start. Danish Expert (talk) 12:22, 30 May 2015 (UTC)
 * It's not a simply an also thing, it's a proper context thing, among many other things. It's also not simply only about a possible future henceforth; it's also retrospective; i.e. setting yourself on a course of trying to explain - or to claim - why Greece 'couldn't go countercyclical/keynesian in the midst of its crisis', you should have either explored as many alternatives (at least the major ones), by now counterfactual, possible strategies, steps or routes Greece and other players could have taken or at least stated explicitly your assumptions, the framing you're using. You've e.g. done, all these years, great work presenting the structural deficit etc. story or side thereof; as I've frankly told you before I personally think that this kind of story, of causation, is BS (cause, to say the least, it's of secondary or tertiary importance), nevertheless it's a very popular story, so congrats and many thanx! What I can't congratulate you on or thank you about though is the fact that you've flooded the article and/or its talk pages with that story without having made explicitly clear to the layperson, the one coming here to educate oneself on the subject, the context, the framing and the hidden assumptions and hypotheses you've been using.... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 13:43, 30 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I got your point. But politely disagree. The article is the result of many editor contributions, and not the result of a single editor's personal view. As for the articles so-called choice of "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", it is clear it opted to reflect the same view as presented by the objective Troika review reports. Adopting an alternative "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", i.e. present the Greek crisis from a Marxist perspective based on another set of strange assumptions, would not be appropriate, as it would not represent the objective main view shared by the technical expert working groups of IMF and the European Union. It is clear and evident even to casual readers, and not something that need a flashing alert box in the article, that the article's presentation of the crisis facts, mainly is based on sources agreeing with the "cause interpretation and analysis" made by the objective Troika review reports.
 * Using the Troika review reports as framework for a fundamental understanding of the crisis, is the only sober objective thing to do. Likewise, my request here in this talkpage debate, for the article also to present extracted "S2-LTC" and "calculated minimum MTO" data from the European Commission's 2009 Fiscal Sustainability Report, should not be refuted as something being "not relevant" to feature. Perhaps I went a bit too far with my analysis here at the talkpage, about the appropriateness/availability of utilizing "Keynesian economics" for Greece, but so far, it was only mend to be a first hand invitation for other editors to dive into this additional topic and find sources about, so that a special subchapter explaining this difficult "austerity discussion" can be crafted down the road. When that day comes, I wont object that we also add a single line to mention that the magnitude of "austerity need" most likely could have been less in case the debt-haircut had happened early in May 2010 rather than late in May 2012 (as I am positively certain we can find a valid notable source backing up such view). This said, it is evident (and can be backed by multiple sources), that an early debt-haircut could not have solved all the fundamental economic problems Greece faced in early 2010. The Greek sovereign-debt crisis would still have erupted, and the medicine would still have been a mix of austerity + structural reforms + privatization + bank recapitalization. ;-) Danish Expert (talk) 18:21, 30 May 2015 (UTC)
 * "Adopting an alternative "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", i.e. present the Greek crisis from a Marxist perspective based on another set of strange assumptions, would not be appropriate, as it would not represent the objective main view shared by the technical expert working groups of IMF and the European Union".
 * Marxist...objective... For fuck's sake!! Read for example, the CIGI paper I've pointed you to elsewhere; it includes and mentions among many other things, WSJ articles that first broke various stories relating to various interesting stuff about the Greek program, shedding light upon what was actually going on inside the IMF at that time (and dare I say by extension also later, hitherto; both per se and vis-à-vis the two other parts of the Troika). Or have a long, careful reading of a Krugman quotation from the NYT, included in this wiki-article:
 * PS This is a fantastic, a prime example of what I've already said, about us two discussing the issue being potentially fun but pointless, about us having a different take on reality itself... Thanatos|talk|contributions 20:01, 30 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I had a full read of your CIGI paper and the Krugman article ahead of starting this debate, and it did not change a single point/argument in my above posts. From a technical point of view, I agreed with the CIGI paper's finding, that if anything else had been equal (which unfortunately it was not), then IMF should have insisted for the debt-haircut to take place in May 2010 rather than in March 2012. What the CIGI paper fails to do (which is perfectly normal when writing a scientific article based on a narrow "research question") , is that it does not perform a deeper analysis of: technical economic factors + political context factors + market functionality context factors, that all affected the Troika's decision how to design the first bailout programme (being reluctant to require early debt-haircut - masked by adoption of unrealistic best case scenario forecasts - due to concern of major contagion risks that potentially could have blown the eurozone into pieces if this debt-haircut had been required to take place already in May 2010).
 * This said, it seems like you falsely believe the Greek sovereign-debt crisis could have been totally avoided, if the debt-haircut had just arrived two years earlier than it did, which is a great illusion. As stated above, Greece needed in any-case bailout help accompanied by implementation of austerity to fix its "structural budget balance problem", structural reforms to fix its "competitiveness problem and long-term sustainability problem of its pension system and health care system", and privatization + bank recapitalization to help "boost healthy economic growth". The debt-restructuring (and long-term debt sustainability) was a separate issue that co-existed among the other issues. This a scientific fact, at least for as long one make use of the sane status quo assumption, that Greece would continue to be a eurozone member under the same fiscal sustainability rules applying towards all other eurozone states. Krugman does not represent the general viewpoint among economic experts about the challenges the Greek society faced in its crisis, and he tend to simplify his argumentation under certain special assumptions, which the majority of experts disagree with him about.
 * My focus in this talkpage debate, is not to attempt convincing you/Krugman to adopt certian crisis analysis assumptions. My focus was just to propose how an add of additional technical economic info to the article (i.e. the S2-LTC value and "calculated min.MTO" value in 2009), would be appreciated, as this technical insight would help answer the difficult question "why austerity + structural reforms were needed under the Troika's utilized technical assumptions". Your counter-proposal was then (apparently), that you wanted the article to descripe the entire Greek sovereign-debt crisis not from an objective factual point of view (reflected by technical facts and figures printed in Troika review reports), but from a subjective alternative Krugman set of special assumptions only made by him. I now rebuffed this proposal and took much time to explain why. Thanks for the debate. But lets stop debating now. ;-) Danish Expert (talk) 07:50, 31 May 2015 (UTC)
 * "I had a full read of your ...May 2010)."
 * "I had a full read of your ...May 2010)."

.
 * It doesn't because it doesn't need to. Let's say that the point thereof is to show that program was really awful, a miserable failure again and again, and the reason for this is that the real purpose or primary priority thereof was not to save Greece. The technical details you're invoking are not sacrosanct or a necessity of the laws of nature, they're assumptions etc. of the said miserably failed program/model itself. The ideological, political, socioeconomic, geopolitical etc issues, parameters, constraints etc. are essential parts of the equation of the Game and cannot be simply waved off as secondary issues or minor details as you have done. THE IMF is not God, neither is the ECB or the EU; their views, predictions, policies, programs etc. (which by the way and inter alia disagree with one another) are not scientific facts or simply direct consquequences or results of strict, formal scientific laws and reasoning, of a value-neutral analysis, at least not necessarily or in their totality.
 * "This said, it seems like you falsely believe the Greek sovereign-debt crisis could have been totally avoided, if the debt-haircut had just arrived two years earlier than it did, which is a great illusion"
 * No I don't and that's a huge strawman. Did you miss for example the part in which I'm claiming (repeating other people's claims), that the Greek (in)solvency problem/crisis has been treated as if it were an (il)liquidity problem/crisis?
 * "As stated above, Greece needed in any-case bailout help accompanied by implementation of austerity to fix its "structural budget balance problem", structural reforms to fix its "competitiveness problem and long-term sustainability problem of its pension system and health care system", and privatization + bank recapitalization to help "boost healthy economic growth"."


 * This is a fantastic exemplar of a petitio principii...
 * "The debt-restructuring (and long-term debt sustainability) was a separate issue that co-existed among the other issues."


 * No it was/is not simply a separate issue; it's of !@$!$!%$ central, paramount importance.
 * "This a scientific fact, at least for as long one make use of the sane status quo assumption, that Greece would continue to be a eurozone member under the same fiscal sustainability rules applying towards all other eurozone states."


 * No it's certainly not a scientific fact /facepalm/, either assuming Greece remaining in the EZ or not. Moreover the very fact that Greece (and/or others) is in the EZ has been argued by many that it is in essence the real cause of the crisis (see the refs).
 * "My focus in this talkpage debate...Thanks for the debate. But lets stop debating now. ;-)"


 * If you want us to stop debating (need I repeat that I've regarded this as being futile?) then please stop flooding the article and its talk page with a view portayed as a scientific fact or as the scientific consensus view when to say the least, it's not, it's neither... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 12:33, 31 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Please stop flooding the talkpage by multiple futile replies, which now more and more clearly fail to focus on how the content of the existing article can be improved. All posts from me in this debate, was a genuine attempt to open a thread leading to content improvements for the article - calling for other editors to help create a subchapter featuring additional technical details helping readers to understand "why austerity was needed immediately as part of the bailout-programme in the eyes of the Troika?" (I am not going to repeat anything now, but just refer to my previous reply) . You managed sole-handedly to derail this debate with futile replies, and now excuse your futile behavior by saying that you warned me from the start, that this debate in your point of view would lead to nothing. Yet, I still WP:AGF on your behalf, and just politely ask you to stop flooding this talkpage debate with futile replies. Danish Expert (talk) 14:17, 31 May 2015 (UTC)


 * One of the reasons why no other editors get involved is the lengthy communication (ie flooding). If you truly want to involve others you should make the things you are saying easily accessible (ie short). This thread alone is now already 6000 words long, which is on the long side for a full article. Arnoutf (talk) 15:02, 31 May 2015 (UTC)
 * ""why austerity was needed immediately as part of the bailout-programme in the eyes of the Troika?" (emphasis mine)"


 * Although that's hardly the full or an accurate picture, it's certainly an improvement!!! Now if you could only have explicitly said/written this from the beginning, you could or might have saved so much of my time, time spent arguing against multiple essay-long supposedly "scientific facts"... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 15:55, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

The Troika were hardly alone in pointing out that Greece had severe economic problems, or in arguing that Greek government spending should be reduced to sustainable levels. bobrayner (talk) 18:29, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

'''Did Greece need austerity? The "fact-based answer" can only be "yes" '''

If an author does not arrive at an "yes", it would by a try to redefine history for Wikipedia.


 * Borrower perspective: Greek government needed to limit spending to the fiscal income level (="austerity") because Greece was not able anymore to borrow money without certain conditions attached to the borrowing contract, one condition being a certain degree of "austerity". Even Greece itself did not try to reduce the "austerity" burden with its internal fund raising possibilities like significant privatizations. Historic fact.


 * Lender perspective: Neither Greek investors nor international investors/states/organizations did lend significant money to Greece without "austerity" conditions attached to it. Historic fact.


 * Why not stopping irrelevant perspectives: it would help improving the article. Ideas like "the real purpose of the bail-out was not to save Greece but the lenders" can not be proved as there have been 100s of Greek and international decision makers involved and if it were so, it wouldn't change the Greek debt crisis for Wikipedia, it would not change the causes, not the measures and not the evolvement of this Greek debt crisis (as those are facts); what the authors of those sentences really want to say (but somehow put it as a conspiracy) is that they don't like the fact that 100s of decision makers also tried to stabilize the banking and financial system.


 * The term "austerity" is a theoretical (POV) conception. It assumes that the natural state for a country is to have an automatic financing of deficits and there needs to be a political effort/action to stop this automatic source of government income. But the reality is clearly much more the contrary:  the natural state is that a government can spend its income and its reserves. To spend more it needs to keep up creditworthiness and can then decide to borrow (which typically reduces further creditworthiness). It is the same as with credit cards: if the average creditworthy citizen has one credit card and you have already three credit cards and all maxed out and lost your creditworthiness, nobody would say further banks are forcing you into anything (like austerity) because they are not providing a debt laden citizen with a fourth and fifth credit card.

Danish Expert's reasoning on why there were no real alternatives (without "austerity") to Greece sounds very structured, logical, and reasonable to me, it is in line what you can read in the mainstream press, as it is based on average understanding and assumptions how economies work. --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 07:13, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

Mind if I jump in?
 * "when the Troika arrived to rescue Greece in May 2010…"

When the Troika arrived to rescue Greece? Are you serious? You can't be serious. The Troika arrived to rescue the banks—nothing more. The fact you still can't (actually, refuse to) see this, even in mid-2015, does you no credit. Here is a recapitulation of what happened, and it wasn't rescuing Greece:

It was no different with the save-Germany bailout for Spain. If you don't have access, let me know and I will upload the article somewhere for you to read, though there are plenty of analyses freely available on this front, some of which are used in the article.

So I submit that you are putting forward a false dilemma: country can't borrow, but needs stimulus spending—ergo, just got to bite the bullet and do austerity. The third choice, which you have shut out, was writing off Greece's unsustainable debt. As quoted above, even the IMF finally said so. A debt write-off, however, wasn't acceptable, since who were the idiots who recklessly lent Greece so much money? French and German banks. This is what Greeks have suffered so much for, for so many years now?

No pain, no gain—unless you're German, of course. --YeOldeGentleman (talk) 15:06, 3 June 2015 (UTC)


 * @YeOldeGentleman - I had already proposed (in following para) not to call the measures "rescue" (as different parties may have had different intentions when they decided and executed the measures). So, why don't we just call them (NPOV) "measures". Those measures had effects on international private creditors/banks AND on Greece, so it would also be POV if WP only mentions the effect on creditors/banks.
 * A total "debt write-off" would probably also have made the Greeks suffer as there would have been conditions to this attached too; but there we are really speculating a lot.
 * --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 17:25, 3 June 2015 (UTC)


 * Main point for the debate, was an invitation for a skilled editor with more time than me, to create a subchapter with factual details explaining why "austerity was needed" as one of the countermeasures. I only wrote the long "context presentation" here at the talkpage to be a potential help (or drafted argumentation) for such work to be done, when other editors start to search for the appropriate sources to help display these facts in a neutral appropriate way in the proposed subchapter. This debate was never intended to focus on, whether or not a specific phrase in my context presentation ("when the Troika arrived to rescue Greece in May 2010") should be replaced by another more neutral word.


 * This said, now when this specific objection popped up for using the word "rescue", I want to respond that it is completely out of factual/scientific logic, to insist that the Troika did not rescue Greece from default in May 2010. Because they did rescue Greece for something which would have been worse, as a fact. Default is per definition never a nice event (no historic examples can be posted to the contrary). If Greece had defaulted without help in May 2010, all experts agree this would have caused an immediate bankruptcy of all its domestic banks (with Greek savers loosing all their deposits from one day to the next, which btw also is why Greeks 4 biggest systemic banks all are considered among experts to belong to the category labeled "To Big Too Fail" requiring to be rescued in event of crisis - no matter what to protect the greater interest of the Greek society), while the Greek GDP had suffered a collapse because the state at the time ran high primary budget balance deficits - which would have caused an immediate liquidity crunch if its expenditures had not been adjusted immediately to match the revenues. As a paradox, a 100% unilateral uncontrolled non-negotiated default in May 2010 would have entailed even higher demands for very fast (automatic) austerity - effective from day 1, and the GDP in such cases would have suffered significantly more.


 * This said, I agree with Thanatos and YOG, that its valid (if anything else had been equal - and no other internal/external interests had existed to impact the decision), to question the appropriateness of delaying the debt-haircut towards private bondholders, only to be executed two years later and not already in May 2010. However, as EconomicsEconomics replied there were many reasons (not one) why it did not happen straight away in May 2010. As I outlined earlier in this debate, it is also not really a key question (contrary to what some of you believe), because even if it had happened in May 2010 rather than March 2012, there would still have been need for Greece to receive bailout support conditional on implementation of austerity + structural reforms + privatizations. Because the private lending market would not stand ready to support Greece with fresh capital straight from day 1 after having suffered a 54% debt-haircut. When such things happen, states need first to proof they are back on a "sustainable path", before private lending markets reopen again. The bailout from the Troika helped Greece, so that it could gradually adjust both its budget balance and implement the needed structural reforms to bring it back onto a path entailing long-term sustainability - while staying in the eurozone. This is a factual observation (not POV), which if people continue to question this as a fact, really can be backed up by multiple sources.


 * Again I do not object, that we can also add a special additional line in the proposed factual austerity chapter, mentioning that the need to implement austerity could have been less if the debt-haircut had happened in May 2010 rather than in March 2012 (as long as we can find appropriate sources to document how this alternative scenario would have been). I however object, if anyone propose we should feature a long paragraph presenting pieces of counterfactual history. My objection also remain, for the proposal of lines suggesting that austerity could have been entirely avoided - if the debt-haircut had just happened two years earlier. This is false. As the factual "structural balance" data show for 2009 along with the calculated S2-LTC value from the 2009 Fiscal Sustainability Report, it was evident Greece no matter what, needed both structural reforms of its health care system and pension system along with implementation of additional austerity, in order to transform the state into a path of being long-term sustainable. This was an underlying fact, which btw also was acknowledged to be the mix of needed medicine, by the Greek government itself in their Jan-2010 Stability Report (before the Troika even had arrived to the stage and the debt revealed to be unsustainable).


 * Moreover, being part of the eurozone while benefiting from all the goodies of such membership (low interest rates, ECB liquidity support, financial support mechanisms, Quantiative Easening, etc), made it undesirable for Greece to default 100% and leave the eurozone in May 2010. Yes, a few economists indeed argued back then, that while it would be a short-term disaster, it could have made it easier for Greece in the long-term - but only under the hostile assumption that Greece was incapable to implement the needed structural reforms anyway - and then it was better to quit the euro club sooner rather than later (so that it could return to the instrument of devaluation instrument to solve its never ending problems). Although all this counterfactual history is fun to debate, it is not appropriate to crowd the article with such things. So lets focus the proposed subchapter only to feature factual actual data, being published by reliable primary sources, to help explain towards bewildered readers why immediate austerity was needed as a necessary evil in the eyes of the Troika (which happen to reflect the neutral consensus/majority view point of economic experts - as they represent the two biggest International Organisations engaged to assess such things).
 * Danish Expert (talk) 19:25, 3 June 2015 (UTC)

If you think reference names are a good place to add your own personal rants, stop editing the article
YeOldeGentleman, I understand that you might feel strongly about the topic, but naming a reference "IMF staffed by scum and idiots" is a very bad move. Cut it out. bobrayner (talk) 23:02, 4 June 2015 (UTC)


 * ♥ ♥ ♥ --YeOldeGentleman (talk) 18:58, 5 June 2015 (UTC)