Talk:Greek government-debt crisis/Archive 6

POV / LEAD debate
May be those authors having a WP:CONFLICT (conflict of interests; COI; here persons that have a special interest in Greece) should stop editing this article and stop blocking everything (COI editing is strongly discouraged in Wikipedia). It is obvious that they contribute nothing here to improve the article. It it very hard to understand what they really want to say in these discussions. Everything from them sounds more or less like the world is having a conspiracy against Greece they need to block here in Wikipedia to fight for Greece. EconomicsEconomics (talk) 07:13, 1 June 2015 (UTC)


 * I guess we Greeks must have paid this and many other guys to advance a story of a conspiracy theory against us because of our inferior, our decadent national character... PS This is the second time you've attacked Greeks and Greek wikieditors with your proofs. Furthermore you've now added among other things an accusation of WP:CONFLICT arguing in essence for Greek editors to be prohibited from editing the article, the topic!!!! I'm briefly replying to you and I'm remaining reasonably polite only because third parties may read this and I don't want people to think that I/"we" can't respond; next time I assure you, I won't be so polite... Thanatos|talk|contributions 20:24, 1 June 2015 (UTC)


 * You are exactly confirming what I said: With a mainstream understanding how economies work it is easy to understand that BOTH happened - Greece got a debt cut worth 100 bn, bailout loans >200 bn, various other supports AND there was a firewalling and support of the international financial and banking system, too (no conspiracy thoughts needed, just common sense). With common sense it is also easy to understand that a 10 mil population with >300 bn debt and a high debt/GDP ratio and >10% annual deficit has to execute a lot of hard changes to arrive again at a sustainable state.


 * To comment the measures in the debt crisis with a phrase like "the interests of the Greek people were arguably sacrificed" seems to be as POV as to reducing it to a sentence like "the interests of the Eurozone tax payers have been sacrificed because Greece circumvented the Euro treaties and now wants the other people to pay for it". But even if you prefer one-sided sources like Paul Blustein to comment or "better understand" the debt crisis, it does not change the way Wikipedia should describe the crisis in a summary, i.e. the main causes, main measures, and main evolvement points. So, why still block a transparent summary of the debt crisis?


 * --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 22:50, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * You fucking racist idiot, the very fact that it was only ~100bn and that had been for so long delayed and that such a huge new loan(s) was given under such conditions is the very point of it being extremely negative for the interests of Greek people, tipping the scale greatly for the interests of the creditors, even that is, if one limits oneself to a framework of a supposedly, a so called mutually agreed upon, amicable agreement and exclude a Grexit etc.. Has for example the Greek debt become sustainable after and because of the program? Fuck no! It's even worse! (It's e.g. more or less the same in absolute terms and has skyrocketed in relative ones. Moreover it has been issued under English/British Law, instead of Greek Law, and is owed to the Official Sector instead of the Private one, making a much needed - and agreed upon once a primary surplus had been achieved, a taken back promise and agreement... - substantial additional haircut or even an outright default even more harmful and/or difficult to/for Greece) Have the consecutive DSAs (and assumptions thereof etc.) been reasonable or even sincere? Fuck no! (Even the supposedly achievable end-result of the program(s) would be e.g. a debt level equal to the one Greece entered the crisis with in the first place!) And so on and so forth.
 * Note: the interests of the European taxpayers have indeed been sacrificed, be they Greeks only if one refers to them only, cause Greek taxpayers belong to the set of the European taxpayers, or Greeks and Germans and..., cause among things European (EZ) taxpayers in general have been lending Greece more and more, again and again, money to pay and save the German and French and Greek and... banks etc., kicking the can of the Greek insolvency further down the road and making thus things worse. Note: I won't even bother to comment on the Greek entry into the EZ. There are plenty of arguments, facts and citations available at the relevant section you have to deal with and argue against if you could...
 * Even if common sense sided with you, which it doesn't, it very often sucks in economics, especially during macroeconomic crises; watching someone supposedly teaching ex cathedra others economics by invoking "common sense" is very commonly guaranteed to be ludicrous. The numbers, the conditions for example you've stated are not necessarily unsustainable by themselves for a country nor do they necessarily require the changes you're alluding to; they're missing for example the context of the debt being mostly external, for all practical purposes in a foreign currency because of the monetary union, and that they've followed a global crisis which caused a sudden stop to the capital inflows to this country (and to other countries of said monetary union); capital flows and stops/flights in a very flawed monetary union that have in fact been regarded by many scholars, economists, analysts,... as the very cause of the problem/crisis itself in the first place. That means that even if common sense dictates something true, it does not follow that it dictates what you're claiming it does. Greece for example could have unilaterally defaulted and exited the EZ and then dealt with a different set of consequences and problems. Or Germany and the rest of the surplus North could have reflated or differentially inflated in relation, with respect to the South/Periphery, making the adjustment or the austerity needed, demanded from or rather dictated to Greece and the rest of the South/Periphery, much softer, much milder. Or the austerity dictated on Greece could have been much less or much more frontloaded. Or the ECB could have dropped the rates to zero from the start and kept them constanly there since; or it could have gone for an OMT program from the beginning, including or excluding Greece to/from it. Or the IMF could have relentlessly disagreed with the rest of what then became the Troika, instead of acceding to their views against its own rules, and hence never taken part in such a ridiculous program, a mind-boggling mess. And so on and so forth. The relevant decision tree or game has thus many (more) branches, nodes, paths etc.; the possible worlds, the alternative possibilities are virtually endless compared to the specific and supposedly necessary story and sequence of events you're advocating.
 * The very reason I've been arguing for a proper context and/or against a simplistic and misleading definitive bullet list or summary of causes etc. or ... (against which I have to remind you, cause for some strange reason it seems that you've forgotten, others have argued too) is exactly because Wikipedia is supposed to present a NPOV, to present the scientific, scholarly, etc. consensus view or as many views as possible, if there is no consensus on the subject at hand. I've cited and quoted e.g. at least one such respectable source that argues that Greek interests have been sacrificed in favour of the ones of the creditors. That means that this has to be included or at least taken into account. If other such sources disagree on this or even claim that e.g. it was not the Greek but rather the German or the Danish or... the Martian interests that have been sacrificed, or that ..., that's fine, let them be included or taken into account too, as some of them, for that matter, presently are and have been, and as and about which for example I've have congratulated and thanked Danish Expert, inspite of, that is, my slightly different view on the subject. There are many POVs in such a complex, multifaceted and long lasting issue, that's what I've been saying from the beginning. So what I can't allow you to do, be it as an interested Greek or as a thoughtful wikipedian, what YOU MAY NOT do, you ignorant and racist piece of shit, is to have the article portay a single false or one-sided supposedly definitive and simplistic picture of the crisis as the scientific consensus, as a scientific fact! Now I have spent more than enough time dealing with you; feel free to fuck off!!!
 * PS Preemptively to any wikipedia admin(s) who might read this: Punish me if you must for my language, I don't care, I don't mind; in fact I understand and accept the consequences of my choice of words. What I do strongly care about, what I do strongly demand from you though is
 * 1. to see and acknowledge the racist slurs this editor has used against me and more importantly against Greek editors and Greeks in general, and to act on them,
 * 2. not to delete this discussion or any choice of words/expressions used herein, so that people, interested readers or editors, could judge for themselves, and
 * 3. to prevent this or any other editor from turning this article (arguably even more) into a simple-minded POV article, greatly misleading and misinforming (or should I say disinforming?) readers who might come here to educate themselves on the subject.
 * Thanatos|talk|contributions 02:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Thanatos|talk|contributions 02:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC)


 * I still think a good summary can list main causes, main measures, and main evolvement points of the crisis without necessarily having a significant POV problem. I don't see in my bullet point proposal as a preparation for a short summary of the debt crisis (preceding para) any real POV problems. Also your statements do not really invalidate it; you are merely talking about theoretical alternative historic developments and I don't have any problems if they are described as special features in the depth of the 100+ pages article, but not in the summary (I can even comment that there was a clear reasons why history went like this without the need for conspiracies as explanation pattern; just later as right now I don't have enough time). And I invited everyone to propose add-ons/changes/deletions to the summary without making it too long. I know I might have less involvement and therefore less emotion than you editing in this subject, being the only reason to propose to consider WP:CONFLICT. --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 05:41, 2 June 2015 (UTC)

@Thanatos, you have a lot of POV in your arguments:
 * Oh god, here we go again....


 * You miss that there was and is a "no-bail-out clause" in the EU contracts (otherwise there would be a contractual incentive for piling up unsustainable debt levels) that forbid eurozone states to give debt-cuts or bail-outs. It was already pushing the legal limits when the eurozone states and the ECB indirectly helped out Greece with huge unsecured credits and interest rate subsidies. And the private creditors did not want to give more or earlier debt cuts to Greece which is just a historical market result. The main reasons private creditors don't aggressively give early debt cuts (apart from the fact that they don't like to be forced to donate money to their debtors) is that it incentivises other debtors not to pay back debt and instead ask for debt forgiveness, too. Parting from these historic facts is introducing a strong POV.
 * 1.No bailout clause: True. But you're using naive legalism and a mess to justify a mess. None of the actions of the ECB for example would be deemed legal, would have happened if 2007 hadn't happened. 2.You're also neglecting the fact, if you want to go legalistic on me that, the according to the Greek Constitution which is btw the Supreme Law, it's not EU or other treaties, contracts or laws, as far as Greeks are concerned, the interests and the welfare of Greece, of the Greek nation and people, are of primary importance. 3.Private bond-holders' objections would e.g. be irrelevant if e.g. Germany really pushed for it.In any case, you're justifying a mess by arguing it's a mess. I personally have no problem to accept that joining the EZ was a stupid decicion on the Greek side or that EZ is a mess. We entered, we opened the door to the mess by ourselves; noone forced us in, to do it (though the average Giorgos or Giannes could be somewhat but not fully excused because noone really asked his opinion nor really explained things to him). But what I'm arguing for is that once we were in the mess was also others people's fault in a systemic way and that simply the rescue of Greece is not a rescue of Greece. Noone is obliged to help us, to save us, but noone is also obliged not to help us let alone to lie about supposedly helping, rescuing us when in fact they're helping themselves and fucking us over even more. Every country has its own national interests and laws. Neither the EU nor the EZ is a country or a nation, we're just a very flawed, non optimal currency union. Preteding that whatever the Troika decides and then is dictated to Greece is derived by a simple objective cold logic of numbers and not or not also to a major extend by national interests and other reasons is simply naive and misleading.
 * 1. (myth) - The EU contracts governing the Euro are not a legal "mess" but circumventing/neglecting them can lead to a real "mess" like a debt crisis; referring to the euro governing treaties (second largest currency in the world) is not naive legalism; if the ECB had exceeded its mandate (i.e. violated the EU treaties) this would not produce a wild card for other eurozone states to break the euro treaties too, e.g.  neglecting the no-bail-out clause. One person neglecting a clause in a multi-party contract doesn't lead to an invalidation of the contract or give others the right also to neglect clauses in that contract.  2. (counterfactual) - if Greece had deemed the euro contracts as irrelevant because of the primacy of Greek law, Greece wouldn't have paid huge sums to investment banks to conceal its breaking of those contracts; 3. (myth/counterfactual) - I am not arguing that everybody can/should neglect contracts because other parties may have neglected other clauses of a contract, i.e.  I am not justifying a mess with a mess. As early as in 1992 there was and is also today is a widespread public agreement among politicians and economic scientists that having non-convergent economies in a joint currency will lead to tensions and eventually to a "mess" like this debt crisis. The consequences were broadly known before the euro was created. It didn't prevent some states to test their luck, some even the extreme way with investing a lot in long-term concealing of a non-convergence. But in the end one can't betray basic economic logic as we all saw.  I didn't pretend anything about the Troika. I didn't deny the existence of national interests. I was just explaining typical decision makers motives why this historic decisions have been like they were (facts) because you seemed a bit lost that history went like that, but motives of decision makers are anyway not really that relevant for WP.
 * 1. (myth) - The EU contracts governing the Euro are not a legal "mess" but circumventing/neglecting them can lead to a real "mess" like a debt crisis; referring to the euro governing treaties (second largest currency in the world) is not naive legalism; if the ECB had exceeded its mandate (i.e. violated the EU treaties) this would not produce a wild card for other eurozone states to break the euro treaties too, e.g.  neglecting the no-bail-out clause. One person neglecting a clause in a multi-party contract doesn't lead to an invalidation of the contract or give others the right also to neglect clauses in that contract.  2. (counterfactual) - if Greece had deemed the euro contracts as irrelevant because of the primacy of Greek law, Greece wouldn't have paid huge sums to investment banks to conceal its breaking of those contracts; 3. (myth/counterfactual) - I am not arguing that everybody can/should neglect contracts because other parties may have neglected other clauses of a contract, i.e.  I am not justifying a mess with a mess. As early as in 1992 there was and is also today is a widespread public agreement among politicians and economic scientists that having non-convergent economies in a joint currency will lead to tensions and eventually to a "mess" like this debt crisis. The consequences were broadly known before the euro was created. It didn't prevent some states to test their luck, some even the extreme way with investing a lot in long-term concealing of a non-convergence. But in the end one can't betray basic economic logic as we all saw.  I didn't pretend anything about the Troika. I didn't deny the existence of national interests. I was just explaining typical decision makers motives why this historic decisions have been like they were (facts) because you seemed a bit lost that history went like that, but motives of decision makers are anyway not really that relevant for WP.


 * If the eurozone makes it an easy way to default on credit contracts and to get bail-outs, it would be bad for all eurozone states because of moral hazard problems, it would probably kill the EU as an economic community. Let's assume this easy way would be in Greece's interest, why should Greece's interests (being 2% of the EU) rank higher than the general agreed principles in the EU and eurozone, is that not introducing a strong POV?
 * 1.Whether it does or it doesn't is irrelevant with respect to whether the program was/is indeed a rescue of Greece. 2.If talking about what Greece has to say on the rescue of Greece and/or Greek interests in a story about the Greek crisis is a minor, secondary POV, well... (An other answer could be that the main POV is about the interests of whoever is much more powerful over who is weak. But that would mean that the article is mainly about a Power Game and not simply about real or made up structural deficits numbers or made up known-from-the-beginning-to-eventually-end-in-failure solutions to made up or real but irrelevant, secondary, problems.
 * 1. (myth/unclear) - you forgot that it is unclear if Greece wants to be "rescued" from outside as they actively denied international support in collecting taxes or stop corruption or privatize, also emphasizing the national proud of the Greek people; you also forgot that Greece didn't have the same idea what a "rescued Greece" will look like than the potential "rescuers" have (lean state and privatizations? productive private sector and less protected markets? collection of old due taxes? balanced budgets? and so on). So "rescue" is not an easy to agree-on concept concerning Greece's development; so using it in this debt crisis context makes sense if you don't want to be specific and understood or introduce unclear POV . 2. (myth/unclear) - now you are introducing the concept of "Greek interests". You forgot that Greece first complained it got too much easy money (while Greece concealed a lot of their financial problems to get this easy money) and then Greece complained it is not getting enough easy money anymore (after it became clear that easy money did no good to Greece and its financial reputation is now too low for easy money). So what is in Greece’s interest? Is having a higher consumption level in Greece’s interests? Is it still in Greece’s best interests if financed with credits? Is it in Greece’s interests that the various governments did not raise money with privatizations and hard tax colleting? Is it still in Greece’s interest if there are not enough other sources of government income and the population has to suffer? Is it in Greece's interests that the current government is going for a big bet – like trying to get more debt-cuts and risking a Grexit? I am not answering these points, I am just showing that if you want to be specific and understood, the concept of “Greek's interests“ is this context is very blurry and unclear, so not very suitable, and it would certainly introduce unclear POVs in WP.
 * 1. (myth/unclear) - you forgot that it is unclear if Greece wants to be "rescued" from outside as they actively denied international support in collecting taxes or stop corruption or privatize, also emphasizing the national proud of the Greek people; you also forgot that Greece didn't have the same idea what a "rescued Greece" will look like than the potential "rescuers" have (lean state and privatizations? productive private sector and less protected markets? collection of old due taxes? balanced budgets? and so on). So "rescue" is not an easy to agree-on concept concerning Greece's development; so using it in this debt crisis context makes sense if you don't want to be specific and understood or introduce unclear POV . 2. (myth/unclear) - now you are introducing the concept of "Greek interests". You forgot that Greece first complained it got too much easy money (while Greece concealed a lot of their financial problems to get this easy money) and then Greece complained it is not getting enough easy money anymore (after it became clear that easy money did no good to Greece and its financial reputation is now too low for easy money). So what is in Greece’s interest? Is having a higher consumption level in Greece’s interests? Is it still in Greece’s best interests if financed with credits? Is it in Greece’s interests that the various governments did not raise money with privatizations and hard tax colleting? Is it still in Greece’s interest if there are not enough other sources of government income and the population has to suffer? Is it in Greece's interests that the current government is going for a big bet – like trying to get more debt-cuts and risking a Grexit? I am not answering these points, I am just showing that if you want to be specific and understood, the concept of “Greek's interests“ is this context is very blurry and unclear, so not very suitable, and it would certainly introduce unclear POVs in WP.


 * Then you are blaming the international parties for a debt forgiveness of "only" 100bn and bail-out loans of 200+bn that Greece got. You forget to mention that international parties delivered 100% on agreed actions while it was Greece that only delivered tiny parts of their planned measures, be it to collect taxes, to do privatizations, to reduce the escalated corruption levels and so on. The non-delivery of Greece had two effects: 100+bn was missing in the Greek budget, and Greece lost further international trust that it can deliver at all, meaning it also got cut-off of further investments the economy would have needed to grow and stabilize. You also forgot that Greece actively blocked any international help to get the Greek measures done (e.g. not accepting the Swiss offer to inform Greek authorities about huge untaxed amounts of Greek citizen's assets) which further reduced the trust that Greece is at least trying to get their finances stabilized.
 * It is a bit of POV now blaming the international parties for problems during the rescue process (2010-2015) if it was the Greek party that worked actively against agreed-on plans.
 * 1.The international parties delivered on their part because they were the ones to set both their own and Greece's part (asymmetry of power but also admittedly idiocy and/or private interests on the Greek side) making the former easy and the latter impossible. Even more so there are stuff that they haven't deliver on; Greece had been promised for example a further haircut once it had achieved a primary surplus; well... 2.Even if for example privatisations were indeed good or necessary, which they aren't, it's a firesale of the family silver going into a bottomless pit,
 * there was never any possibility of getting 50bil€ by selling them, not even close. Do you think that Troika hasn't known this from the beginning?
 * 1. (myth) – why should it be “impossible” for Greece to collect due taxes and execute privatizations? If it was impossible why did Greece actively reject international support in doing so? Why should it be “easy” for foreign governments and private institutions to support Greece with a lot of money if the foreign voters/shareholders start getting critical about it? -  2. (myth/counterfactual) – Total Greece doesn’t have assets worth 50 bn that it could sell?  I read that by not collecting the full taxes Greece gives away a cash of 20-30 bn a year, so selling tax claims/receivables of the last 10 years alone should yield much more than 50 bn, let alone real assets. If you talk of “family silver” it always depends who manages it. Maybe a new investor can transform a silver state asset in a private gold asset, especially if it was managed mediocre beforehand. Then the Greece government would get the price for silver assets and (because the assets would be more productive afterwards) also an increased tax income thereafter.
 * 1. (myth) – why should it be “impossible” for Greece to collect due taxes and execute privatizations? If it was impossible why did Greece actively reject international support in doing so? Why should it be “easy” for foreign governments and private institutions to support Greece with a lot of money if the foreign voters/shareholders start getting critical about it? -  2. (myth/counterfactual) – Total Greece doesn’t have assets worth 50 bn that it could sell?  I read that by not collecting the full taxes Greece gives away a cash of 20-30 bn a year, so selling tax claims/receivables of the last 10 years alone should yield much more than 50 bn, let alone real assets. If you talk of “family silver” it always depends who manages it. Maybe a new investor can transform a silver state asset in a private gold asset, especially if it was managed mediocre beforehand. Then the Greece government would get the price for silver assets and (because the assets would be more productive afterwards) also an increased tax income thereafter.


 * That is a pity because this is the main root cause that Greece got into the debt crisis. By tweaking debt and deficit reporting for 10 years until 2009 Greece joined an (external) currency, getting access to the investor's trust and low interest rates of the eurozone, but in reality without being convergent to the fiscal and economical rules of the Euro at all - everybody warned in 1992 (Maastricht treaty) that it would be an economic bomb that would eventually explode if you do that. Greece did that. (It deprived Greece of devauating any debt by 10% to 20% a year as Greece did with the Drachma, so it deprived Greece of 200+ bn "debt reduction by inflation" during their time in the Euro. This single factor alone would explain the whole debt problem of Greece since entering the Euro.) It is a litte bit POV if you don't consider this (all-explaining) route cause.
 * {{font color|red|OK now you're playing silly games; at this point I was obviously referring and replying to your claim about Greece entering the EZ by falsifying data etc., I was not speaking about the consequences of entering the EZ etc. in general. And no, not everybody accepted that it would be a bomb or even if it were they said they would find a solution (bicycle theory etc.); well the definition of a solution it seems, is in the eye of the beholder.} Also inflation (or the lack thereof) is important but it's not the full picture. Casue among other things it's non linear; greater inflation (differential) in comparison to the North was also a cause etc.}}
 * (myth/counterfactual) – there was and is widespread agreement among leading politicians and scientists there will always be tensions if non-convergent countries join in a currency union like the Eurozone (and if you are far away from convergence like Greece it is more like a bomb than only tensions). I didn’t say that you can always find sources telling the opposite, especially if you look for people blogging with a strong political agenda. It is wrong that important variables like “inflation” are “in the eye of the beholder” as the eurozone contracts (and the ECB) have a concept how to handle “inflation” (which is very different from how inflation was handled with the historic Drachma). “non-linear relationships” have been one of the causes Greece couldn’t conceal its real financial situation forever, but they don’t explain what … I didn’t get your argument there
 * (myth/counterfactual) – there was and is widespread agreement among leading politicians and scientists there will always be tensions if non-convergent countries join in a currency union like the Eurozone (and if you are far away from convergence like Greece it is more like a bomb than only tensions). I didn’t say that you can always find sources telling the opposite, especially if you look for people blogging with a strong political agenda. It is wrong that important variables like “inflation” are “in the eye of the beholder” as the eurozone contracts (and the ECB) have a concept how to handle “inflation” (which is very different from how inflation was handled with the historic Drachma). “non-linear relationships” have been one of the causes Greece couldn’t conceal its real financial situation forever, but they don’t explain what … I didn’t get your argument there


 * This is the consequence of joining the Euro zone. Nobody missed this context as a main cause, except you by "not bothering" for this factor of "the Greek entry into the EZ."
 * Bullshit. There is virtually for example no mentioning in this article, in all the 347,275 bytes thereof, of the debt being external excluding the few parts in which I've mentioned it.
 * 1. (confirmation) – that is exactly why I put “joining the Euro without sufficient financial convergence and competitiveness“ at the top of my proposed bullet point summary – because this important point is broadly implied in the article but missing as an explicit point (I am sorry for the misunderstanding because for me I was clear that the “missing convergence” is mainly important because the euro is an external currency and can’t be devalued – maybe if I formulate my bullet list as a "summary text", then those misunderstandings can be avoided as the bullet list is only a summary of a summary)
 * 1. (confirmation) – that is exactly why I put “joining the Euro without sufficient financial convergence and competitiveness“ at the top of my proposed bullet point summary – because this important point is broadly implied in the article but missing as an explicit point (I am sorry for the misunderstanding because for me I was clear that the “missing convergence” is mainly important because the euro is an external currency and can’t be devalued – maybe if I formulate my bullet list as a "summary text", then those misunderstandings can be avoided as the bullet list is only a summary of a summary)


 * Nobody can deny that, and 100s of other theoretical historic pathes would have been possible. But how is this relevant for a description of causes, measures, and crisis evolvement in Wikipedia? And without getting into strong POV?
 * 1.Adding in POVs when there is not a NPOV is not exactly a wiki-sin. Or put in another way, listing many POVs, especially the most important ones, when there is no NPOV is/becomes the (meta-)NPOV.2.Are you joking? What about TINA?
 * 1. (counterfactual) – NPOV is the historical fact because Greece did apply and did get bail-out deal – I am not against writing up other theoretical scenarios that didn’t happen in the article - but let’s keep the summary short and near to the known facts. 2. (?) – I never said there was a lack of alternatives.
 * 1. (counterfactual) – NPOV is the historical fact because Greece did apply and did get bail-out deal – I am not against writing up other theoretical scenarios that didn’t happen in the article - but let’s keep the summary short and near to the known facts. 2. (?) – I never said there was a lack of alternatives.


 * Europe has a market economy without a central decision maker (like dictator/communism leader). Prices and wages are freely negotiated. As the North is continually seeing a lot of its value creation transferred to Asia and to other regions because the wages/sourcing prices are cheaper over there, how can you recommand to centrally increase prices and destroy the market results? (That is the continued problem of communism that market results are much better than central management attempts and the "Communist Party" is always overconfident about its knowledge). And take the risk to massively tweak market economy results just to have a "relative" convergence to Greece (2% of EU) and loosing competitveness to the total world at the same time? Who should then pay for bail-outs or other crisis if the North has lost more competitiveness? Seems to be a strong POV and not really elaborated.
 * 1. Paul Krugman among other people does. He has among other things been awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics. Ask him. 2. Yes in essence the EZ therefore sucks. Moving on. Btw it's not about Greece only (I've explicitly stated so I really don't have to strawmen), it's about all the deficit countries vs the surplus countries. Or put in another way again, it's exactly why the EZ sucks.
 * 1. (POV/not relevant) – it is known that during his whole career Krugman has had a strong political left agenda. It is also known that people with left agendas tend to have a (too) high confidence that a state can do/decide things better centrally than otherwise markets/individuals. They also tend to “forget” to also incorporate the negative effects of interfering too much in market results (also left people with a Nobel price). Did you ever read Krugman writing about the negative economic effects of the European North losing value creation and income to Asia and other regions if the North artificially increases prices to “relatively” support Greece? No, as Krugman is not interested in making transparent the real effects (total effects) of his agenda. That is also the reason a lot of Krugman’s agenda points are not really relevant and not applied by politicians in very open economies. 2. (myth) - can you provide calculations/reports why it would be an advantage for the EZ if the North decreases its competitiveness (in order to be nearer to the South) even though Europe is already losing competitive positions to America and Asia? Is an increased loss of the aggregate competitive positions versus the world an advantage for Europe?
 * 1. (POV/not relevant) – it is known that during his whole career Krugman has had a strong political left agenda. It is also known that people with left agendas tend to have a (too) high confidence that a state can do/decide things better centrally than otherwise markets/individuals. They also tend to “forget” to also incorporate the negative effects of interfering too much in market results (also left people with a Nobel price). Did you ever read Krugman writing about the negative economic effects of the European North losing value creation and income to Asia and other regions if the North artificially increases prices to “relatively” support Greece? No, as Krugman is not interested in making transparent the real effects (total effects) of his agenda. That is also the reason a lot of Krugman’s agenda points are not really relevant and not applied by politicians in very open economies. 2. (myth) - can you provide calculations/reports why it would be an advantage for the EZ if the North decreases its competitiveness (in order to be nearer to the South) even though Europe is already losing competitive positions to America and Asia? Is an increased loss of the aggregate competitive positions versus the world an advantage for Europe?


 * Now you are conradicting yourself. If you say Greece could also have defaulted (implying Greece is free in its decisions) how can "austerity" be dictated to Greece? The situation was more that nobody thought it to be a good idea to further finance Greek government's deficits (including the Greek citizens who were and are hiding their money from Greek state in the amounts of 100+ bn) (and including the Greek government not executing significan privatisations). In your logic, the Greek people would also "dictate austerity" by not investing in Greek debt paper (or pay due taxes). Or do only international investors/states/organizations qualify as "austerity dictators" when not financing further Greek deficits? Seems a litte POV again.
 * Now you're simply lying or have very poor reading comprehension skills: Had listed some alternative possibilities, not necessarily overlapping ones, arguing against TINA.
 * 1. (“austerity dictatorship” is a POV concept) – I explained this above and see no arguments against my explanation. I was never arguing for TINA.
 * 1. (“austerity dictatorship” is a POV concept) – I explained this above and see no arguments against my explanation. I was never arguing for TINA.


 * Again a theoretical alternative history that is not really relevant for Wikipedia (POV). A zero interest rate has many disadvantages as it destroys the various price signals the market can show in different interest rates. It also destroys the asset side of insurances and pension funds by taking away yields. It may be the start of the next bubble as a lot of projects are done because of super-cheap financing. And so on. Not to have those problems was one of the reasons the Maastricht treaty in 1992 had clauses in it to avoid to have non-convergent economies joining the same currency.
 * Trichet has been manyatime called a fucking idiot for raising them; bust, no fiscal policies, rates increase; basic macroeconomics. Also very relevant on the prevailing mindset and ideology in the corridors of power. Hardly therefore non relevant however big or small the subsequent potential, hypothetical change with respect to Greece. Also, legalistic arguments suck.
 * 1. (counterfactual) – There was no early “zero interest phase”. Historical fact. I was just explaining to you typical decision makers motives why there was no early zero interest phase because you seemed again a bit lost that history went like that; but again, motives of decision makers are not really that relevant for WP and they don’t change the facts anyway, so forget my explanations on why history went like that.
 * 1. (counterfactual) – There was no early “zero interest phase”. Historical fact. I was just explaining to you typical decision makers motives why there was no early zero interest phase because you seemed again a bit lost that history went like that; but again, motives of decision makers are not really that relevant for WP and they don’t change the facts anyway, so forget my explanations on why history went like that.


 * I find strong POV in all your views and arguments as explained above. But you are trying to "accuse" me of POV even though you did not show me one single POV point in my "bullet point summary" (preceding para) or maybe you didn't tell me clear enough which point it was. Anything else relevant for WP or NPOV? Otherwise it would be a good time to improve the summary.


 * --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 16:13, 2 June 2015 (UTC)


 * 1. Perhaps you should go check again wiki NPOV policies (just like you should check confict of interest policies or using racist slurs against other national groups of wikipedians and nations in general policies) and realise that this is an article about the Greek crisis, therefore Greek interests etc. might have prominence? I'm accusing you among many other things of trying to push a single POV when they are many. Moreover I and other editos have argued that it would be difficult, futile, misleading etc. to summarise for example in such a simple or simplistic way the crisis. Or again for the nth time, do the actual work on your sandbox and come back with the results. Also, others are free to override my objections deciding by majority vote. Now I repeat, I have spent more than enough time. End of story.Thanatos|talk|contributions 17:02, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
 * 1. (?) – I am arguing that the WP article should have the main facts in the summary and have at least the summary NPOV. Again, you did not show any POV in any of the points in my bullet point summary but funnily enough - you are again accusing me of POV. Additionally, you introduced a lot of new POV in your red comments. I made this transparent with my blue comments. So I assume you didn’t find a single POV in any of my summary points because you never named one. That means the summary can be improved having the main facts in it and POV positions out.
 * PS: Did the authors writing the current summery (with POVs in it) use sandboxes?
 * --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 12:49, 3 June 2015 (UTC)

As I see it, this entire POV subdebate (which I now structured into becoming a separate subdebate of the initial one), fails to be constructive in regards of raising specific proposals how to improve the current article content. As we also currently have no general POV issue for the article, I think we are really wasting our time and energy by continuing this lengthy POV subdebate here at the talkpage. Just my personal opinion. ;-) Danish Expert (talk) 16:14, 3 June 2015 (UTC)


 * At least it is clear to me now what Thanatos wanted to say between the lines in the previous discussion; I couldn't understand before what he really wanted to say.
 * Sorry to mention but there is a lot of POV in the summary right now. If one looks at the first 20+ words only: "The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is part of the ongoing European debt crisis, being triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession,..."
 * Concerning the "European debt crisis" there is no mention that the Eurozone states finished their bail-out programs except for Greece (and small Cyprus); the "subprime crisis" was already gone June 2009 (as one can see by the interest rate spread data), and as to my knowledge there was no "Great Recession" in the EU or in Greece (or elsewere? is this lemma a wikipedia only invention?), and the Greek debt crisis started in 2010 after Greece stopped masking its debt and deficits; there is a direct time&logic connection between these two events (stop masking - public shock - start of Greek debt crisis). So, there are still many unnecessary POVs and just outdated facts in the summary - I am not saying it is there intentionally - but it is there.
 * --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 18:10, 3 June 2015 (UTC)


 * This specific debate was never about the lead summary, which I btw do not agree to be POV. Wikipedia's description that the Great Recession hit Europe in 2008-2009 (in many states however under the name Financial Crisis - i.e. in Denmark it was called "Finanskrisen"), is something which has been supported by multiple primary reliable sources (i.e. IMF economic analysis and outlook reports). Moreover it is also a commonly accepted fact among experts - that the so-called Great Recession had different end dates for the specific states being hit (so it can not be said to have ended with certainty for all states in June 2009). When the lead mention that "the European debt crisis was triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession", this deliberately highlight it was not directly caused by the Great Recession (but only triggered). Some underlying structural unhealthy states for the majority of European Economies, were the true cause for eruption of the subsequent "European sovereign-debt crisis", which the second part of the line then also continue to explain.


 * There is no need for the lead of this article to go into greater details about the geographical+time scope for all the other country-specific European-sovereign debt crisis. As a general term, the European-sovereign debt crisis has been described by its lead paragraph, to have started from the moment in "late 2009" when the spreads of long-term government interest rates started to increase. Only details about the Greek crisis is relevant here in the lead of our article, because readers can learn more about such additional country-specific European debt-crisis by clicking at its Wikilink in the lead. Point is, that the "Great Recession" and "European debt-crisis" are sort of interconnected, without saying the first caused the second (which would be false), but rather that the first triggered eruption of the second in "certain weak states" plagued by fragile economies (with macroeconomic imbalances / competitive issues / financial instability / fiscal sustainability issues, being the true causes - and not the "Great Recession itself" which only was the trigger for these unhealthy issues suddenly becoming visible - because such fundamental problems are never visible during good times but per definition will always only be revealed during bad times when "no-risk behavior" reverse to become "risk aversion" among investors).


 * When everything is taken into consideration, I believe the lead has been written in a very neutral way. I agree with you the Greek debt-crisis can be argued only to have started when the first bailout programme was signed 2 May 2010. However, on the other hand, it can also be argued when looking at the history, that the Great Recession more likely ended in Greece in Q2-2009, while the Greek sovereign-debt crisis then started already from Q3-2009 (coinciding with eruption of the third Greek recession recorded to start in Q3-2009), which was also reflected by the long-term Greek government interest rates starting their rising path away from the similar rate in Germany - also that time around. In addition, the reveal of the correct 2009-data also came drip by drip as explained further down in the article (i.e. 2/3 of the true figures were revealed slightly ahead of the election campaign, already in September 2009), supporting that the debt-crisis indeed started in Q3-2009 rather than May 2010. Danish Expert (talk) 21:18, 3 June 2015 (UTC)


 * @Danish Expert: "no need for the lead of this article to go into greater details about the geographical+time scope for all the other country-specific European-sovereign debt crisis" (agree);  "Only details about the Greek crisis is relevant here in the lead" (agree, but the lead also should summarize to be short)


 * The current status of the first 30+ words in the lead: "The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is part of the ongoing European debt crisis, being triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession, and believed initially to have been caused locally in Greece ..."


 * @all: (oppose to strong "European debt crisis" context, especially for crisis start): one should keep in mind that there was no "European debt crisis" and no other eurozone state in a debt crisis when the Greek debt crisis started, therefore stressing cause-effect relationships of the European debt crisis to describe that Greece went into a debt crisis seems to be unnecessary POV. One should also keep in mind that there is no "European debt crisis" anymore (and therefore the current lead wrongly assumes that Greece is part of it.)


 * (oppose to ""Great recession" trigger): There are always business cycles, so one can usually define countries/regions as being more in a boom/expanion or a recession phase but I don't think there is common agreement on years/countries/content of a "Great recession". Everybody agrees what the subprime-crisis, dotcom-crisis, "Black Friday" and so was. But the "Great recession"? Nobody I know is aware of such a "monstrum" or can define it (neither by country, starting point, ending point, or whatsoever), even though it should have been the latest crisis; maybe we don't use this term in the summary (I don't deny there are specialists who define in their communities a lot and analyse much more cycles than are broadly known, but this may not be suitable as a context for the lead section); especially not suitable as a "trigger", as a trigger is something very exact. Like the revelation by Greek government in 2010 that they had to revise the 2009 buget deficit again, this time to a "2-digit figure". This was a severe message and it took seconds, exact as a trigger. Greece has been able to borrow in free capital markets still in 2010 just before this latest announcements (--> no debt crisis), Greek has not been able anymore to borrow in free capital markets since then (and could not pay back due debt since then without external help) (after this announcement (--> debt crisis)). That is what everybody would probably agree to be trigger-like. But business cycles (incl. a multi-year "Great Recession", if that really existed in Greece) come and go and can contribute as one of the multi-year-causes to the Greek debt crisis like "overspending for years" is a multi-year-cause, like "no real collection of due taxes" is a multi-year-cause and so on. But imho you can't pick one of the multi-year-causes for the Greek debt crisis, and decide this should now be the exact trigger, and the other mult-year-causes don't qualify as trigger (POV).


 * First lead sentence: "The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is part of the ongoing European debt crisis, being triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession, and believed initially to have been caused locally in Greece ..."); can everybody understand what "believed initially" really means? Is it not believed anymore? For the lead: Why don't we just list all the main causes in the lead, as they are known more than five years after the crisis started.


 * If you read only the first 30+ words (what many may do), you read something that is not true (anymore). It is not hammered in stone, anyway, is it? --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 09:43, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
 * I am not opposed to implement potentially improved formulations (if the existing one can be misunderstood). The first line was intended just to say - and can perhaps be reformulated to either:
 * Counterproposal A: The Greek government-debt crisis (also know as the Greek Depression) is part of the European debt crisis (the collective term for a handful of country-specific sovereign-debt crisis erupting within the eurozone in wake of the Great Recession), and was caused locally in Greece by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy along with a decade long pre-existence of overly high structural deficits and debt-to-GDP levels on public accounts.
 * Counterproposal B: ''The Greek government-debt crisis (also know as the Greek Depression) is part of the European debt crisis, which erupted in wake of the Great Recession, and was caused locally in Greece by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy along with a decade long pre-existence of overly high structural deficits and debt-to-GDP levels on public accounts.
 * Can you accept we implement the above A/B reformulation, instead of the current one?
 * As for your proposal to extend or rewrite the second half of the line - lets call it the "cause line" of the lead (which were displayed by the article continuously by this formulation for the past five years), such change in my point of view should only be implemented after having posted such alternative formulation proposal either at your sandbox or here at the talkpage, followed by consensus agreement that such change would be an improvement (as it can be considered to be controversial to emphasize some causes rather than others) . Point here is also to note, that it is kind of intentional the current "cause line" of the lead is vague - as it is not supposed to mention all specific causes but only the main "root causes" (as the first lead paragraph only per WP:LEAD shall introduce readers to a "general definition of the topic and presentation of its context") . In example, a specific "balance of payment" cause is normally understood just to be part of the more general root cause term "structural weakness of the economy", which is why we have not mentioned this specific cause explicitly in the first paragraph of the lead. Danish Expert (talk) 11:36, 4 June 2015 (UTC)

How about this:


 * 1) The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is a multi-year crisis having begun early 2010 when Greece made public their end of 2009 debt level and 2009 budget deficit. The revelation of a 13% deficit and a €300 billion debt level being 130% of GDP was widely perceived as a shock - because of its magnitude and because earlier estimates and reported figures were lower. This situation was broadly recognized as a government-debt crisis because Greece lost the ability to service its due debt on its own, as it had lost creditworthiness to borrow fresh money to the tune of sustainable interest rates - while at the same time being incapable to generate sufficient financial funding by its own - through operating a government budget balance surplus or having a positive liquidity stock flow stemming from sale of government financial assets.

This defines the government-debt crisis so one can understand the country, the timing, the relevant debt volume, and that this debt volume - being publicly known - was a crisis debt level, as Greece could not service anymore due debt in this state.

Only in a 2nd paragraph I would start categeorizing and relating the Greek government-debt crisis (could be POV) like being part or the start of the European debt crisis, and maybe naming major causes (could be POV) (incl. global recession, long pre-existence of ... and all the other major causes.)

PS: Was the revised 300bn debt level already known April 2010? Or only later 2010? --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 13:32, 4 June 2015 (UTC)


 * To make my reply easier and more short, I took the freedom to color your proposed alternative phrasing. My first taught is, that the green line (to which I added a slight reformulation/clarification), could perhaps be good to add. However, as for the red line, I am still opposed. Reason for my oppose, is that it selects a later start point for the crisis ("early 2010" instead of "late 2009"), and overemphasize the meaning of the corrected debt and deficit figures. As an isolated event, the "April 2010 correction of figures" only explain why the tipping point for a shift from "private lending markets" to "public creditors" happened on 2 May 2010. However, it was not because the debt figures themselves were a market shock (btw this point is something you can find proof on, just by looking at how the long-term interest rate reacted in the lead graph, which display that it only gradually increased month by month with no sudden spike from one day to the next).


 * In example, if the structural budget balance had been positive and the S2-LTC value close to 0.0% for Greece in 2009 (this would have generated sufficient trust in the heads of professional private creditors, that the Greek government would achieve a government budget surplus along with declining debt-to-GDP ratios once it would exit its ongoing two-year recession - while the fiscal stance of the government also had prospects to remain sustainable for the long-term as indicated by the close to 0.0% S2-LTC value), then the private lending market gladly on this basis alone would have continued financing a prolonged two-year recession for Greece, even to the tune of an annual 16% government budget deficit and a debt-to-GDP ratio deteriorating to 130%. No problem at all. And Yes, the 300bn debt level was known in April 2010, and btw also more or less known in 2008+2009, as the incorrect figures were not wildly wrong, as far as I remember the "cheat"/"inaccuracy" was just in the level of 25bn - so the cheat itself or corrected debt amount itself did not generate a shock. The shock was more connected to the fact how big an annual structural deficit the state operated, which revealed how big its current short-term fiscal sustainability problems were.


 * As the current root-cause line in the lead explain, the Greek government-debt crisis "was caused locally in Greece by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy along with a decade long pre-existence of overly high structural deficits and debt-to-GDP levels on public accounts." This was the fundamental reason why the private lending market shut down for Greece in May 2010, after having lived through its first recession years. It was not the debt-level or government deficit itself being the problem, but that investors realized (starting from October 2009 as revealed by the rise in Greek interest rates), that Greece had been caught by an unsustainable debt trap due to its combination of problems.


 * By the way, the "Balance of Payment" and "short-term external funding" issue, which DugganMC1 today posted an article about, is for the same reason neither relevant enough to mention for the first paragraph, as the highlighted causes in this article in the same way can not be understood to be root causes, but causes at the next level beneath the root causes. Because "structural weaknesses of the economy" (which btw include the competitiveness and productivity problem) causes a "Balance of Payment problem", and the articles focus on existence of a "short-term external funding issue" will only be a real felt problem the moment private creditors loose their market trust in the fiscal sustainability stance of the Greek government and as a consequence withdraw their unbounded short-term funding. Danish Expert (talk) 22:07, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Bullshit!!!! This is plain POV, an interpretation. We could argue for ever about e.g. what/which is defined, believed as or is the root cause, the effective cause, a trigger, Aristotle's or Kant's causes or whatever but again it would be pointless. The point is that I have provide to you ample evidence, sources that claim otherwise! So stop pushing this as a fact or as the scientific consensus!!! And btw I obviously disagree with both of you so obviously there is also no wiki-consensus. So stop acting as if there was one; the fact that I've stopped replying to EconomicsEconomics - as I had pointed I would - does not in any way mean that I've consented to you two making the decisions! I've accepted - a grave error - for far too long your view being presented in the article as the 'Truth'; I won't accept it anymore! Thanatos|talk|contributions 13:57, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Are Thanatos666 and DugganMC1 - both accounts promoting sources of the political left direction, both with the argumentation, both with a high level of aggression, both at the same time complaining about POV - only working in a rotation principle? if one stops, the other happily takes over? What a coincidence. Or did Thanatos really miss that DugganMC1's source "Marie Christine Duggan" likes marxism? And no, again Thanatos666 is not having any WP:CONFLICT, no, he is really trying to fight POV, this time with the support of Marxism-like ideas, in a duet with DugganMC1.--EconomicsEconomics
 * PS: Again, it it almost impossible to identify what Thanatos really wants to say or oppose, as he doesn't really specify. It is hard to validate his general accusations that the authors of this article would be trying to push POV; I cannot see any POV being pushed, especially no extreme/political POV. It is the opposite, the authors are trying to make the lead understandable and free of POV as much as possible. And Thanatos - as everybody can read above in the red text blocks - is trying to push POV, mainly political left POV and "Greek interests POV" whatever he defines as Greek interests - the blue text blocks above make transparent his POV pushing)--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 13:19, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
 * I shouldn't reply to you - yet again - but again I'm doing it for the sake of other people/editors reading this: OK the editor who parachuted onto the article out of nowhere pushing for among other things a major undoing of the work others have done and has among other things accused whole groups of editors and people of supposedly promoting conspiracy theories when there are plenty - a demonstrated herein fact among other things - of respectable analysts, scholars, .... for example that have made the same relevant or similar claims, the idiot who retorted to racist slurs as an argument, invokes yet again WP:CONFLICT. /facepalm/
 * If you want to understand - that is, if you really can or want to - what I'm referring to, read carefully Danish Expert's claims directly above (also the ones before that, about e.g. the 2007-8 crisis being only a trigger, not a cause; as if for example, triggers are not a kind, a form of a cause) and then scroll up/back and read also the refs (most importantly the ones at the currency/bop crisis article and relevant section thereof; btw they include claims by, of, H.W. Sinn, i.e. hardly, to say the least, of an arch-Communist!!! Oh the irony!!! :D) I had pointed him to; I'm fucking tired of having to argue and counterargue and explain in detail and repeatedly the same things, again and again (e.g. about various views on what is the "real", "main" or "root" to use Danish Expert's expression above, cause(s) of of the crisis). If you won't read, carefully or at all, or can't understand that's not my fucking problem!!! I.e. since you've hardly read, or at least act as if you haven't, what I've writeen to you when we two were talking but instead had retorted to e.g. moving the goalposts (e.g. on the €50bil privatisations for all practical purposes impossibility; you replied by claiming it's supposedly, somehow a myth, according to unknown, unspecified things you've read somewhere, by not responding at all to the citation (may it be perhaps because you don't speak Greek? I don't know, do you?) and by changing the claim/issue (i.e. moving the goalpost) from privatisations to privatisations plus tax receipts), I doubt you will now.
 * Also you damn foul, a Marxist interpretation of something is certainly a POV but a source/source/claim/view being really or allegedly, presumably or supposedly Marxist is not by e.g. definition or ipso facto, wrong, nor is it of course a reason to exclude it from wikipedia!!!!! Just like that is, being a neoliberal, a market-fundamentalist, a heterodox or an orthodox, a right, center or left wing, a keynesian, a monetarist, an ordoliberal, a communist, an anarchist, a fascist, a nazi, a democrat and so on and so forth source/scholar/analysis/view/claim/... isn't!!! GET IT? Claiming in effect otherwise makes to other people abundantly clear that you're unable to think outside the tiny box of your ideological POV. GET IT??? Oh and by the way you moron, (I shouldn't say or needn't have to say this cause there is no reason for me to do but since among other things the irony thereof is enormous, I'm gonna to) I'm right wing ideologically, it's just that as far as I'm concerned, being right wing is not the equivalent of being e.g. a laissez faire or an antimarxist etc. fanatic... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 15:11, 6 June 2015 (UTC)

ok, agree, is this suitable? (I still think - to reasonably define the lemma - it is needed to mention the rough figures 130% and 13% when the debt crisis started, but not as a cause; and it it short enough to qualify for a lead):


 * 1) The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is an ongoig multi-year crisis having begun between late 2009 and April 2010. At that time Greece had a €300 billion debt level being 130% of its GDP and was running a budget deficit in the order of 13% of its GDP. This situation was broadly recognized as the start of the Greek government-debt crisis because Greece lost the ability to service its existing debt, as it was neither capable to refinance due payments with new debt issues because of a reduced creditworthiness, nor able to meet its debt obligations via a budget surplus including any sale of assets.
 * 2) Starting autumn 2010, the eurozone states Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus also slid into a debt crisis. These debt crisis together including the Greek one also have been referred to as the "European debt crisis". The five debt crisis shared some similarities, but also had its differences with respect to causes, measures, and crisis evolvement.

--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 10:43, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
 * I still prefer that we either stick with the first paragraph of the lead as it currently stands, or alternatively replace the first line with "counterproposal A" that I posted above on 4 June 2015 11:36. Reason why I prefer it this way, is because it describe both the crisis and its context in a very neutral way. Inclusion of specific figures like "€300bn debt being 130% GDP" and "13% deficit" in the first paragraph, IMHO still overemphasize the meaning of such figures, in relation to why the crisis erupted. In the way the lead has been formulated already now, it provides a broad and accurate presentation of the crisis (also noting the Greek Economy suffered from a pre-crisis and double-dip recession in Q3-Q4 2007 + Q2 2008 - Q1 2009) . Readers need also to get presented to this pre-crisis context from the start, to understand why the second "Greek government-debt crisis" erupted in late 2009 (being Q3-2009 if we link it to recorded recession data) . On this basis, I still think we should keep featuring a wikilink both to the Great Recession and European debt crisis, as they are important main context topics. To further back up my argument, that the existing lead presentation of the article is fair, appropriate and neutral, I will now post the direct quote from the EC Spring Forecast report (5 May 2010) (in which I bolded some of the important words) :


 * This above quoted neutral understanding of the crisis, can be found not only in the economic forecast reports printed by the European Commission (representing the consensus view by its employed group of economic experts), but also by similar OECD and IMF reports printed at the time. They all conquer, and give more or less the same description of the Greek government-debt crisis, which the first paragraph of the lead has been modeled to present and reflect in the exact same way. I am inclined to keep it this way (at least for now), and do not see a heavy need for reformulating the first paragraph of the lead. Danish Expert (talk) 13:18, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
 * 1. I don't want to over-emphasize anything. But maybe, saying that Greece slid into the "debt" crisis with a 300 bn "debt" level is neither over-emphasizing the topic "debt" nor a unnecessary detailing of the first definition/description sentence, what debt crisis the WP article is about. (I added a "common sense analogy" section below on the discussion page as I feel - because of the discussion intensity - everything is getting a bit paranoid; next thing would be not to mention in WP it is about Greece because other states also had a debt crisis? ... just joking :-)
 * 2. The EU reports are always naming many reasons for the Greek debt crisis but never really touched the crisis reason that a non-Maastricht-convergent Greece joined the euro. Why does the EU have so many EU reports, identifying so many reasons for the Greek debt crisis, but is always "forgetting" the root cause of non-Maastricht-convergent entry in 1999/2001? Maybe because the EU administration is a party and not neutral in this.--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 17:55, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
 * 3. To give the lead a clearer structure (and to be intellectually more honest), one should have a sentence/paragraph in the lead listing all the major causes, as already agreed. That would mean not to "hide" the cause "Great Recession" already in the first definiton sentence by saying "triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession" (which is no less than taking one multi-year-cause out of the various causes and give it much more prominence than all the other multi-year-cause causes). Is that ok? --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 10:42, 7 June 2015 (UTC)

Ok, taking into account the various discussions (thanks for the constructive contributions), I am deriving a lead start not mentioning the 130% debt and 13% deficit ratios so nobody is inclined to think this is already mentioning the causes:


 * 1) The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is an ongoing multi-year crisis having begun between late 2009 and April 2010. At that time Greece had a €300 billion debt level. This situation was broadly recognized as the start of the Greek government-debt crisis because Greece lost the ability to service its existing debt, as it was neither capable to refinance due payments with new debt issues because of a reduced creditworthiness, nor able to meet its debt obligations via a budget surplus including any sale of assets.
 * 2) Starting autumn 2010, the eurozone states Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus also slid into a debt crisis. These debt crisis together including the Greek one also have been referred to as the "European debt crisis". The five debt crisis shared some similarities, but also had its differences with respect to causes, measures, and crisis evolvement.

The third paragraph should now list the causes. I have no problems that overlapping causes are listed as that is how reality was. I also have no problems if there is one sentence about there being special views on causes (but please let's stop to put sources close to Marxism in any prominence as this is not the broad view; all those special views can be elaborated in the article, they don't need any (wrong) prominence in the lead) --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 11:16, 9 June 2015 (UTC)

I will propose a modified lead based on the discussion and the current article status, ok?--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 08:26, 30 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Also here no contradiction, so I take it as a 'yes'. --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 10:54, 24 July 2015 (UTC)