Talk:Legal status of Taiwan

Staighre (talk) 22:45, 8 October 2009 (UTC)


 * /Archive1

Re-writing of all Legal Arguments
I have spent several days entirely re-writing the Legal Arguments section. I have included all links to other Wiki articles as appropriate. I have not eliminated anything from the original text, but have thoroughly reorganized it and supplemented it. This new re-organization should enable the differing schools of thought to build and expand upon their own arguments by adding further data as appropriate. Hmortar 03:47, 9 December 2006 (UTC)
 * Thank you for the reorganization. I believe it is excellent. My only concern is that there may be undue weight issues for certain sections, and by giving particular sections undue weight, the article can become non-neutral. In terms of the section on say, the United States, I propose shrinking it in the next few days depending on what other feedback is received. Thanks. Ngchen 15:10, 9 December 2006 (UTC)
 * I have trimmed the article, removing what seems to be redundant mentions of the same facts from different sectiions. I also trimmed the last section to avoid undue weight issues. If anyone would like to work in some of the SFPT statements by the various delegates years after the conference, please feel free to do so. The statement about Mao Zedong supporting Taiwan independence at one time I removed because (1) it has no legal merit, and (2) is unnecessarily inflammatory. IIRC that statement did appear (and rightly so IMO) in the political status of Taiwan article. The material about former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell I removed because of an active dispute about what he meant, that exists on this talk page. Ngchen 03:06, 17 December 2006 (UTC)
 * Made some changes to strengthen Pro-China arguements. Redcloud822 02:58, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

Restoration of NPOV redux
I edited the article in an attempt to explain the various possible prescriptions to explain the PRC and ROC POVs. Also, I removed the word provisionally from the historical overview section describing the Japanese instrument of surrender, where Japan " provisionally accepted" the terms of the Potsdam declaration. I believe that a significant part of the argument between the PRC/ROC position and the other position hinges on whether the Japanese surrender was or was not of a provisional nature; as such, to claim that it somehow is provisional violates NPOV. I did note in the subsequent paragraph on the 228 incident that some people claimed such.


 * Agreed. Thank you. I also did some minor restoration of NPOV redux. :) Mababa 06:42, 9 Jan 2005 (UTC)

As for the removal of the links to the PRC foreign ministry and the ROC government information office, I would like to hear the specific reasons why they were removed before restoring them. As they contain more or less definitive claims on the part of the two parties, I don't currently see why the information there being irrelevant. Ngchen 17:09, 8 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * I commented out the links because they are too general to be helpful. For example, the PRC foreign ministry has a page devoted to Taiwan that has various white papers and press releases from past year - that page should be linked, not the home page of the FM. --Jiang 04:32, 9 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I would suggest This one. A bit old though.Mababa 06:42, 9 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Handling Rebuttals
Reading through the article again, I noticed that several arguments on the pro-independence/self-determination side are in some sense rebuttals to claims in favor of Chinese sovereignty. Does anyone have suggestions on a NPOV way of incorporating rebuttals to each side's arguments?


 * I think it probably is my fault to present the arguments in a style that seemed to be rebuttals if rebuttal style is not right; however, these contents are the real arugments hold by vairous pro-Taiwan independence/self-determination groups. For those pro-Taiwan self-determination groups, they HAVE to make assertions(arguments) disproving pro-Chinese sovereignty claims in order to refuse whatever the pro-Chinese sovereignty groups(ROC/PRC/pro-unification groups) trying to impose onto the land they lives in. It is just their NATURE to refute the ROC's legitimacy and also to rebuttal the claims from the PRC in the international community. Thus, these areguments are the genuine position held by these groups. They are neither fabricated by me nor specific to the contents above in the "pro-chinese sovereignty" section but were generated by the pro-independent groups during a long-period of debate. And it is our responsibility to present their arguments to fullfill the NPOV policy. If this style is not appropriate, we can certainly reshuffle the contents and present their claims in a non-rebuttal style. Or perhaps we can present the arguments from pro-independence/self-determination first and present the pro-chinese sovereignty arguments later so that it wouldn't appear to be a rebuttal process.Mababa 00:25, 18 Jan 2005 (UTC)
 * It would be better if you can just organize it as pro arguements for one POV followed by rebuttal, then another POV followed by rebuttal. I made the suggestion at the top. Redcloud822 20:08, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Specifically, the argument against the lack of a valid prescription would be that only states can have legal sovereignty. People can be sovereign over states, but not directly over territory. As such, the 228 incident wouldn't be a valid protest, as no state was protesting the retrocession claim. And for the "Provisional Government of Formosa," IMO it is currently a fringe/radical group that very few people know or care about, although of course that could change in the future. As such a group with no significant recognition nor following, one can argue that their protest doesn't count. Does anyone have a way of working that fact in? Thanks. Ngchen 22:53, 17 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * I am sure that you can make arguments that these are invalid arguments just like those pro-independence/self-determination groups can argue that the claims from PRC or ROC are invalid ab initio. Based on the NPOV policy, I thought we should gather different opinions and present altogether instead of suppressing either side. By presenting the arguments, it not necessarily turn them into facts. On the other hands, had I fabricate these arguments, I would happily withdraw them.


 * To be more specific on this groups, it might be difficult to prove that this claim is from a radical/fringe group since there is no polls to prove or indicate this, especially when there currently is a steady 20% RADICAL Taiwanese residents favor independence over status quo. I think it is a POV and could be a radical move to tag them the label of "radical" now. :) Moreover, this group quite often have letters appeared on one of the major News Papers in Taiwan; thus, I assume they have a certain level of popularity higher than the threshold to be called radical. Even if this is indeed a radical group, it still falls into the pool of "various pro-independence/self-determination" groups.Mababa 00:25, 18 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * I have made some minor changes to make the claim to be attributed to one group. This should help readers not to mistake this argument to be held by all pro-independence/self-determination groups, with the caveat that we do not know the popularity of this specific group. I hope this would suffice.Mababa 00:42, 18 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I think the question is really how we handle arguements seemed to be rebuttals. An alternative way to address this issue, besides a reshuffling of contents, is to revamp the argument sections. The core argument from each side should be presented at the beginning. Then, a second rebuttal section from each side to address on each other's initial point. This would require a make over of the current version and I would really hesitate for another round of discussion. Moreover, Pro-Chinese sovereignty group hinged on multiple legal arguments and the rebuttal from this side should be supplemented if we make such a change. I think it is more important to include the pro-chinese sovereignty and also the pro-independence/self-determination external links.Mababa 02:57, 18 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Other nations' position during the conference
Some useful and factual historical segments that we can think about a NPOV way to put in the article along with the Churchill's position in the future.

During SF Peace Conference
 * The decision to keep Taiwan's status undetermined was deliberate. As indicated by the British delegate at the Japanese Peace Conference, at which the treaty was concluded:


 * ''"The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambition. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa."


 * "We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty."


 * The British delegate stated that "In due course a solution must be found in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." The Egyptian delegate stated that specifying the recipient is "to afford the opportunity to take into consideration the principle of self-determination and the expressed desire of the inhabitants of Taiwan." The French delegate stated that: "Taiwan's legal status must be determined one of these days, taking the wishes of the Formosan population into consideration."


 * It was thus the specific intention of the attendants of the San Francisco Peace Conference that the people of Taiwan should determine the future status of the island based on the principle of self-determination. Such process was not possible at the time, because the island was occupied by the losing side of China's Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists.

US position
 * In the US Congress, the 50th Anniversary of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was marked by the introduction of a resolution in support of Taiwan's self-determination. The resolution, HCR-221, states that it is the sense of Congress that "It is United States policy that the future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully, through a democratic mechanism such as a plebiscite and with the express consent of the people of Taiwan". The resolution specifically refers to the fact that under the provisions of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan, and the status of the island was left undetermined.

More on US's position: John Czyzak, legal adviser at the Far East Affairs Bureau in 1961. The other was a rewriting in non-technical language, by Robert Starr in 1971, of Czyzak's analysis.

Anthony Eden in 1955
 * Sir Anthony Eden in a written reply in 1955: "In September 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-Shek (&#34083;&#20171;&#30707;) put him there on a basis of military occupation pending future arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese."

Propose:

1)The position of the UK, Egyptian and French delegates to be put into the historical section since that belongs to the conference.

2)US congress resolotion to be put into the US postition.

3)Refraim from overinterpreting Anthony Eden and Churchill's interpretation until we can figure out a good use of it in the future. Others later.

I think all of the proposed modification are factual. Please generously advise. Mababa 05:28, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * Unfortunately, none of these statements were made "during the Conference" and instead made at least ten years after the fact.
 * I am not sure what do you mean. I thought these comments were cited from the delegates in the Peace Conference. Pehaps I did not express my points clear enough, I ment these statements were made during SF Peace Conference of 1951, not the Cairo Conference. I wonder if it is not too much trouble, can you specifically let me know what makes you think they are not made during the SF Peace conference fo 1951.Mababa 03:20, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * All of these statements were also made by western-bloc nations that, while recognizing the PRC as the sole "China", did not want to see capitalist Taiwan fall to the communists.
 * Still, these statements were pertinent to the situation where the participants of the peace treaty decide how to make Japan dispose Taiwan island.Mababa 03:20, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * After 1979, almost all US legislation and official statements stopped referring to the Republic of China because in establishing relations with the PRC, the US acknowledged the ROC to be a defunct entity. Instead, everything is made out to "the people of Taiwan" (see the Taiwan Relations Act) for example. The US position makes the false assumption that the Republic of China no longer exists and has nothing to do with the legitimacy of the ROC administration on Taiwan versus a self-determined Taiwanese government, but rather with the legitimacy of a PRC administration on Taiwan versus a self-determined Taiwanese government. The same could be said of the UK position post 1950.


 * It is fallacious to make assumption that US made a false assumption. You may say that US position was biased against other positions but I do not think we can assert that they are false. Then would you suggest these historical documents about the western countries to be included in the article of political status of Taiwan? Please comment on this proposal.--Mababa


 * I dont see an argument behind your assertion. Even US laws after 1979 claim so: "before January 1, 1979, known as the Republic of China", the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979. It is no conincidence that laws pre-1979 all state "Republic of China" and laws post-1979 state "Taiwan". It is therefore improper to try to infer much else from the use of the phrase "people of Taiwan". --Jiang 04:40, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * All I want to say is that this is not necessarily correct and it is a POV to say U.S. position is fallacious. :) Mababa 03:10, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * To use the current situation and statements made due to the current situation as if they were made during the Cairo Conference is just plain misleading and a misinterpretation of these statements. If there are statements made before the 1949 division of China, then I would like to see them. --Jiang 09:12, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * I would love to see those too. However, I do not think people are arguing the existance of the intention between the allies to transfer Taiwan to China. The arguement on this intention is whether a unsigned declaration is legal binding or not. Thus, the interpretation of the Cairo Declaration among the participants: US, UK and China after the meeting are important. Even it is signed, I do not think people can argue that a declaration is supreme over a treaty. Sure, situation are different and makes people change their mind; just like Churchill's comment, a lot of things changed. However, I still wonder if this encyclopedia can selectively neglect the factual change of attitude of the Allies. I still suggest we can find a proper place to include them, even if this means to create a separate page, I would really appreciate if you can make some suggestions as to where would be a best place to collect them.  If this article needs to be fully concentrated on the legal arguement, then what would you say to include them in the political status of Taiwan? Moreoever, the position of the western world are still arguement actively used by the pro-independence/self-determination supporters, do you think we can include them among the arguemnts? Cairo declaration aside, please comment on my original proposal on the statements during the SFPT conference. Many thanks.Mababa 03:20, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * Again, these are arguments, unless you can phrase what you have to put in other ways. These are arguments against soveriegnty of the PRC over Taiwan, not to be inferred as arguments against the legitimacy of the ROC since in the eyes of the arguer, the ROC does not really exist.


 * I assume the arguments you were refering to are the arguemtn from Churchill and the arguments after SFPT. For the pro-self determination groups, they not necessarily regards ROC as legitimate government and quite often, they would regard ROC as government in exile occupying the island. These arguements do not contradict to their position excluding PRC and ROC. These arguments are the arguments actively being used and should be represented in the encyclopedia in relevant articles. If it is not appropriate to be listed here, I suggest we can find other places to include them.Mababa 03:10, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * The political status article needs to be re-written. Maybe we should draft an outline on its talk page and we can deal with whatever there. Yes, some of this 'might be relevant. --Jiang 04:40, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * This sounds great. I would really appreciate it if we can find an appropriate place to gather these international opinion on this matter if this article is not the right place for them. I am still wondering what you think about the opinions expressed during the SFPT conference and whether you think it would be okay to include them here. Thank you.Mababa 03:10, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * I encourage the re-writing and will contribute. I however note that this endless political finery shouldn't block addition to the article. I also encourage contributors here to edit in related articles (i.e. Taiwan Relations Act). Richardc020 (talk) 16:24, 16 June 2011 (UTC)

Peace in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was violated by Qing
I also have noticed that this arguement in the Arguments in favor of Chinese sovereignty is disputable and is not factually correct. It states:

The waging of aggressive war by Japan against China in 1931 and beyond violates the peace that was brokered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki

However, there are more sino-japanese treaties in between 1895 and 1931. For example, the Boxer Rebellion leads to the Boxer Protocol, Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China, and China again reached a second peace agreement with Japan in this treaty.

Thus the peace that was brokered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki clearly was not breached by the second Sino-Japanese war but WAS violated by the Boxer Rebellion which Qing court was behind and supported; if we assume that there were no other peace treaty between China and Japan between the two Sino-Japanese war. Still there could be other peace treaties exists.

And it was the peace brokered in the Boxer protocol being breached when the second sino-japanese war break out. The arguement calling this war violated the peace brokered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was fallacious and inaccurate. I am wondering if we can fix this statement. Perhaps ommiting this statement or we should correct the statement by finding out the closest peace treaty between Japan and China before the second sino-japanese war.

It was a Chinese POV to call it an aggression from Japan toward China at the second Sino-Japanese war. I am also not sure if Japan's official position has acknowledged that it was their fault to wage a war against China already. This could be a next POV argument if there is a Japanese contributer participating this article.Mababa 03:20, 12 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I have checked on lists of the unequal treaties and concluded that there are more treaties signed in between China and Japan in between 1895 and 1931. While the contents are various, the Boxer protocol was the only one PEACE TREATY between the two countries. And this is also confirmed by the SFPT where it specifically stipulate Japan renounce the treaty right derived from this Boxer Protocol.


 * Article 10
 * Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

The current version claiming that the second Sino-Japanese War breached the peace brokered in Treaty of Shimonoseki was inaccurate. I hope to hear if Ngchen or Jiang has any suggestion to help the text be more accurate.Mababa 02:59, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Don't worry about it. I have just made some change to balance the POV. :)Mababa 03:27, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Truman's position
I wouldn't make a fuss on this matter and I do not expect a debate on this issue; however, I am only a bit confused by the statement:

President Truman, ....... was prepared to see Taiwan fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists

I always thought that Truman only withdrawed U.S. from gettin involved in the Chinese civil war but this not necessarily can be equated to throwing Taiwan to PRC. I am certainly awared of the fact that the Nationalist was the side losing the civil war and did not seem to be capable of geting lost territories back. However, it does not mean that they were incapable of securing the island from any PRC invasion, especially this required PRC to deploy troops across the strait. Thus, I wonder if Truman really was indeed ready for giving Taiwan to PRC or this is an extrapolation from Truman's passive role in the issue of chinese civil war.

I do not think that we have to raise a new debate and request both side to show evidence on Truman's position before the Korea war; since, in my judgement, it is kind of trivial and would not change the historical moves afterwards or the arguments from all sides anyway. However, I am still curious to read on this issue and would really appreciate it if someone can make a reference link below from any of the contributers, just for quick reference, if it is not too much trouble.

Here is one more post-Korean-war evidence showing Truman and Britain proposed Formosa issue to be solved in UN:

Joint Statement Following Discussions With the Prime Minister of Great Britain December 8, 1950
 * On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

Some more: Mababa 06:17, 16 Jan 2005 (UTC)

US position over years
I would like to question the accuracy of the statements about how the US has treated the sovereignty of Taiwan over the years. More specifically, (1) did the US State Department officially report that the sovereignty of Taiwan was "undetermined" in 1970, or did it claim that it belonged to the ROC which the US recognized at the time as the Chinese government, or was it simply silent, or did it actually claim it for the US via the SFPT? (2) Did the US make any statements on territorial sovereignty in the Shanghai Communique at all, other than acknowledging the PRC position? (3) In the six assurances, the US stated that it would not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan - considering how the US recognized the PRC then as the Chinese government, would that really imply a lack of recognition of the unrecognized ROC holding sovereignty over Taiwan as the article implies as opposed to simply not recognizing PRC sovereignty over Taiwan? And in the same spirit, can former US Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement really be construed to question the ROC's hold of sovereignty, or is it a jab against those favoring Taiwan independence or "two Chinas" which is the way I remember it was construed? I would appreciate definitive source info here to ensure accuracy. FWIW, it's well known that diplomats have basically had to do a dance when dealing with such questions, since the US does not recognize the ROC at present and reading what is really meant by their carefully parsed statements can be quite difficult. Thanks.Ngchen 23:06, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Let me give it a try: 1) That line was initially cited with the source . In that article, the source was cited as Starr, "Legal Status of Taiwan." Perhaps we should add the link back in the article to prevent future confusion. It specifically states that "sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution," thus undetermined even at the time when the U.S. recognizes ROC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole China. Taiwan does not belong to ROC, nor PRC, in the eyes of the U.S. during that time. However, it was silent on the role of SFPT in the sovereignty question of Taiwan. After this statement, I do not remember if there is any other clear statement on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty.

2)Probably not. But, you must understand the fact that the U.S. merely acknowledges PRC's claim but not recognizes it.

3)It seems to be clear that the sentence in the article targeted on PRC's claim over Taiwan, not ROC's. I do not believe the sentence in the article in tend to make any implication more than that. I agree with you that ROC's sovereignty claim has nothing to do with the six assurance which was intended to assure the U.S.'s support with Taiwan but not necessarily to recognize ROC's claim.

4)Colin Powell states:1)"There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy." He also stated: 2)"We want to see both sides not take unilateral action that would prejudice an eventual outcome, a reunification that all parties are seeking"

Powell was quick to withdraw the position described in the second statement once he went back to US. However, I do not recall that he ever modified his first statement, which denied Taiwan to be an independence country. I agree with you that reading between the lines is not always easy when interpreting diplomats' statements. Since we have no idea whether his statement is an dance targeting to the Taiwan independence supporters (as you suggested) or just another random mistake slip through his lips, all we can be certain is that he does not recognize the sovereignty of ROC.

If my question somehow help to ease your doubts on some or part of the statements, would you mind to remove the dubious sign for us? Many thanks. :) --Mababa 03:25, 12 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I believe that a full analysis of the US position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty, plus an analysis of Powell's remarks will be found here What Are You Doing? http://www.taiwankey.net/dc/what2do6.htm :Hmortar 06:38, 16 November 2005 (UTC)

Thank you for providing the links. I have removed a few of the dubious statements, and added the National Review link. FWIW, upon googling the statement, all the links that come up are either those of pro-Taiwan independence sites or right-wing US sites, so I am still a bit skeptical. If someone can find the actual State Department transcript, it would settle all doubt. Nevertheless, a cited source trumps any hunches on my part. I modified the statement regarding the Six Assurances, based on the argument that the statement was (1) given to the ROC dictatorship, (2) the US IIRC recognized that the PRC was the sole legal government of all China. So, the statement probably was a reassurance that the US wouldn't recognize PRC sovereignty. As to the question of ROC sovereignty, it would be silent. As to the part about Colin Powell's statement, I still believe it was a jab at those promoting independence and/or those supporting "two Chinas" and that was why he was criticized for it. In fact, the NR article you noted specifically faulted him for so-called offering up too much. FWIW, his statement as a whole was definitely a pro (peaceful) unification statement, though he tried to backpedal on the second sentence as you said. If there are clarifications and such to the contrary, I would like to see them. Thanks. Ngchen 01:44, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Thank you for your prompt response and edit. I personally think his comment is not very informative but provoking debates on its true meaning. Perhaps it would be more neutral if we remove that line?--Mababa 05:20, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Who cares about US position over Taiwan. In fact Taiwan is not recognized as a country, as many in wikipedia questioning legal and political status of the Taiwan island, it is clear Taiwan's international status is doubtful as a country. Even US administration sells arms to Taiwan, US legislation's TRA calls Taiwan a state, and AIT serves as US interest in Taiwan, still, Taiwan is not recognized as a country by the US nor can the US claim Taiwan a US protectorate/US protected state/US colony/US overseas territory because official position of US such as the State Department's position (that handles foreign affairs of the US) on Taiwan is that Taiwan is part of China and US government is abiding by the One China policy. '''US does not support Taiwan independence, US does not want any unilateral attempt to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, US urges two sides to have dialogues and future of Taiwan should be settled peacefully. Meanwhile, TRA authorizes contacts in non- official means such as commerce and cultural exchanges between the people in Taiwan and US. ' US agrees gradually decreasing arms sale both in quality and quantity to Taiwan to the final settlement of Taiwan as stated in the Three Communiques between US and PRC. The Taiwan Relations Act states that US has to sell defensive arms to Taiwan to help Taiwan defend itself.''

Check : [[Three Communiques]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Communiques], State Department on Taiwan

Note: US position on Taiwan does not reflect global view on Taiwan. It is just only the US that handles Taiwan in the above-mentioned manner, as US is the only superpower in the world, however some countries might have similar attitudes in areas such as encouraging dialogue between the two sides and urge to preserve peace and stability in the region, and mostly maintain non-official trade and cultural-related contacts with Taiwan.

unsigned comment added by 218.174.137.50 (talk) 14:35, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

Dispositive treaty as doctrine or international law?
Now my turn. I have marked the description coining dispositive treaty as a doctrine dubious. I am not familiar with international laws in detail. However, since this section was about Taiwanese arguement not in favor Chinese sovereignty, their arguement should be preserved. I think it would be better and less confussing if rebuttals be placed in the pro-Chinese sovereignty section. Here, by coining the dispositive treaty as a doctrine, we would place the arguement at a place comparable to the Chinese unequal treaty doctrine, contrary to the pro-Taiwanese scholar's claim.


 * One side seems to have professional help; a lot of lingos would be confusing to average readers and make the pro-Independent arguements seem more authoritative. Redcloud822 17:43, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

On the other hand, when we trace back to the original article making the arguement of dispositive treaty, one should find out that the dispositive treaty was probably introduced as part of international law, as either international norm or costumary law. Thus, we may be twisting their arguement at the beginning and also probably incorrect as a matter of fact. Fortunately that article gives the citation.
 * 1) (1) Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford Univ Press, 1961), pp&#65294;704&#65374;705&#12290;
 * 2) &#27243;&#30000;&#21916;&#19977;&#37070;&#12298;&#22283;&#38555;&#27861;II&#12299;&#65292;&#27861;&#24459;&#23416;&#20840;&#38598;56&#65292;&#26377;&#26000;&#38307;&#65292;&#19968;&#20061;&#20116;&#20843; &#24180;&#65292;&#38913;&#19977;&#9675;&#9675;&#65374;&#19977;&#9675;&#19968;&#65289;&#12290;
 * 3) (26)McNair, op. cit, pp. 705&#65374;706.

It would be great if someone can help us do some fact check on these sources and confirm either direction on the question wether dispositive treaty is a doctrine or an established international law.--Mababa 05:17, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)
 * Actually, FWIW, calling something a doctrine doesn't mean its invalid, or that its validity is even questioned. There are numerous well-established ideas (such as the succession of states doctrine, sovereignty of states doctrine, etc.) that are called doctrines. Nevertheless, I agree it would be good for someone to fact check that notion of international law. Ngchen 17:36, 25 May 2005 (UTC)

The significance of UN Resolution 2758
The founding of PRC on Oct. 1, 1949 together with the existing ROC government, created two competing governments of China in a typical civil war scenario. At the time, the ROC government was the recognized legal government of China by majority of the world, and the PRC was considered a rebel government. Since Oct 1949 up to 1971, rebel PRC government pushed the recognized ROC government to the island of Taiwan, which is a sovereign part of ROC since 1945.
 * The Allies recognized no "transfer of sovereignty" of the areas of Formosa and the Pescadores to China in 1945. The surrender ceremonies in Taipei on Oct. 25, 1945, do not serve to make these areas Chinese territory.  It is hence incorrect to say that Taiwan is a sovereign part of the ROC since 1945.  Hmortar 06:05, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
 * The "transfer of sovereignty" does not need to be recognized by Allies for it to take place. For example Northeast China (ManchuKuo), which was occupied by Japan since 1931, when ROC moved in to reclaim Chinese sovereignty, there was no recognition by the Allies. However, the "transfer of sovereignty" did take place. When other Allied countries, such as Norway or Sweden moved in to reclaim their sovereignty, there was no explicit recognition by the Allies either. But "the transfer of sovereignty" took place as well. Can you claim that "no transfer of sovereignty" took place elsewhere for any Axis occupied territories unless there was recognition by the Allies? Is "Allied recognition" a prerequisite to "transfer of sovereignty" for all liberated territories previously occupied by the Axis powers? There was no evidence to support such assertion. Therefore, explicit recognition is not required for the "transfer of sovereignty" to take place. Indeed Cairo Declaration, Postdam Declaration, Japanese Instrument of Surrender provide more than ample authorization for China to reclaim sovereignty in Taiwan.  Redcloud822 14:44, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

During this period, even the PRC administrated much larger parts of China compared to that of the ROC, ROC was still the recognized legal government of China in the ongoing Chinese Civil War. Until in 1971 the UN passed Resolution 2758, which restores the legal representation of China to PRC. At that moment, the sovereignty of China was transfered to PRC, including the sovereignty of Taiwan. From then on, ROC has been a rebel government in the unfinished Chinese Civil War to this day. The ROC still administrates the territory of Taiwan, but it does not have the sovereignty of Taiwan. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to PRC. This means that if PRC so desires to remove current ROC administration of Taiwan by whatever means, it is well within the boundary of PRC domestic and international law.
 * Since the ROC has never held the sovereignty of Taiwan, the PRC cannot use the "successor government theory" to claim that that sovereignty now belongs to the PRC.  According to international law, there was no transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty to the ROC at the surrender ceremonies for Japanese troops, nor in either of the two post-war peace treaties.   Clearly, China has no legal claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Hmortar 06:10, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
 * ROC's sovereignty over Taiwan has not be challenged by any country, and has been recognized by the world including Japan and the US. "Successor government theory" can be and should be applied here. Therefore, after UN resolution 2758 in 1971, I don't see how PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan can be disputed from a legal stand point. Redcloud822 14:44, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Suggestion of the organization of arguments
Given the way current arguements are orgnizedm the pro-Indepedent views seem to have the last word. I suggest to orgnize the arguements as a pro arguements section for one POV followed with a rebuttal to that POV, then another section of pro arguements for the second POV followed with a rebuttal, so on and so forth. This way anyone can add to his/her supporting or rebuttal arguements without having to edit/delete the view points from the other side. Also arguements of Pro-ROC and Pro-PRC should be separate, current format provides a bias as if the Pro-ROC and Pro-PRC are the same camp, which is not necessarily true. Redcloud822 05:47, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I respectfully disagree with laying out the arguments that way. Anytime something becomes a list of arguments followed by rebuttals and counterarguments, the list becomes (1) something without end, and (2) non-neutral. The latter because the rebuttals would inherently imply that the original argument is wrong. In terms of PRC vs ROC arguments, I believe their arguments have a lot in common, which is why they share a large section. The "blue" and "red" factions, AFAIK, generally do belong to the same side on this issue, disagreeing only over each other's legitimacy as to being the legitimate Chinese government.Ngchen 02:55, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Right now the Taiwan Independence arguements serve as both a platform and a rebuttal. Yet, Pro-China arguements have no way to put a rebuttal. The claims such as Taiwan is a state of the US, should easily be refuted. But there is no way for it to be done. Redcloud822 02:39, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

Question on General order No.1 by MacArthur
The link in the page referring to General Order No.1 by Gen. MacArthru does not show the text of original General Order No.1. The article paraphased the order as to say that the order was issued to direct the Japanese troops instead of ROC troops. Was the Allied troops in China under the command of Gen. MacArthur? If the Allied troops in China were not under the command of Gen. MacArthur, how could he issue commands to Chinese troops? Redcloud822 05:47, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

Quate from the section of Historical overview,


 * "The representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander in the China Theater, Chiang Kai-shek (i.e. the Republic of China military forces), were directed to go to Taiwan and accept the surrender of Japanese troops according to the directions of General Douglas MacArthur, head of the United States Military Government, in General Order No. 1, which was issued September 2, 1945."

When examining the original text of General Order No.1 by MacArthur, one finds in no place Gen. MacArthur ever dircted the representitives of Chiang Kai-shek. The statement in the article can be considered weasel words. Please make some corrections. Welcome comments. Redcloud822 15:55, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Since nobody has disputed my proposal. I have gone ahead corrected the statement wrongly implying Chinese troops were under MacArthur's command. Redcloud822 23:58, 3 April 2007 (UTC)

Chinese sovereignty argument weak
The Chinese sovereignty argument is weak, and was rewritten by a Taiwan independence supporter Hmortar. I edited that section to strengthen the arguments. My editing was reverted by Gangsta another independence biased editor, who accused me of POV pushing. This is unreasonable. I suppose the whole section of Legal Arguments was written to provide both POV's. Gangsta's explanation for reverting my editing is unacceptable. If Taiwan Independence supporters can push their POV in their section of Legal Argument, why accuse someone pushing pro-China POV in pro-China section of the Legal Arguments? Need third party comment. Redcloud822 16:11, 11 April 2007 (UTC)
 * I agree that your edit seems fine, and is more concise than the earlier version. Perhaps Certified Gangsta can explain why he feels it is POV pushing? Ngchen 18:24, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

My only objection to your edit is you seemed to be stating the San Francisco Treaty is irrelevant, which was obviously biased. SFT essentially means Taiwan should either be an international mandate or have the right to self-determine its future.--Certified.Gangsta 08:21, 18 April 2007 (UTC)
 * Well, from the Chinese perspective, the SFPT is irrelevant with regard to their claims for the simple reason that they never signed it. So it cannot affect their claims' validity one way or another. Sure, this is a POV, but it is one that is correctly attributed to China. Ngchen 13:01, 18 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Gangsta, I see where you're coming from, and generally I'd agree with you. However, in this particular case, I think Redcloud is right - the whole Legal Argument section is designed to explain the various POVs.  Now, I won't go far as to say that both the ROC and PRC believe the SFPT is irrelevant to the case of Taiwan's independence (or lack thereof).  However, I do think that this POV is worth noting in the Legal Arguments section, whether under the "Common to both ROC and PRC" heading or under the PRC alone. Folic Acid 17:50, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

Removing links in the "See Also" section?
I see that Certified.Gangsta removed the links to the History of China and the Category:Politics of Taiwan with the allegation that it was "POV pushing." How are the history of China and the politics of Taiwan links pushing a particular POV? It seems to me that history is THE primary source of determination of the ROC's (and Taiwan's) legal status, and that Chinese history is a central factor in that determination. Thoughts? -- Folic Acid 15:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Certified.Gangsta is indeed the most passionate POV pusher I have ever seen. He takes his political views way too personal. Please revert Certified.Gangsta's edition. Redcloud822 04:17, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Confused
What does point 7 in the section "Arguments for the Republic of China and/or People's Republic of China sovereignty claims" mean ?

Do PRC/ROC consider itself a successor state or successor government ?

Siyac 15:15, 9 July 2007 (UTC)
 * The argument is that the entire world currently considers Taiwan (implicitly) to be part of China. Regardless of the government that is recognized as the legitimate one, it is undoubtedly Chinese. Now, for the successor issue, I recently learned from my brother that there is a difference between successor state and successor government. I'm not sure what the official position of the PRC and ROC governments is on that, although I know that what is uncontested is that the order of succession went like this Qing dynasty -> ROC. The PRC considers itself the successor of the ROC from its founding on 10-1-1949. Not surprisingly, the ROC denies ever being succeded and de jure considers itself the legitimate government of all China.Ngchen 12:07, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Legitimacy claim
Actually ROC government still claims to be the sole legitimate government of China(including Taiwan) up to today.

It is stated in every ROC communiques on establishing diplomatic relations with other states as follows:

There is only one China in the world; The government of Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China; Taiwan is part of China

The aforementioned 3 policies are identical to PRC's "One-China" policy, except for that PRC is substitued with ROC.

The aforementioned communiques can be obtained from National Library in Taiwan or from ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This proves that PRC succeeded PRC as a successor government instead of a successor state.

This proves also that Taiwan is not a state yet and that ROC was established as a successor government of Imperial Chinese government in 1912, not a new state.

Please could someone incorporate this information into the article.

Siyac 16:26, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

Quick Question
Out of idle curiosity, if (hypothetically), Taiwan was to invade China, or attempt a coup, or something similar, then presumably the international countries who do not recognise Taiwan officially could claim that, as Taiwan is officially recognised as a part of China, no international situation had broken out. How do you think it would play out in reality? --El Pollo Diablo (Talk) 12:51, 3 December 2007 (UTC)


 * You're leaving out critical information. First, does the invasion succeed; do people expect it to succeed?  Second, how much money does Taiwan have compared to China to purchase recognition after this invasion?  How big of a market is Taiwan able to provide to various countries?


 * The best answer is that if Taiwan were to invade China, Taiwan would lose immediately and, having expended itself on the fruitless effort, would find itself being counter-invaded almost immediately, but with no hope of support from the U.S. or anyone else because they would see that Taiwan had been the first to break the international peach (if Taiwan had invaded).  And it would not be Taiwan making the case that it was not an international situation, it would be China making the case because China would see it as an advantageous case for them to make.  Of course we all know that Taiwan has no interest invading China or any other nation. Readin (talk) 15:19, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

UN position
I removed the section below because first, there are countries that recognize Taiwan (ROC)

The United Nations regards Taiwan as a "province of China".

The problem is that the source isn't a reliable indicator of the UN position. It is merely an informational document from one of the many UN agencies. It is not a General Assembly resolution nor a Security Council resolution. Readin (talk) 00:32, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
 * But the fact that such a statement was made by an official UN agency, and I'm sure can be found on other UN documents in general, would imply some sort of recognition, would it not? At the very least, if any UN member considered the statement incorrect or such, a protest would be made.Ngchen (talk) 03:58, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
 * But does the cited source support the assertion? I think not. The cited supporting source is the UN/LOCODE page for the code TW. The UN/LOCODE Manual] says: "The designations employed and the presentation of the material in the United Nations Code for ports and other locations (UN/LOCODE) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries." -- Boracay Bill (talk) 05:00, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

Written records say Taiwan part of China during Ming dynasty?
I slapped a dubious tag on "Taiwan has been a part of Chinese territory since Ming dynasty(by written record)." because in all the times I've read about Konxinga, there has been no reference to him taking Taiwan from the Ming, only from the Dutch. Further, all the readings I've read about the Dutch in Taiwan, there has been no mention of a Ming presence, only aborigine, Spanish, and later imported Chinese laborers. If this statement is to remain, particularly the comment about "by written record", a citation will be required. Readin (talk) 17:26, 1 April 2008 (UTC)
 * I did a quick search, and this PRC affiliated site notes that administrative divisions starting from the Yuan dynasty were established to administer Taiwan. FWIW, Konxinga was a Ming loyalist, who took Taiwan from the Dutch and was hoping to use it as a base to counterattack against the Qing. So it would make no sense to say that he somehow took it from the Ming.Ngchen (talk) 04:58, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
 * You're right, I should have noted that although Koxinga was a Ming loyalist, he was being loyal to a dynasty that no longer existed when he captured Taiwan.Readin (talk) 13:55, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

External links discussion
I feel that as of now, the external links section is giving undue weight to the borderline fringe theory of the US holding Taiwan's sovereignty. Sure, one link to the theory is OK; however, having multiple ones is excessive, when compared to links arguing for other points of view. Readin argues that the PRC holding sovereignty is equally fringe; I disagree. The PRC and its many supporters (e.g. Russia) argue for PRC sovereignty. No state (not even the US, which actually has stated that it does not make any claim), or any other sort of mainstream entity (such as the KMT, DPP, TSU, CPC, etc.), has made the "US is sovereign" argument. Just because something is published does not mean it's mainstream. Per external links, there is an undue weight issue.Ngchen (talk) 21:55, 18 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok, on closer inspection I see you're point. I thought you were removing a reference rather than an external link.  You were correct to remove that link so I'll undo my undo.  The external link is bad for many reasons.  It's a good reference but a bad external link.Readin (talk) 13:03, 19 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks.Ngchen (talk) 13:15, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

various issues
The following are not legal arguments, and I think they should be removed from this article. They belong in political status of Taiwan.


 * "The sovereignty of Taiwan naturally belongs to the Taiwanese people, who are entitled to form their own government under the nomenclature of their own chosing. According to recent polls in Taiwan, an increasing percentage of the populace favors Taiwan independence under the moniker of Republic of Taiwan (ROT). Self-determination is a fundamental right of people everywhere."

There is no legal basis to say:-


 * "The sovereignty of Taiwan naturally belongs to the Taiwanese people, who are entitled to form their own government under the nomenclature of their own chosing."

In particular, the inclusion of opinion polls in this case has no relevance in law.


 * "Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture have many similarities, currently the majority of Taiwanese are descendants of Han Chinese who moved to Taiwan from mainland China."

No legal basis for this argument. There are many countries having similar cultures to each other, that doesn't make them one state.


 * "In the Six Assurances offered to Taiwan in the 1980s, the U.S. is explicit in not recognizing the sovereignty claim over Taiwan by the PRC. The U.S. also denied the sovereignty claim by the ROC in a congressional report in the 1970s. "

The foreign policies of a state don't constitute a valid legal argument. They merely reflect the view of that state.

Also I think we can merge "Arguments for Taiwan already being an independent, sovereign nation" into "Republic of China", as Taiwan is Arguments for Taiwan already being an independent, sovereign nation known as the "Republic of China", according to Presidents Lee and Chen. If we aren't merging the two, I think we should clarify this a bit more.--pyl (talk) 07:02, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I"m not a lawyer, but is there not a concept of "natural law"? Would opinion polls not have a place when invoking the right to self-determination that was placed in the UN Charter and I believe in one of the agreements that came at the end of WWI?
 * In international law, the right to sovereignty doesn't *naturally* belong to the local residents. For example, the sovereignty of the United Kingdom belongs to the Crown. And the opinion polls aren't really legal arguments. They may be used as evidence if a legal argument is available, but in this case, I don't see any legal arguments.


 * Anytime I see the phrase "international law" I want to slap a tag on it.  But since international law is most of this article is about there is really no way to avoid it.
 * Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says (according to Wikipedia) "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." Readin (talk) 13:54, 14 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The statement you quoted is for "the basis of the authority of government", not sovereignty.--pyl (talk) 05:12, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * You're splitting hairs here. Sovereignty is the legal basis of the authority of government. Readin (talk) 14:05, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * No, I am not. They are different things. By your argument the UK crown won't be the sovereign, but it is common knowledge that it is.--pyl (talk) 14:24, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * "Common knowledge" is not a synonym for "true". The UK crown is certainly called sovereign, but whether it is in fact sovereign under various definitions can be debated.  Also I'm not how you're saying that my argument precludes UK crown being sovereign, but I'm not really interested in having that debate.
 * To avoid that argument, perhaps the wording simply needs to be changed. "Legal status" (as in the name of this article) certainly includes the "basis for the authority of government" even if that basis is called by something other than the word "sovereignty". Readin (talk) 14:41, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * No. The UK Crown has the sovereignty of the United Kingdom is not subject to debate. I find debating this issue silly (not you, but the issue). I don't really want to explain this kind of things in Wikipedia. If you have queries, please research into this issue.
 * We are talking about sovereignty and it is not "basis for the authority of government". We are not talking about the politics of word playing here. They aren't the same in law. The very first paragraph already defined the scope of this article. It is about de jour sovereignty. I wish to focus on my original issue, and the way the "argument" is worded is not a legal argument. Putting it very plainly, if "The sovereignty of Taiwan naturally belongs to the Taiwanese people" then what is this article here for? The sovereignty is with the people!
 * Bearing in mind with Ngchen's reminder of No "original research", I will remove this argument as in my view it is not a legal argument. If there are other legal arguments that can be added, I am happy for them to be added with citation.--pyl (talk) 16:57, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * You seem to believe that there is one and only one definition for every word in existence, and that furthermore whatever definition or what ever definition source you choose to use is the only correct definition. However most dictionaries provide multiple definitions for each word. And if every word were so clearly defined with exactly one meaning we wouldn't have so many lawyers running around arguing about what all the laws mean.  The fact that I do not believe that your definition is the one and only definition may appear to you as ignorance.  I suspect you are going to argue that such and such a court ruling or such and such a legal text defines sovereign in one particular way.  However, court rulings have been overturned, sometimes by the very same court that made the decision, showing that their rulings are still subject to argument.  Legal textbooks are not definitive.  And even when a court rules, and particularly when an "international court" rules, the authority of that ruling is very open to dispute.  Even the authority of original documents, typically treaties and agreements, is open to dispute because they usually not signed by all nations and even if they are the right of many of the signing governments to represent a certain people can be disputed.  Add that to the complexities (and outright lying) involved in international diplomacy and the tendency to redefine words for diplomatic purposes, and you end up with it being pretty arrogant to assert that your definition of a word is the only one around or the only one that can be used in an argument.


 * Ngchen has a point though so until there is a reliable source reference we can leave the argument out. Readin (talk) 16:30, 16 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I would reply the personally related comments on User talk:Readin.--pyl (talk) 17:39, 16 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I agree with you that the statement about similarities or lack thereof belongs elsewhere or should be removed entirely. 15:37, 13 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The foreign policies of a state don't constitute a valid legal argument. They merely reflect the view of that state. I agree with you entirely, but many people seem to consider international recognition as a highly important for determining sovereignty.  (I know its ridiculous, it's like saying a people of a certain skin color aren't human so long as the rest of us agree that they aren't human -  what a crock!)   If international recognition is to be used as criteria, it is important to note that in many (most?) cases where the PRC is recognized, it is not necessarily recognized as having sovereignty over Taiwan.  You're right that it is insufficient to note just the U.S. position.  Other countries similarly "acknowledge" the PRC position without accepting it.Readin (talk) 15:43, 13 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Foreign policy of another state is not a legal argument. Foreign recognition may be used as evidence for recognition as a state, but it is not itself a legal argument for statehood. Also, the fact that it is a US policy not to support de jure Taiwan independence conflicts with the premises of this argument (which is to support the view Taiwan that should declare itself a sovereign state).
 * According to the article, a legal argument for Taiwanese being subjects of China is "No states in the world recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Regardless of which government PRC or ROC is recognized, the recognition government is recognized as the legitimate government of China (including Taiwan)." Perhaps this should be eliminated from the article also. Readin (talk) 13:54, 14 October 2008 (UTC)
 * This argument that you cited above is valid for arguing for the ROC or the ROC. It is the evidence to show that Taiwan is not recognised internationally at all, hence the sovereignty cannot possibily be held by Taiwan: there is sovereignty somewhere, but it is not on Taiwan. But it is a weak argument.--pyl (talk) 05:12, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * According to your statement, The foreign policies of a state don't constitute a valid legal argument. They merely reflect the view of that state. the argument I cite is not valid for legally arguing anything. At best it is merely "evidence".  So we should get rid of both arguments. Readin (talk) 14:05, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * OK.--pyl (talk) 14:24, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I'm not sure what you're saying with the merger proposal. Can you clarify? Readin (talk) 15:44, 13 October 2008 (UTC)
 * My understanding is that when people say "Taiwan already being an independent, sovereign nation", they mean the "Republic of China", as it is the only state on Taiwan. So I don't think we need to have separate arguments for "Taiwan already being an independent, sovereign nation" and for "Republic of China" since they are essentially one and the same entity.--pyl (talk) 15:57, 13 October 2008 (UTC)


 * There are a several distinctions to be made.
 * Not all who say Taiwan is independent agree that the RoC is Taiwan. Some people in Taiwan consider Taiwan by right an independent nation, with the ROC being an illegitimate occupying power.  That is, legally the Taiwanese are sovereign, but that law is being broken by the ROC.
 * Then in this case Taiwan isn't already an independent state. The view you are putting forward is a political view, not a legal view.--pyl (talk) 05:12, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Look in the article at the section for arguing that Taiwan is legally independent. The section is named "Arguments by various groups that claim Taiwan should declare itself to be an independent sovereign nation".  We should change that.  The statements contained therein argue that from a legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the ROC and not part of the PRC.  And further, that the Taiwanese people have the legal right to determine their own future. Readin (talk) 14:05, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Amoung those who see the RoC as a legitimate government of Taiwan, there is an important distinction between those who believe the Republic of China, is "the legitimate ruler of all China which includes Taiwan", and those who see the ROC as simply a poorly named Republic of Taiwan no longer having anything to do with China which does not include Taiwan, have no rights to rule "China" and no implication that Taiwan is part of "China". Not only are the arguments very different, the legal outcome is different as well because the arguments for ROC as China would establish RoC rights to rule PRC or, failing that, the PRC's right to rule Taiwan.  The arguments for ROC as Taiwan would establish that Taiwan is simply independent with no relation to the PRC.  Readin (talk) 13:54, 14 October 2008 (UTC)
 * That's fine. I think we should better clarify "Republic of China" and "Taiwan already being an independent, sovereign nation". I think for a start Arguments in support of ROC sovereignty claims no 6 should be moved down, it is not about ROC being the state that represents China.
 * Please let me know what you propose to do with the clarification. Maybe we can change the headings to better reflect the intended meanings.--pyl (talk) 05:12, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree that the names should be changed. I also agree that #6 Sovereignty transfer to the ROC by prescription does not apply to Taiwan's case since... is in the wrong place. Readin (talk) 14:05, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Would you like to propose the names? We can discuss the viability.--pyl (talk) 14:24, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

With respect to the debates going on here, let us not forget the rule against original research. There is no point in debating whether argument X is strong or weak, if it has been published in a reliable source as arguing for the sovereignty belonging to A. As I noted below, what this article needs most is complete references to all the various claims and counterclaims. Ngchen (talk) 14:56, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * There is a big issue with this article, and it is likely that the whole article may have to be removed. This article should be about legal issues, but I don't think it would be easy to find individuals with legal training and an interest in Taiwan to write up this article with proper citation.
 * I am happy to remove all arguments which, in my view, are not legal arguments. But I am not keen on finding the references for those remaining ones. I think in this event it works anyway since what I am doing will not violate any Wikipedia rules, in particular the "no original research rule": it is for people who want the arugments made to provide citations as well as the reasons why it is a legal arugment.
 * I understand there is no point in debating whether argument X is strong or weak. I'm interested in correct information, but I would avoid debating issues or challenges that are obviously not legally related.
 * This is supposed to be an article about legal issues, and I don't think we should be examining them from a political point of view.--pyl (talk) 16:57, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Rounding up references
A long time ago the article had a peer review. I would like to have this article ultimately make featured article status. IMO, what it lacks most right now is sufficient references. Anyone have access to say a large research library or something similar, so that each and every argument can be properly referenced? Thanks. Ngchen (talk) 14:08, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

The self-contradictory paragraph
The folllowing paragraph in my view is self-contradictory
 * The San Francisco Peace Treaty's omission of China as a participant was not an accident of history, but reflected the very true fact that the ROC had failed to maintain its original position as the de jure and de facto government of China. By fleeing to occupied Taiwan in December 1949, the ROC had already become a government in exile. Under international law, there are no actions which a government in exile can take in its current location of residence in order to be recognized as the local legitimate government. Hence, Taiwan's current international problems have arisen from the fact that the ROC government in exile is limited in international recognition as the legitimate government of Taiwan.

It first says "there are no actions which a government in exile can take in its current location of residence in order to be recognized as the local legitimate government". Then it says "Taiwan's current international problems have arisen from the fact that the ROC government in exile is limited in internationally recognition as the legitimate government of Taiwan."

So which position does this paragraph take? Is the ROC in exile or not? If it is in exile as parts of this paragraph is suggesting, then the latter part of "limited in relational recognition" doesn't work. The word "limited" means some, not zero.--pyl (talk) 15:02, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
 * "there are no actions which a government in exile can take in its current location of residence in order to be recognized as the local legitimate government"
 * I guess this means, that ROC can not do anything in order to be recognized, but if there are countries which recognize it as a full state, then only by their own decision, and not by being influenced by ROC. Still I think it's strange that this paragraph says so. Looking at old Chen's actions there things you can do, even when those actions ain't good, but this is my own POV. &#24555;&#27138;&#40845; 16:34, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
 * Yes that's why I find it self-contradictory. Since a government in exile cannot do anything at all, according to the first part of the paragraph, how did it get limited (that is, some) recognition as described in the latter part of the paragraph.--pyl (talk) 16:58, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
 * If I understand the argument as it was before a recent modification, it is saying that as a government-in-exile, the ROC could not take any actions to gain recognition as the legit government of Taiwan, therefor there is no recognition because any such recognition is illegal. I've restored the wording to its earlier state.Readin (talk) 17:37, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
 * Oh I recall now. I was the person who made the change from no international recognition to limited. I changed it because the ROC was in fact recognised by some countries as the legitimate country for Taiwan. And that's why I also removed "in exile" so the latter part wouldn't conflict iwth the first part of the paragraph.
 * Now after you fixed it, it goes back to the original issue. The fact that the ROC is recognised by some countries as a legitimate state for Taiwan (as well as the whole of China) makes the sentence incorrect in fact.--pyl (talk) 17:41, 8 May 2009 (UTC)

Perhaps the confusion arises from the confusion over who's making the claim. From (a particular) TI perspective, the ROC is a government in exile. From the perspective of the states that recognize the ROC, it is not in exile. Of course, one can also argue that the limited recognition "stems" from it being in exile. Ngchen (talk) 17:45, 8 May 2009 (UTC)

Potsdam Declaration
The statement The sovereignty of Taiwan, however, was not formally transfered at that time and thus remains unclear to this day. I believe is non-neutral, and is an unnecessary commentary on the issue that resembles original research. The reasons are (1) whether the sovereignty was or was not transferred is disputed between those who support the "Chinese" position, and those who oppose it, and (2) it is not clear that the debate over TI or the lack therof is really due (completely) to this issue. I would appreciate comments. Ngchen (talk) 01:29, 17 May 2009 (UTC)


 * The Potsdam Declaration and surrender of Japan section of the article is totally devoid of supporting cites. I'm no expert about this but, from what I see (citing supporting sources):


 * The Potsdam Declaration (sometimes called the "Potsdam statement") did not contain any specifics about adjustments in territories under Japanese sovereignty. What it did say was:


 * The Cairo Declaration (sometimes called the "Caro communique*) contained the following statement regarding sovereignty over surrendered Japanese territories:


 * The First Instrument of Surrender, 2 September 1945, didn't explicitly mention territories. It did say:


 * The Act of Surrender - China Theatre, executed on 9 September 1945, didn't mention territories. It spoke to the surrender of forces, saying:


 * On 24 October 1945, Gen. Chen Yi, appointed by the Generalissimo in September as Governor-General of Taiwan, arrived in Taipei. On 25 October 1945, Gen. Ando Rikichi and Gen. Chen Yi met in Taipei’s old City Hall in the West Gate district, where Gen. Ando, as commander of the Japanese 10th  Area Army and Governor-General of Taiwan, signed and handed to Gen. Chen an instrument of surrender, concluding the war in Formosa. Gen. Chen Yi then declared:


 * References


 * If there is serious dispute about any of this, this article ought to include cite-supported info about all sides of that dispute. -- Boracay Bill (talk) 01:28, 18 May 2009 (UTC)


 * I think the sentence is necessary to explain the next paragraph, which says: "Based on the argument that the Japanese surrender did not formally transfer sovereignty, Taiwan was still legally part of Japan and occupied by the United States (with administrative authority for the occupation delegated to the Chinese Nationalists), and a direct intervention was appropriate for a territory with such status." If we don't explain in some way that Taiwan sovereignty was unclear after Japan surrended, the rest of the article is not completely clear. Laurent (talk) 09:12, 18 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Thanks to Wtmitchell for providing so many references. I still don't see how the sentence in the next paragraph can't stand by itself. Afterall, it says that it is an argument that the surrender did not transfer sovereignty. The clarity or lack thereof of the sovereignty issue after Japan surrendered is amply referred to in the "arguments" section. To assert flat out that the sovereignty was "unclear" at that time I feel is pushing a POV. BTW, with the new references, maybe they can help get everything properly referenced, which would get this article on the way to GA status. Ngchen (talk) 13:50, 18 May 2009 (UTC)
 * Ngchen, I'm not completely following you. What is non-neutral about saying that Taiwan's status was "unclear"? The way I see it, this is actually very neutral - it can mean "maybe Taiwan was sovereign, maybe it wasn't". We have both POVs in the sentence, and we also have the notion that nothing was formally on paper, which helps understand the rest of the article. To be honest, I don't mind if the sentence is written in some other, perhaps more neutral, way, but I still think it should stay.
 * It's true that the topic is discussed into more details in the "Arguments" section, however it would also be useful to brieftly introduce how the Potsdam Declaration was understood (or misunderstood) in the history section. Laurent (talk) 14:12, 18 May 2009 (UTC)

Ngchen I certainly agree with you that the following sentence: The sovereignty of Taiwan, however, was not formally transfered at that time and thus remains unclear to this day. is a bad choice of words. It would be fair to say that The sovereignty of Taiwan is disputed to this day. Thats as far as one can go without being POV....but there is tonnnes of POV here so don't feel too bad about it. By way of further explanation, its nonsense to say that most of the parties to the dispute are "unclear" about sovereignty over the Taiwan area. They have very clear views. They are simply in dispute. Regards. Staighre (talk) 22:46, 8 October 2009 (UTC)

Why the revert?
I added these paras into the article (in a few different places)....but they have been reverted:

(1) China had ceded Formosa to Japan by the peace treaty of Shimonoseki of April 16, 1895. In order to judge the validity of this cession subsequent developments in international law which may, or may not, have affected the validity of cessions achieved as the result of aggressive war must be disregarded. Thus, the validity of this cession can hardly be contested. The joint communiqué which was issued at the Cairo conference (December 1, 1943) and referred to Formosa as one of the territories which Japan had "stolen from the Chinese" and which were to be restored to China was a retrospective moral condemnation of an international transaction which, at the time and long afterwards, was never questioned as being in any way contrary to international law.

(2) The understandings reached at the Cairo conference of 1943 were at the most legal commitments entered between the three parties to the statement -i.e. China, the United States, and the United Kingdom - regarding their intention to restore, inter alia, Formosa to China. The three Powers reaffirmed this intention in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and, on entering the war against Japan, the Soviet Union associated herself with this declaration. In relation to Japan, these inter-allied understandings became binding by the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation (August 14, 1945). Thus whatever final arrangements would be made by the other parties to this instrument of unconditional surrender were to be carried out by Japan. These Powers were China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. On October 15, 1945, as a result of an order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between the allied Powers concerned, the Japanese forces' in Formosa surrendered to General Chiang Kai-shek and, with the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, the administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China.

(3)Until the treaty of peace with Japan of San Francisco (September 5, 1951) nothing further appears to have happened that in any way affected the legal position of Formosa. Some of the States until then still legally at war with Japan had undertaken commitments inter se on the future of Formosa, and Japan was under an obligation to recognize whatever steps might be taken by the other parties to the instrument of unconditional surrender. It was, therefore, completely in accordance with the legal position as it then existed for the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom to state in reply to a question submitted to it by the Chief Justice of Hong Kong that Formosa was still de jure part of Japan (Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Chennault and Others, 1950). On the other hand, Mr. Acheson expressed the view that Formosa had become Chinese territory (The Times, January 6, 1950). By Article 2 (b) of the treaty of peace of San Francisco of 1951 Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to Formosa." This meant that, in relation to Japan, Formosa ceased to be Japanese territory and the other parties to the peace treaty had become the co-sovereigns of Formosa.

(4) The position as it has existed since is similar to that after the renunciation by Germany in favour of the principal allied and associated Powers of all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions under the peace treaty of Versailles or that of Turkey since the peace treaty of Lausanne in relation to those parts of the Ottoman Empire which had been detached from it. Until the Powers other than Japan who are parties to the peace treaty of San Francisco decide otherwise, they exercise in law a condominium over Formosa. Whether those of them who entered commitments at Cairo and Potsdam regarding Formosa with China intend to honour them, and in relation to which of the two Chinas, is perhaps a complicated but, in any case, a separate issue. What is clear is that General Chiang Kai-shek exercises only a delegated authority in Formosa. It is exercised by him on behalf of those parties to the peace treaty of San Francisco who recognize his Government either as that of China or at least in relation to Formosa. These States are free agents to decide collectively on the future of this territory outside the United Nations or, with the consent of the latter, to transfer their condominium to the United Nations.

Don't these paragraphs provide an excellent and fantastically succinct summary of the position. Why have they been deleted in their entirety? Regards. Staighre (talk) 20:58, 7 October 2009 (UTC)


 * A better idea....I will add these in as support for the claim (under a new section) that those who are sovereign in Taiwan/Formosa are those Powers (except Japan) who are parties to the Treaty of San Francisco. Regards. Staighre (talk) 21:09, 7 October 2009 (UTC)


 * I didn't read it all but your text sounds more like a blog entry than an encyclopedia article. Just in the first paragraph, even without looking at the meaning, there are plenty of POV words that shouldn't be there: "can hardly be contested", "in any way", etc. Also some of the paragraphs seem to repeat some sections of the article and may contain original research or non-attributed POVs. Rather than putting your paragraphs as is, perhaps you could simply expand or rewrite some parts of the article. Laurent (talk) 21:29, 7 October 2009 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the explanation Laurent. Regards.Staighre (talk) 22:45, 8 October 2009 (UTC)

Arguments of United States sovereignty claims
An anonymous editor has added the following to the article... This is from United States government paper,

DR. ROGER C.S. LIN, et al.,Plaintiffs-Appellants, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Defendant-Appellee

and see the two case of this paper on page 18,

[http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=1&xmldoc=1959458177FSupp281_1419.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985&SizeDisp=7 Cheng Fu Shenq v. Rogers,177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959)]

In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all `right, title and claim' to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China."

Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China.

Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng,280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960)

But in the view of our State Department, no agreement has 'purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to (the Republic of) China.'

I believe that this addition is unwarranted, in that we are basically dealing with a near-fringe theory. Perhaps some of this material could be moved to other sections? Finally, it's the holding of court cases that really matters. There are notability issues, even with the holdings. The rest I feel doesn't belong; how notable is dicta, if it's even that? Legal briefs would hold little weight either. Barring additional discussion, I plan to trim the section to its barest essentials in around a week. Ngchen (talk) 16:34, 16 September 2011 (UTC)

Content moved here from article
I've moved the following content added to the Arguments for United States sovereignty claims section in this edit here from the article for possible reformatting/rewording and incorporation into the article. This is from United States government paper,

DR. ROGER C.S. LIN, et al.,Plaintiffs-Appellants, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Defendant-Appellee

and see the two case of this paper on page 18,

[http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=1&xmldoc=1959458177FSupp281_1419.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985&SizeDisp=7 Cheng Fu Shenq v. Rogers,177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959)]

In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all `right, title and claim' to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China."

Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China.

Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng,280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960)

But in the view of our State Department, no agreement has 'purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to (the Republic of) China.' I don't have time to spend on this myself at present. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 21:28, 17 September 2011 (UTC)

Arguments common to both the PRC and ROC
Point 5, Cairo Declaration transferring sovereignty to China. As stated here, the argument fails to recognize the legal distinction between "country" and "government". Because sovereignty is vested in governments, not countries, Cairo explicitly declared transfer of sovereignty to the ROC, not "China".

I point this out not to take issue with the argument, but to say that while the ambiguity of "China" works in favor of the pro-PRC/unification side, it significantly and needlessly weakens the argument for pro-ROC/independence advocates. Which is why it's been my experience that, while pro-unification/PRC advocates generally say "China", pro-ROC advocates usually have taken great pains to say "ROC".

The distinction is crucial to the strength and direction of the argument, which it why I think it's misleading to cite the argument, as currently worded, as common to both sides. At least, there should be a note explaining the terminological distinctions, and their significance.

CNJECulver (talk) 02:02, 25 October 2011 (UTC)

Point 5 states that Even if the SFPT were determinative, it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Potsdam and Cairo Declaration.... The SFPT was was in 1952, so at that time an interpretation that was consistent with Potsdam and Cairo would, in the eyes of both the PRC and the ROC, have meant annexing Taiwan to "China" as both the ROC and PRC claimed to be the legitimate China at that time. This section is showing arguments that both the PRC and ROC had in common - and while only the ROC would claim the argument supports ROC sovereignty, both government would agree the argument supports "China" sovereignty. Point 2, which first mentions the Cairo Declaration, does clearly state the the declaration was made with the Republic of China government. If someone were to read point 5 all by itself I suppose they could be confused, but it seems unlikely that anyone would do that. Readin (talk) 17:45, 25 October 2011 (UTC)

I've been doing some more thinking about this and the passage still bothers me, but I was wrong about why.

Setting the argument out the way the article does and explicitly defining "China" as ambiguous is greatly convenient for creating a one-size-fits-all argument, but it's a straw man.

I concede I'm speaking only from personal experience here, but I have lived in Taiwan and China for the past twelve years and have had discussions on Taiwanese sovereignty in both countries. And yet I've yet to meet anyone who is intentionally ambiguous about "China". Some mean one thing, some another, but no one has ever meant both, or refused clarification when I've asked.

Thus, the claim the article makes, that the argument "Taiwanese sovereignty was returned to China, with 'China' understood ambiguously" is common to both sides is, in my experience, mistaken; it is, in fact, not common to either side. Rather supporters of PRC sovereignty tend to acknowledge "China", in the Cairo context means the ROC, but then either dismiss it as irrelevant, or supplement the discussion with arguments about succession; cf. Point 2 under "Arguments in support of PRC sovereignty claims".

I'd be interested in others' experiences on this. Which leads to my next issue: the article spends a lot of time laying out arguments in favor of this position or that position, or common to both. Either the article is claiming that these are arguments used by proponents of both positions, or it's doing original research. As an example, Point 1 under "Arguments in support of ROC sovereignty claims" says "The ROC fulfills all requirements for a state...." Either the article is making this argument itself or it's claiming "some people" make this argument. The article claims to be doing the latter ("The arguments below are frequently used by proponents and/or opponents of these claims"), but then fails to cite any actual proponents using the argument, making the article look a lot like original research. CNJECulver (talk) 07:56, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

Arguments by various groups that claim Taiwan should declare itself to be an independent sovereign nation
In point 2 of this sub-section, someone has slapped by whom and citation needed tags on "China was prohibited". Since the section is not making the claim itself, but merely claims to be reporting arguments offered by "various groups", it shouldn't be necessary for the article to footnote other people's claims. It is only necessary for the article to document that "various groups" have, indeed, made these arguments.

Speaking of which, this section doesn't do that.

CNJECulver (talk) 02:23, 25 October 2011 (UTC)