Talk:Lion Air Flight 610

Km, miles or nmi?
Throughout the article, the unit of distance switches between kilometres, miles and nautical miles. I think it would be easier to understand if we adopted one uniform unit. Thoughts? Naihreloe (talk) 12:51, 19 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Indonesian units of measurement: metric first, then nmi (customary units in aviation). Miles should not appear.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 13:07, 19 December 2019 (UTC)

Final report
The "Final report" section of the article appears to be an extended interpretation by one or more editors of a primary source, namely, the official Indonesian "Aircraft Accident Investigation Report". Wikipedia text that introduces the section says: "According to a summary of the report, the contributing factors and safety recommendations are as follows". On the assumption that the Wikipedia text was paraphrasing or even directly quoting most or all of the official Indonesian "Summary", I looked for such a summary in the cited PDF of the accident report and did not find one that could have been used as the source for the structure and content of the Wikipedia text. The Wikipedia text thus looks like the result of editor(s) deciding which parts of the very long official primary source to summarize and interpret, rather than using secondary sources. The Wikipedia text appears to be a sincere effort and might be mostly accurate, but I believe it seriously violates the Wikipedia policy on OR--Original Research, which says: "Any interpretation of primary source material requires a reliable secondary source" and also says: "A primary source may be used on Wikipedia only to make straightforward, descriptive statements of facts". The Explanatory Supplement to the OR policy, Wikipedia:Identifying and using primary sources, contains a section, Primary sources should be used carefully, which says: "The goal is only that the person could compare the primary source with the material in the Wikipedia article, and agree that the primary source actually, directly says just what the article says it does." The Wikipedia text in the "Final report" section is not brief or simple; it is rather long and elaborate. A person would have to study an excessively large amount of the very long Indonesian report to be able to actually make a determination whether or not "the primary source actually, directly says just what the article says it does."

I propose that the Wikipedia text be replaced with either: rewritten text based on secondary sources; or, more simply, a directly quoted copy of the "Contributing Factors" portion of the official Indonesian accident report (page 215, section 3.2 of the referenced PDF source). That passage lists nine items, which have been mentioned in some secondary sources. Those nine items, in my judgement, provide information equivalent to the current text, which is based on detailed editorial selection and interpretation of the primary source, contrary to policy. Making this substitution will somewhat shorten the existing Wikipedia article section. Comments, please. DonFB (talk) 03:13, 25 February 2020 (UTC)


 * Can you summarize?--Marc Lacoste (talk) 07:33, 25 February 2020 (UTC)
 * The summary was added by an IP editor 6 Nov 2019; previsouly there was (only) a quote from sec. sources. At that time, I hoped someone else would edit it. Feel free to rewrite or even to revert to the previsou version. WikiHannibal (talk) 08:31, 25 February 2020 (UTC)
 * I took the easy way and directly quoted the "Contributing Factors" section from the official report; also some copyediting of existing text. It's a sizeable amount of primary source material, but is clearly written and can be easily verified in the referenced report, whereas the previous "summary" text forced the reader to accept an editor's interpreted version of the findings. DonFB (talk) 12:24, 27 February 2020 (UTC)

MCAS "active"
The lead section says: "During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active because of pilot error." But what could the pilots have done to make the MCAS inactive? For the rest of the flight? When or how would MAS have become "inactive"? The pilots couldn't have disabled or deselected MCAS, it was running all the time. They did not know even know of it's existence. And yet we still call it "pilot error". Really? Martinevans123 (talk) 21:42, 28 February 2024 (UTC)


 * Open to suggestions on a rewording. RickyCourtney (talk) 22:06, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * They should have followed the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist, just as the preceding flight did.
 * StalkerFishy (talk) 22:17, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * Following the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist won't have disabled MCAS? For the remainder of the flight? That's quite a long item on a checklist? Martinevans123 (talk) 22:37, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * The same procedures used to stop trim runaway (also, is it trim runaway or runaway stabilizer?) would also stop an MCAS activation (which would be commanding the stabilizer).
 * How about...
 * During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active and the pilots did not follow the trim runaway stabilizer checklist. The pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS and were not required to undergo simulator training on the difference between the 737 MAX, or to demonstrate an MCAS activation. RickyCourtney (talk) 22:44, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * That looks a lot better. But we need to clarify (perhaps in the body of the article?) whether or not the trim runaway would have eventually stopped or would have persisted for the remainder of the fight? Talk of a "checklist item" suggests that there's a simple action, or series of simple actions, that the pilot could make that would have remedied the anomalous situation? So, yes, I think that wording would be much better. Unless, of course we are determined to shoe-horn the phrase "pilot error" into the lead section for some reason. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:50, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * Actual sources we have, related specifically to the Indonesian final report:
 * The report, from its list of nine "contributing factors" said the many cockpit alerts and warnings were:
 * "not able to be effectively managed"
 * and it said these distractions led to:
 * "ineffective CRM application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight."
 * That's the closest official Indonesian comes to pilot error.
 * The Guardian:
 * "...found that problems with Boeing’s design, the airline’s maintenance of the jet and pilot errors contributed to the disaster"....
 * "final report said the first officer onboard was unfamiliar with procedures and had shown issues handling the aircraft during training"
 * https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/lion-air-crash-report-criticises-design-maintenance-and-pilot-error
 * My comments:
 * Runaway procedure should have been followed, but the sources listed above for the Lion accident do not make that specific assertion. Suggested wording based on these specific sources:
 * "Pilot error resulted in ineffective handling of the emergency."
 * The body of the article can be used to fill in the details. DonFB (talk) 23:05, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * I'd definitely support including that in the article. Something along the lines of "had the pilots followed the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist as the previous Lion Air crew had done, the MCAS activation and subsequent runaway trim would have been resolved."
 * StalkerFishy (talk) 23:09, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * The checklist itself is titled RUNAWAY STABILIZER, but the scenario is for a "runaway pitch trim". I'd recommend the latter for most of the article, except when specifically referring to the checklist.
 * I'm not itching to get into this discussion again, but the "...or to demonstrate an MCAS activation" isn't totally accurate in my mind, as the aircraft is always changing its pitch trim. So it didn't matter if it was the MCAS, autopilot trim, mach trim, or an act of god controlling the pitch trim, it presents itself in the same way. Hence why the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist doesn't distinguish between the actual cause of the malfunction.
 * StalkerFishy (talk) 23:04, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * My only thinking behind the "or to demonstrate an MCAS activation" addition is that part of the FAA recertification process was a requirement that pilots experience an erroneous MCAS activation in the simulator.
 * How about...
 * During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active and the subsequent investigation found the pilots ineffectively handled the emergency. They also did not follow the procedure for runaway pitch trim as the previous Lion Air crew had done. However, the pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS and were not required to undergo simulator training on the differences between the 737 MAX and the prior generation. RickyCourtney (talk) 23:23, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
 * I'm going to try my hand at these two paragraphs in the intro, as it's difficult to include everything in a logical order. I feel like if we're going to include the pilots lack of training on the MCAS, it should come after we reference what the MCAS actually does, instead of plugging it in at the end of the paragraph after the pilots inactions of the checklist.
 * Investigations revealed that the aircraft experienced serious flight control problems on the aircraft's previous flight, likely caused by a miscalibrated angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor recently replaced on the aircraft. The AoA sensor fed erroneous data to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which attempted to correct for what it was being incorrectly told was a nose-up position of the aircraft. To avoid the stall, MCAS pushes the nose of the aircraft down by moving the horizontal stabilizer. Pilots were not informed of this MCAS system, nor were they required to undergo additional simulator training on the 737 MAX.
 * In the prior flight, the pilots were able to halt movement of the horizontal stabilizer by following the applicable runaway stabilizer checklist, ending the errant MCAS activation. Lion Air should have grounded the jet following the incident but failed to do so. Investigators also found pages missing from the airline's maintenance logs.
 * During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which pushed the nose of the aircraft down. The pilots of this flight did not properly follow the runaway stabilizer checklist, which kept the MCAS active and led to the aircraft assuming an unsafe nose-down position until it collided with the ground.
 * StalkerFishy (talk) 00:08, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
 * Looks good to me. RickyCourtney (talk) 00:21, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
 * I think that's a great improvement. As the main body of the article already says, it took three pilots to figure out what to do on the previous flight: ""Information later emerged that a third pilot was on the flight to Jakarta and told the crew to cut electrical power to the stabilizer trim motors." It might be wise to explicitly state cut electrical power to the stabilizer trim motors to clarify that you can't "turn off" the MCAS, you can only disable its effects (even though you don't know what's producing those effects). But the lead section is looking quite large now, with 8 paragraphs, so some other editors might want to trim it. I'm not sure how that could be done. Martinevans123 (talk) 08:52, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
 * First paragraph contains excessive statistics about:
 * the first major accident
 * highest death toll
 * deadliest accident
 * deadliest aircraft accident
 * All of that, except perhaps deadliest Indonesia accident, can be moved into the body.
 * 2nd para:
 * Move all into body, except perhaps that a rescuer died.
 * In general, too much detail about AoA and horizontal elevator; those details can be put in body.
 * Can reduce text about prior flight; don't need info on its missing logs, or that it should have been grounded; all of that can go in body. Suffice to say it had an MCAS emergency and crew used a standard procedure to stop it.
 * I think all the explanatory information could be condensed as follows:
 * "Investigation revealed that a new software function in the flight control system forced the airplane to nose down repeatedly. That function [or feature], the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), had been intentionally omitted by Boeing from airplane documentation for aircrews, so the Lion Air pilots did not know about it, or what it could do. Investigators concluded that an external device on the airplane, the angle of attack (AoA) sensor, sent an erroneous signal to MCAS, indicating the airplane was angled up too steeply. MCAS responded by repeatedly pushing down the nose, even though the airplane had not been at too steep an angle. The problem had occurred on the same airplane during its immediately preceding flight, and the pilots had recovered using a standard procedure for such a "runaway" condition."
 * Then, would follow the recently edited text, beginning, "During the accident flight...." I'm not recommending anything be deleted from the article, only that the lede can be shortened by moving details I've noted into the body. DonFB (talk) 10:15, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
 * No objections. ...although I'd always use "aircraft" instead of "airplane", as this article is marked EngvarB? Obviously, I've watched too many films... Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 11:38, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi all, this is "IP 2603" from the previous 737 MAX discussions.
 * Again, I have to insist that the specific phrase "pilot error" appears in this article. Two of the sources cited even mention "pilot error", but it does not appear in the body of the article. Reading through, it gives the feeling that the phrase is intentionally being left out, which I feel is editorializing the information. If we've agreed to include the phrase in the MAX article, it should also appear here (and the article for the Ethiopian flight but I haven't checked there yet).
 * We have "human error", "captain error", "engineer error", "driver error", "operator error" etc. for all other situations involving human control over complex machines and systems, and those phrases are used regularly to describe how the humans in control of those systems failed to do something correctly and how that contributed to an accident. Leaving the phrase "pilot error" out of an article about a plane crash that has clear evidence of pilot error does a disservice to the countless pilots who dedicate their lives to understanding the machines they operate every day.
 * The phrase "pilot error" carries no more negative prejudice than the other "error" phrases I've mentioned; it is simply the best, most efficient way to express the concept of "the humans trained to be pilots who were in charge of properly operating the plane encountered difficulties and failed to follow pre-established standard procedures which would have allowed them to avoid a catastrophe". Rob Roilen (talk) 14:47, 13 March 2024 (UTC)