Talk:Personal identity

This article is entirely skewed
…toward the empricist/naturalist tradition, from Descartes -> Locke -> Hume (which continues in the work of people like Strawson & Parfitt). It needs a balanced and a fair representation of the important views on the concept of a person, from non-naturalists like Harry Frankfurt, Charles Taylor, Maurice Merlau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus, Stanley Cavell, Wilfrid Sellars and Ernst Tugendhat.

I can start, but others are welcome to contribute their thoughts as well. For ideas, see the discussion on the Person page, under "Compromise on Lead". Walkinxyz (talk) 17:09, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

The section on Personal Continuity seems to be more grounded in Psychology than Philosophy; perhaps that should be moved to the psychology wiki page, or have it's own page? (kforche; 21 Oct. 2009)

On merging the topic: The problem of diachronic Personal identity is a distinct issue, in my opinion there is enough things to be said about it for it to deserve its own article. Orgone 14:11, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

There is a discussion of the topic Here with a view to expanding the article. Orgone 19:08, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

in fiction there are instanes of being melding their mind and removing the distinction between their identities

That is true Taracka, much of the philosophical dicussion in this area revolves around just such thought experiments, questions of fission (brain or mind splitting) and fusion (mind or brain combining) and change over time. I believe its reading lots of science fiction from an early age which lead to me studying philosophy!

P.S Remember to sign all of your posts by typing four tildes: (~&#126;) Orgone 23:26, 22 May 2006 (UTC)

The portion on personal identity is important but really repetitive. "Personal ID based on repeated consciousness" was repeated several times. It can be condensed or replaced with more analogies. 98.193.100.152 (talk) 20:41, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

---

I think the opening paragraph needs to be made more clearer. --Awenty 19:16, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

'...more clear.' Zillmerj 21:37, 27 December 2006 (UTC)

Additons?
Structured additions recommended: An overview of diachronic accounts (e.g. Parfit, Perry). A comprehensive outline of synchroninc accounts (e.g. the narrative views of Schechtman, Lindemann, etc.; desire-endorsement views such as Frankfurt's). Links to 'Identity Politics' sort of entries. Zillmerj 21:31, 27 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Cant find narrative views of Schechtman or Lindemann ... and no entries on desire-endorsement views ... is the frankfurt, the Harry Frankfurt? J. D. Redding

In the "mind-body" section, is says "Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move their body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain said pizza." But as far as I'm aware, this only relates to Belief-Desire Theory. Perhaps this should be referenced? - 11 June 2008 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Hi-teem13 (talk • contribs) 21:22, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

Grammar
Anyone else find it a forehead slapper when verb conjugation involves apostrophes? D'oh! (Just a minor correction) Hexalm 19:56, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

Cleanup to meet quality standards?
What needs to be cleaned up to meet quality standards? If nothing, tag should be removed. J. D. Redding 02:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

removed Cleanup|date=September 2006 ... J. D. Redding

List any items that need to be reviewed here after tagging. J. D. Redding 13:42, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Cite its references or sources?
What needs to be cited, referenced, or sourced? If nothing, tag should be removed. J. D. Redding 02:02, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Removed Unreferenced|date=March 2007 ... put back if you think it needs to be ... J. D. Redding

List any items that need to be reviewed here after tagging. J. D. Redding 13:42, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

An observation

If I may draw your attention to what follows: In VALUE THEORY there are many philosophs which hold that in identity the individualistical one is important, but not as important as the Folkish one. Maybe somebody could work this into the article? --Hanno Kuntze 09:26, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

typo
Ego identity Main article: Id, ego, and super-ego

Ego integrity is the ego's accumulated assurance of its capacity for order and meaning.

^^^^^^^^^ should read IDENTITY —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.45.197.24 (talk) 06:05, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Requested move

 * The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section. 

The result of the move request was: page moved. Vegaswikian (talk) 03:48, 24 December 2011 (UTC)

Personal identity (philosophy) → Personal identity – The clear primary topic for this title, and only one with the disambiguated name. Can easily hat-disambiguate to the other two articles.. Pfhorrest (talk) 10:08, 17 December 2011 (UTC)
 * Indeed. --The Evil IP address (talk) 14:23, 18 December 2011 (UTC)
 * Is that a "support" vote? If so, can you please register it with the appropriate formatting, as below?


 * Oppose the page was a disambiguation page until a few days ago (see http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Personal_identity&oldid=453883821 ) If there is a primary topic, it would be Personally identifiable information, since "personal identity" is intimately linked with "identity theft", which involves falsifying "personally identifiable information", and is quite frequently in the news, unlike the sociology or philsophy constructs. 76.65.128.198 (talk) 06:49, 19 December 2011 (UTC)
 * Support (I proposed the move). Identity theft may be in the news more often than philosophical discussion, but one's "personal identity" is at best a misnomer for what is being stolen, and so the article named that shouldn't be about that. You can't steal someone's actual identity without actually becoming them, at best you can steal some information and impersonate them. Personally identifying information is about that information; Personal identity (philosophy) is about one's actual identity as a particular person. Identity (social science) is about "identifying with" in the sense of associating with some set or group; it is also not about being one person vs another person, i.e. the numerical identity of persons, which the philosophy article is about, and which is the proper referent of "personal identity".
 * Support. This is the standard name for a large area of philosophy. On the other hand, the other two articles don't even mention the phrase personal identity in their current respective leads . Andrewa (talk) 07:01, 23 December 2011 (UTC)
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Something broke?
It appears that after the move the article (now "Personal identity") consists of nothing but a redirect to itself, and has no history of the older content. Likewise the redirect at the old title ("Personal identity (philosophy)"). What happened? --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:09, 24 December 2011 (UTC)

Bernard Williams thought experiment
I'm not a philosopher by any stretch of the imagination so perhaps I'm misunderstanding, but I have to admit I'm very confused by the info regarding Williams' torture scenario. The article states regarding the torture scenario that "our intuition is that in all these cases we are to be afraid of being tortured, that it is still us despite having our memories erased and receiving new memories". Now I'm not sure about other editors but for me, in the scenarios described my own intuition is that there is no reason whatsoever to be afraid and that the person cannot possibly be me. I honestly don't see how it can be read in any other way, and the way in which the counter-intuitive conclusion is matter-of-factly stated as obvious seems very odd.

Is this article describing Williams' thought experiment incorrectly, leading me to this "wrong" intuition? If not, surely other philosophers have rejected Williams' assertion of what is or isn't intuitive in this scenario, and their ideas should also be mentioned?

I'm not looking to get drawn into a pointless philosophy debate here (which would obviously not be appropriate for a talk page)! It just seems that this article is either not describing Williams' position properly or is at least missing a notable opposing viewpoint. --EminentCluster (talk) 11:05, 24 April 2013 (UTC)


 * If you're interested in pursuing this, you can find a downloadable pdf of Williams's paper at http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/07-08/Phil-87/williams.pdf. His ideas have been pretty extensively discussed, and from a quick scan (I'm certainly not an expert on this), it looks like most philosophers accept his intuition as a way that a person might reasonably feel, even if not necessarily inevitable. Looie496 (talk) 15:45, 24 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the link! Interesting read, although I'm afraid it's only left me more confused. I'm 100% with Williams right up until he introduces the torture scenario at which point the argument becomes rather infuriatingly nonsensical. How can I imagine myself both being me and also not remembering who I am? Or imagine myself as someone else but also (apparently) myself at the same time? Everything after that point assumes a priori that this is not only possible but the *only* possible response.


 * At first I thought perhaps my reading of the scenario was wrong because I was assuming that after the torture I would be placed back in my body and be free to live my life as before. If this does not happen then I would have every reason to be afraid because the scenario requires my annihilation, either partial (amnesia) or total (replaced with another person). But at the top of p.171 the paper very clearly draws a distinction between this fear and the fear of torture and even insists that they could exist alongside each other. So I have to admit I am at a complete loss to understand how anyone can possibly feel the way Williams describes, barring perhaps belief in an immortal soul. Although even in that case we could just say the soul can also be moved or erased. Very confusing!


 * I have removed the dubious tag I added to the article because I'm beginning to suspect I've completely missed the point in some fundamental way. Might be best to leave philosophy to the philosophers for now ;) --EminentCluster (talk) 22:24, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Clarifying problems with dualism
In this paragraph, the first sentence has been tagged for clarification, after being separated from the rest of the paragraph. The rest of the paragraph provides the clarification, and it is the separation of them that makes it appear to need clarification. Bolded for easier identification:


 * However, dualism is far from uncontroversial or unproblematic, and adopting it as a solution raises a host of other questions. Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states; ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move their body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain said pizza. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of grey matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. A related problem is to explain how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) can cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the correct manner. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of René Descartes.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 01:11, 21 August 2013 (UTC)


 * I agree that the paragraph does state the questions, but I also think that it could be worded to get the message across more clearly. Looie496 (talk) 02:29, 21 August 2013 (UTC)

Proof of identity?
I would like to add a section on 'Proof of Identity' and bring this article into the modern world. Comments? Pinkelk (talk) 22:37, 11 June 2016 (UTC)


 * That's a different topic entirely and already has several articles such as identity document and personally identifying information. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:03, 12 June 2016 (UTC)

Proof of identity username admin Ofikprude (talk) 04:36, 23 November 2017 (UTC)

Ouch
The 1st &para; of the lede of this article is a weaselfest of gobbledygook. Needs fixin. 98.4.124.117 (talk) 11:53, 20 June 2017 (UTC)


 * Ouch indeed. What about this: "Many people claim we are animals, or organisms, but many others strongly believe that no person can exist without mental traits, such as consciousness. Since an organism can exist without consciousness, both these views cannot be true (if we are organisms we can exist without being conscious; but if we can't exist without consciousness, we are not organisms)."
 * This is obvious nonsense: a cow is also an organism but not all organisms are cows. (Or, in the style of the above paragraph: a cow cannot exist without a special stomach for ruminating the grass it eats, but not all organisms are ruminants, hence cows aren't organisms?) Of course humans, like all species, can have characteristics lacking in most other organisms (although there is much debate which human characteristics are truly unique). That does not alter the fact that we are organisms. It is hard to believe that a supposedly high-minded philosophical article contains such a well-known fallacy. Bever (talk) 23:54, 8 August 2017 (UTC)

Why would anyone give themselves a numerical entity?
I don't get why anyone gives themselves an identity let alone a numerical one. 120.21.88.8 (talk) 04:10, 1 April 2024 (UTC)


 * There is nothing in this article about people naming themselves after numbers. You have misunderstood it. People can name themselves whatever they want but this article isn't about that.
 * Having said that, I do think there is a problem here because the article is pretty unclear so I'll start new sections for that. --DanielRigal (talk) 11:10, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

Experimental philosophy section
I think we may have some serious problems with the Experimental philosophy section. It is vague, difficult to understand, makes claims that are neither clear nor clearly supported supported and may be advancing a POV, or may just be nonsense. Let me explain.

First up, I don't really understand what the section is getting at so I'll have to point to individual red flags:
 * "Since the 21st century" - Vague, popmous but clearly recent. When?
 * "philosophers" - Who?
 * "methods of psychological science" - What methods?
 * "to better understand philosophical intuitions." - "Better" sounds like a value judgement. Who says this is "better"?
 * "This empirical approach to philosophy is known as Experimental philosophy or "xPhi" for short." - Is it though? The Experimental philosophy article certainly doesn't say that it is called "xPhi" or "x-Phi". Searching for "xPhi" doesn't redirect to that article although "x-Phi" does.
 * "Studies in xPhi have found various psychological factors predict variance even in philosophers views about personal identity." - Vague and uninformative. Maybe I am being uncharitable but to me that reads as "Our shrinks analysed your shrinks to predict their opinions after they said them".
 * Moral self theory section:
 * Vague. Opens with a platitude. No wikilinks. Adequately sourced? How much is this actually saying?


 * Numerical and qualitative section:
 * "While the direction of change (e.g., moral improvement vs. moral deterioration) has been found to cause substantial shifts in peoples' judgments about personal identity," - OK. This sounds like complete bollocks. "Moral improvement vs. moral deterioration" is subjective and no scientist would suggest that this is a quantifiable factor with an objective direction. "moral deterioration" sounds a bit too similar to the pseudo-scientific concept of "degeneration" so beloved of far-right cranks. Is that what this is? If not, lets be clear about what it actually is so that cranks don't latch on to it.
 * "multiple studies find that" - Which studies? Are they good studies? Presumably the source given is one?
 * The remainder of the section seems less obviously bad although it could be explained better and doesn't seem to be saying anything particularly unexpected. If any of this can be saved it is probably that last bit.

So... What do we want to do here? Should we just rip the whole thing out, or does somebody who understands this better than me want to pick it over and save the good bits? --DanielRigal (talk) 11:10, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

"Numerical identity"
The phrase "numerical identity" is used without adequate explanation and is likely to confuse the reader. To a typical reader this phrase will evoke something like a Social Security Number, which isn't what we mean here at all. The reader can barely have started reading this article before they need to be redirected to Identity (philosophy), so that they can find out that it is used to distinguish from qualitative identity. I think we should try to use phrases that are more likely to be understood without people needing to read another article first. Possibilities include "individual identity", "unique identity" and other options. Where we absolutely have to use "numerical identity" we should make sure that we are explaining it clearly and correctly, in a way that the readers can understand without too much effort. --DanielRigal (talk) 11:10, 1 April 2024 (UTC)