User:Mjroots/sandbox

I've decided to create a sandbox to work on new articles in peace (hopefully!), rather than having to use the "in use" and "under construction" templates on articles I'm working on. My sandbox can best be thought of as a kind of "junk shed-cum-workshop" where all kinds of stuff is thrown in. Some of it is being worked on, some of it is now redundant, some of it may come in useful someday. Please leave any comments about the content of this sandbox on my talk page.

=Subpages=
 * User:Mjroots/New Belgica (barque)
 * User:Mjroots/List of airports in Kent
 * User:Mjroots/First flight across the English Channel

=New misc article=

Huddersfield Corporation Tramways was the operator of a tramway system in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom. The first line opened in 1882 using horse-drawn tramcars. In 1883, the first steam powered trams started operation. The horse-drawn tram service ended in 1888. In 1901, the first electric tramcars entered service. The steam trams ended in 1902. In 1933, trolleybuses replaced trams on one route, and one by one the other routes were converted until the last trams in Huddersfield ran on 29 June 1940.

Beginnings
In 1877, the London Tramways and General Works Company introduced a bill into Parliament for the construction of tramways within the Borough of Huddersfield. Huddersfield Corporation was asked for their consent, which was withheld as the Corporation wished to retain control of the roads in their area. The bill was nethertheless presented before Parliament, and was defeated when Huddersfield Corporation opposed it. In 1879, the Corporation presented its own bill before Parliament, which passed in 1880. Eleven lines were authorised, these lines originated in central Huddersfield and terminated in Leeds Road North, Bradford Road North, Meltham Road, Buxton Road, Marsden Road, Manchester Road, John William Street, Westgate, Wakefield Road, Newsome and Almondbury respectively.

In 1881, construction of the lines began. The lines were laid to using 49 lb/yd rails. This gauge was chosen in order to enable standard gauge railway wagons to run on the tramrails. The only other systems in the United Kingdom to use this gauge were Glasgow Corporation Tramways and Portsmouth Corporation Transport and its sucessor the Portsdown and Horndean Light Railway. The Corporation tried to find a lessee to operate the system without success. Nottingham Tramways Company offered to work the Lockwood to Fartown route, but were not interested in working the other routes. The Corporation therefore decided to operate the system themselves, and therefore they applied for powers to do this under the Huddersfield Improvement Act, 1882. The Board of Trade granted a licence to the Corporation, to be renewed annually with the Board having the power to revoke the licence if a company made a satisfactory offer to work the system. Thus Huddersfield Corporation became the first municipal tramway operator in the United Kingdom.

Steam tram locomotive
Huddersfield Corporation operated the following steam powered tram locomotives. They were used to haul trailer tramcars.

Steam-hauled trailers
These trailers were hauled by the steam tram locomotives.

Aircraft
The aircraft involved in the accident was Douglas DC-3C, construction number 19109. The aircraft had been built as a C-47A-70-DL in 1943. It served with the United States Army Air Force with serial number 42-100646. The aircraft participated in Operation Market Garden, carrying Lieutenant Richard Winters and Easy Company, 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, United States Army. It was converted to DC-3C standard after the war. In 1946, the aircraft was sold to Aero O/Y and registered as OH-LCB. Aero O/Y became Finnair in 1953. In 1963, OH-LCB was sold to the Finnish Air Force and served with them for twenty years as DO-7.

The aircraft was sold to the DDA in 1984 and registered PH-DDA. A reduced maximum take off weight (MTOW) of 11895 kg and maximum landing weight of 11794 kg was imposed due to the age of the engines and poor single engine flight characteristics. PH-DDA had flown for a total of 38,388 hours at the time of the accident.

Penultimate flight
PH-DDA took off from Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam on the morning of 25 September 1996 for a sightseeing flight to Texel. The occupants of the aircraft were the Captain and First Officer, two Technical Observers, two Flight Attendants and 26 passengers. Departure from Schiphol was under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) due to diminished visibility. During the flight the visibility improved sufficiently to enable continuation under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

On approach to Texel International Airport, the pilot initiated a go-around due to poor visibilty. The aircraft landed without incident on runway 22 at 10:54 hrs after a second approach. The passengers then spent some time cycling on Texel while the six crew remained with the aircraft. During this time they had a hot meal.

Crash flight
PH-DDA took off from runway 04 at 16:38, for the return flight to Schiphol Airport. Witnesses reported that the take-off was normal. The aircraft was squawking code 0060. As the aircraft flew over the east coast of Texel, a witness observed a flash of flame from the underside of the port engine. Another witness said that the engine was making "a shrieking noise".

Five minutes into the flight, the pilots reported to Texel that they had a problem with one of the engines. Texel advised the pilots to contact the Dutch Naval Air Station at De Kooy. At 14:34:33, PH-DDA became visible on De Kooy's Secondary Surveillance Radar. It was then at an altitude of 800 ft and on a heading of 155° gradually turning right until it was on a heading of 175°. At 14:34:32 the crew made contact with De Kooy. They were then at 600 ft and requested an emergency landing at De Kooy. The aircraft then turned left to a heading of 110°. The pilot reported that the left engine had been feathered and that the aircraft was at a height of 700 ft. De Kooy Approach instructed the crew to squawk 4321, passed the QNH and informed them that runway 22 was in use. No response was received from the pilots. The aircraft was turned to a heading of 220° and height decreased to 500 ft. The airspeed decreased during this time.

At 14:36:52 the pilot confirmed that he was squawking 4321 and asked for a heading. De Kooy Approach requested the aircraft's position and the pilot responded that he was 11 nmi north east of De Kooy. De Kooy Approach gave them a heading of 240° but the aircraft turned left onto a heading of 180°. The last transmission received from the crew was confirming the heading of 240°.

At 14:37:28 the aircraft turned left, with the rate of turn increasing. The last radar return was received at 14:37:27 and showed the aircraft at a height of 200 ft. When there was no response to attempts to contact the aircraft, an emergency was declared by De Kooy Approach. At 14:38:08, De Kooy Approach informed the pilot of a KLM ERA helicopter inbound to De Kooy of the incident. That pilot located the wreckage of PH-DDA seven minutes later. The Dakota crashed onto a mudflat between the Afsluitdijk and the island of Texel, some 8 km from Den Oever. The water was 1.2 m deep at the time. A Dutch Navy helicopter was sent to the scene, and airlifted one severely injured passenger to hospital. The rescuee died later that evening. All others on board were presumed to have been killed in the crash.

Investigation
An investigation into the accident was carried out by the Onderzoeksraad Voor Veiligheid (OVV). For the flight, the weight of all on board was estimated at 73 kg each. The calculation omitted the Technical Observer, spares and tools carried on board the aircraft. The declared take-off weight was 11454 kg, within the permitted limits. However, guidelines for General Aviation stated that the flight crew were to be assumed to weigh 82 kg each, cabin crew 72 kg each, male passengers 83 kg each and female passengers 68 kg each. Taking into account the tools and spares this would have given a take-off weight of 11856 kg, which was in excess of the permitted MTOW. The actual take-off weight, using the actual weights of the passengers and crew was 12155 kg after fuel burn during taxiing had been allowed for.

PH-DDA was powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 engines. The port engine had accumulated a total of 3,940 hours and 1,146 hours since last overhaul. The maximum permitted time before overhaul was 1,500 hours. Each engine drove a Hamilton Standard 23E50-474 3-bladed constant speed propellor. The blades of the propellor had a pitch range of 16° to 88°. The pitch angle of the blade was controlled by the propellor governor, which is driven by the engine. The hydraulic feathering mechanism was powered by an electrically driven oil pump. In the event of an engine shutdown in flight the propellor needs to be feathered in order to prevent the engine windmilling and to reduce drag.

The feathering mechanism for the propellors can be tested in a number of ways. Three of methods are carried out with the engine running. Two of these three methods were periodically carried out by the DDA. A fourth method is carried out without the engine running. This check should be performed at a maximum interval of 30 days. The DDA did not perform this procedure.

The DDA had a policy of using full power on the engines for the first take-off off the day, and a reduced power setting for each subsequent take-off. This was contrary to two Engine Operation Information Letters issued by Pratt & Whitney on 15 January 1951 and on 23 January 1952. The practice of simulated engine failures during training flights also increased the risk of a bearing failure. The port engine had suffered a failure of the No. 11 cylinder in June 1995. Repairs included the replacement of the master piston rod bearings.

The weather at the time of the accident was generally good, with local haze. PH-DDA had crashed onto a sandbank which was dry at low tide and under 1.5 m of water at high tide. The aircraft had been severely damaged in the accident, with crushing in a vertical direction. The engines had broken off and the wings and tail were almost broken off. The wreckage was salvaged and removed to the Dutch Navy base at Den Helder. Photographs and video of the recovery operation were made.

The fuselage had been subjected to vertical compression forces, destroying it apart from the roof structure which was intact. The seats had failed under severe downward loading. The cockpit had also been destroyed, with only the floor remaining relatively intact. The tail section had suffered less damage than the forward section. The port wing had suffered severe damage in a rearward and upwards direction, the damage being less at the tip than the root. The port engine had detached in an outwards and downwards direction. The starboard wing was relatively undamaged, apart from a dent and slashes where the starboard engine had broke free. Both main fuel tanks, located in the centre of the wing, had burst open. The starboard auxiliary fuel tank was intact.

It was deduced from the wreckage that the aircraft was intact at the time of the accident. It hit the water with a low forward speed and a high vertical speed. The starboard engine was operating and the port engine was stopped. There was no evidence of any failure in the control surfaces or the connections from the cockpit to them.

Inspection of the port engine revealed that the front bearing had failed. Inspection of the propellor showed that the blades were at an angle of between 50° and 60°. Fully feathered it would have been at an angle of 88°. The propellor was not turning at the time of the accident. The feathering mechanism for the port engine showed no evidence of malfunction.

To assess the flying characterstics of the aircraft, a number of test flights were made by a DC-3 of Air Atlantique where the port engine was shut down in flight. Analysis of radio transmissions during the test flights was carried out by the Air Accident Investigation Branch. Through these it was established that after the port engine had been shut down on PH-DDA, it was flying with the starboard engine at a Maximum Except Take-Off (METO) power setting. It was calculated that the VMC with an unfeathered propellor would be in the region of 92 kn. Flight below this speed would lead to an increased likelihood of difficulty in controlling the aircraft. With a fully feathered propellor, PH-DDA should have been able to climb in single engine flight with the live engine operating at METO power. With the propellor unfeathered, level flight would not have been sustainable at METO power on the live engine. .

In modern airliners, training for dealing with engine failures is done in a flight simulator or during training flights in an aircraft. There were no flight simulators available for the DC-3, so all training had to be done in the air. During training flights, the engine that is simulated to have failed was not shut down, nor was the propellor feathered. Engine re-starts in flight were not practiced. During an emergency, one pilot will fly the plane (the PF) and the other will troubleshoot the situation and carry out the requisite drill with the aid of the relevant checklist (the PNF). If a mayday was declared, standing instructions are to squawk 7700 and inform Air Traffic Control as soon a possible of the nature of the emergency. The PF is responsible for the operation of the aircraft and any decision to divert to an alternate landing place.

Maintenance
PH-DDA was maintained by the Dutch Dakota Association. For commercial aircraft weighing more than 5700 kg the standard applied is known as JAR145. Because PH-DDA was operated by a charitale foundation, it was classed as a non-commercial aircraft and the standard it was operated under was RTL 2093b. The formal permission for the maintenance regime was overseen by the Rijksluchtvaartdienst (RLD). The aircraft was to be maintained according to the most recent standards applicable if the aircraft was in commercial service. The RLD had the authority to impose further conditons on the maintenance and operation of the aircraft, such as specifying that certain spare parts or equipment should be carried on the aircraft.

The DDA believed that its maintenance programme was being agreed by the RLD. The RLD carried out spot checks on the DDAs aircraft and the DDA regularly renewed the Certificate of Airworthiness of its aircraft. In 1977, Hamilton Standard issued a Service Bulletin (SB) , SB657. This was issued because it had been found that a build-up of corrosion on the contacts of the pressure cut-out switch could render the switch inoperative and therefore lead to the propellor becoming unfeathered. The operation of the pressure cut-out switch was to be checked at intervals not exceeding 30 days.

At that time, the RLDs policy was not to make the implemation of such SBs compulsory. In January 1988, the policy was changed to incorporate the implementation of all such SBs into maintenance schedules. The policy was changed again in July 1990 so that such Service Bulletins were only to be incorporated into maintenance schedules if the aircraft's type certificate holder (at that time McDonnell Douglas as successor to the Douglas Aircraft Company) recommended that the SB should be applied.

At the time the SB was issued in 1977, there were no aircraft on the Dutch civil aviation register and it was assumet that the RLD were therefore unaware of Hamilton Standard SB657. It is the aircraft's maintenance organisation which is responsible for the implementation of SBs. When the DDA was formed in 1984, the maintenance regime was created with assistance from McDonnell Douglas. Hamilton Standard SB657 had not been adopted by McDonnell Douglas and the RLD was unaware of its existence. Within the DDA, the existence of Hamilton Standard SB657 was known. It was considered within the DDA that the SB only applied to commercial aircraft and also that is did not apply to PH-DDA because a different type of oil was used in their propellor feathering mechanism. This meant that the operation of the pressure cut-out switch was checked three times in the period March 1996 to September 1996 instead of the seven time it would have been checked if Hamilton Standard SB657 had been incorporated into the maintenance regime.

Air Atlantique, a commercial operator of nine DC-3s in the United Kingdom implemented Hamilton Standard SB657 in their maintenance regime. The main problems found were stuck pistons due to sludge build-up and a larger number of short circuits due to chafed wiring. It was found that a change of oil type had led to a reduction in the number of stuck pistons.

Failure of the engine
The investigation found that the engine failed due to the failure of the front master piston rod bearing. The cause of the failure was not established but it was found that the oil supply line had not become blocked. No evidence of engine damage due to detonation was found. Although it was considered that the engine may have overspeeded during the go-around at Texel during the penultimate flight, no evidence of damage consistent with an overspeed was found. There was no evidence of engine damage due to either overboosting or underboosting. It was noted that front master piston rod bearing had been known to fail in a short time with no previous indications of damage.

Failure of the feathering mechanism
When the wreckage of the aircraft was recovered, it was found that the propellor on the port engine was unfeathered. There was evidence that the propellor had been cycled from feathered to fine pitch and back a number of times. It was determined that a crewmember had operated the feathering button several times during the flight. The investigation determined that there were two failure modes which would lead to a multiple number of feathering cycles. Firstly when the pressure cut-out switch failed to switch off the electrical current as it was designed to do, and secondly due to a short circuit in the wiring associated with the pressure cut-out switch. The investigation ruled out the second mode in the case of PH-DDA and concluded that a stuck piston in the pressure cut-out switch was the cause of the failure. The investigation also found that the failure of the piston in the pressure cut-out switch was an isolated one. The implementation of SB657 may have lead to the discovery of the malfunction of the pressure cut-out switch but the investigation found no grounds to mandate the implementation of SB657.

Investigation findings
The investigation found that had the propellor feathered correctly, the aircraft would have been able to maintain flight and make a successful emergency landing at De Kooy. The flight instrument were not arranged in the optimum way, with the result that easy interpretation of the information presented was unachievable. The flight crew were used to instruments being arranged in the optimum layout. The flight crew were placed under a high workload during the emergency and may have been overwhelmed by the situation. Although the DDA had stated that one of the pilots would be under the age of 60, both pilots operating this flight were over the age of 60. Neither had undergone any training for emergency situations in a simulator because there was no DC-3 simulator in existence to train on. Neither pilot had practiced asymmetric stalls in the DC-3 in flight, their knowledge being theory based. Such practical training was not a requirement of the RLD.

It was found that the accident was not survivable due to the high rate of descent with low forward velocity that the aircraft impacted the water in the Wadden Sea. Although Air-Sea Rescue actions would have made no difference in this case, the actions of the Air-Sea Rescue services were reviewed by the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (English: Ministry of Internal Affairs). No "Mayday" or "PAN" call was made, although the flight crew notified air traffic control of their intention to make an emergency landing at De Kooy.

The RLDs supervision of the operation of the aircraft by the DDA was investigated. It was found that apart from the lower MTOW imposed, the aircraft was generally operated under rules applicable to general aviation and not those of commercial aircraft. In 1991 the DDA agreed to impose more stringent regulations in respect of pilots and cabin crew. A requirement was also made that passengers were to be informed of the lower airworthiness of the aircraft by a note on tickets issued for flights. It was concluded that because the DDA was not required to have an Air Operator's Certificate that safety standards had been eroded.

Similar accidents

 * On 24 April 1994, DC-3 VH-EDC of Southern Pacific Airmotive had an engine malfunction shortly after take-off from Kingsford-Smith Airport, Sydney, Australia on a charter flight to Norfolk Island. The engine was feathered but airspeed decayed an it was found to be impossible to maintain height. A successful ditching was carried out into Botany Bay. All four crew and 21 passengers safely evacuated the aircraft. The investigation revealed that the propellor was not fully feathered.


 * On 19 August 1995, DC-3 C-GZOF of Air North on a ferry flight from Vancouver International Airport to Prince Rupert Airport had a propellor overspeed. An emergency shutdown was initiated but the feather did not completely feather. The increased drag meant that flight could not be sustained. The aircraft crashed by the Fraser River killing one of the three people on board.

Type NJ
Three 1935-built type NJ railbuses were transferred from the Valmondois - Marines line in the Île-de-France to the RB in October 1951. They were numbered M1-M3. They were 8.48 m long, and seated 32, including five in tip-up seats. Power was from a 85 hp 6-cylinder Unic M20 diesel engine. In 1953, M3 was withdrawn from service. Its engine was used in a former Billard type 150 railbus which had been downgraded to a trailer. The former R9 then regained it original number X153. M1 and M2 were scrapped in 1957, their engines being retained as spares sources.

Type NR
The type NR railbus was built in 1936 for service on the metre gauge Réseau Breton. As built, it was 14.85 m long, powered by a 150 hp CLM 6DV85 two-stroke diesel engine. The railbus seated 42. There were 34 fixed seats and eight tip-up seats. Numbered M1 on the RB, the railbus was rebuilt in 1938. It was fitted with an 180 hp Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. The engine was a licence-built copy of a Deutz. The rebuild meant major alterations to the chassis and bodywork, with the railbus being lengthened to 15.15 m. It now seated 47, with 40 fixed seats and 7 tip-up seats. In March 1940, the railbus was transferred to the Chemins de fer départementaux de la Somme, where it was renumbered M21. The railbus is preserved on the Chemin de Fer de la Baie de Somme.

Type OC1
The type OC1 railbus was a development of the type NR. Two were delivered to the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord in 1939. When that line closed in 1956, the were tranferred to the RB where they were numberex X157 and X158. both were rebuilt in 1963-64. They were 18.53 m long. Power was a 180 hp Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. X157 is was sold to, and is preserved on, the CFBS. X158 was sold to the Chemins de fer de Corse and is now preserved at Langueux, Côtes-d'Armor.

Type OC2
Six type OC2 railbuses were ordered by the RB in 1939. Owing to the war, they were not delivered until 1946. The vehicles were 19.12 m long. They seated 59, including eight in tip-up seats. Power was a 180 hp Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. The railbuses were numberex X201-X206. When the RB closed in 1967, they were transferred to the Chemin de Fer du Blanc-Argent where X202 and X205 entered service. The other four railbuses were cannibalized to provide spares. X202 has been preserved by the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord. X205 remains on the Blanc-Argent.

Hotels and Public houses in Hadlow
Hadlow has had a number of public houses and hotels over the years.
 * The Albion / Fiddling Monkey / Two Brewers


 * The Broom


 * The Brown Jug


 * The Castle Arms


 * The Fountain


 * The Golden Eagle


 * The Greyhound Hotel


 * The Harrow


 * The King's Head


 * Leavers Manor Hotel


 * The Oaks


 * The Prince of Wales


 * The Rose / Rose & Crown / Rose Revived / Hadlow Bar and Grill, Ashes Lane


 * The Rose & Crown, Carpenters Lane


 * The Three Squirrels

=New list=

The Little Ships of Dunkirk comprise over 100 merchant vessels, pleasure craft and yachts that took part in the Dunkirk evacuation.

Little ships
The following ships were involved in the evacuation of British and French troops from Dunkirk.

Windmills map 2
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