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The Brazilian blockade of the River Plate was the naval blockade imposed by the Empire of Brazil on the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata in the context of the Cisplatine War between both countries. The blockade strangled the sea trade from the Port of Buenos Aires, which was carried out mostly by British and American ships, crippling the Argentine economy, which greatly relied on it. However, foreign pressure to Brazil's blockade doctrine and the seizure of several ships (mostly blockade runners) from these countries later caused the Brazilian government to alleviate the blockade rules.

The small United Provinces fleet, under the commad of admiral William Brown, attempted to break the blockade several times, which resulted in many of the war's naval battles, such as the Battle of Punta Colares, but was not successful. The blockade was maintained for the entire duration of the conflict, only being lifted on 27 August 1828 after the Preliminary Peace Convention that put an end to the war and resulted in the independence of Uruguay.

Colonial disputes


Following the South American wars of independence, the region known as the Banda Oriental became a point of contention between the Empire of Brazil and the United Provinces after Brazil's independence in 1822. This dispute was inherited from the Portuguese and Spanish colonial empires, whose borders in the River Plate basin had never been settled. It began in 1679, when the Portuguese crown, who had always considered the River Plate as Brazil's natural southern border, ordered Manuel Lobo de Alcáçova, the governor of the Captaincy of Rio de Janeiro, to found the fortress town of Colônia do Sacramento, in an easily defensible peninsula with a natural harbour, on the right bank of the river, right in front of Buenos Aires, which he effectively did in 1680. By expanding into the River Plate basin, the Portuguese wanted to secure access to the continent's interior and also divert the smuggling of silver from Upper Peru away from Buenos Aires.

The Spaniards, wishing to solidify their control over the region, also founded a colony on the opposite bank of the river in 1724, when Bruno Mauricio de Zabala founded the town of Montevideo. After centuries of wars and settling attempts between the two empires, Colônia do Sacramento finally became a Spanish possession by the 1801 Treaty of Badajoz.

With the outbreak of the 1810 May Revolution in Buenos Aires and the Argentine struggle for independence that ensued, Montevideo, under the command of viceroy Francisco Javier de Elío, remained loyal to Spain. The Primera Junta of Buenos Aires then set out to subdue Montevideo and Elío, who requested assistance from Carlota Joaquina, the Spanish wife of Portuguese prince regent John of Braganza. The Portuguese crown, which had fled to Brazil in 1808 after the French invasion of Portugal, then took the opportunity to invade the Banda Oriental in 1811. An army named "Peacekeeping Army of the Banda Oriental" was assembled and command was given to Diogo de Sousa, Count of Rio Pardo, who had orders to help Elío. Diogo de Sousa then led the troops into the Banda Oriental, but a few months later, on 20 October 1811, Elío signed the Treaty of Pacification with the First Triumvirate, which had succeeded the Primera Junta, and so the Argentines, led by José Rondeau, lifted the siege on Montevideo and left the Banda Oriental. Likewise, the Portuguese signed an armistice with Buenos Aires on 26 May 1812 and also left the region.



In this struggle for control over the region, José Gervasio Artigas, a native of the Banda Oriental who had defeated the Spanish at the battle of Las Piedras in 1811, opposed the treaty; Artigas left the Banda Oriental with 16 thousand people, in what became known as the Oriental Exodus, and continued to fight against Spanish rule. In 1814, Artigas, who had fought for independence alongside Buenos Aires troops since 1810, finally defeated the last Spanish forces in the region. Despite receiving military assistance from Buenos Aires in the independence war, Artigas opposed the Buenos Aires elites' intention of centralizing power and resisted their attempts to take control of the Banda Oriental, defeating Manuel Dorrego at the Battle of Gauyabos in 1815 and forming the League of the Free Peoples. This league was based on federalism and social reform, which gained him the support of the poor peoples of the countryside; thus, Artigas became an obstacle to Buenos Aires' politcal ambitions.

Artigas also opposed Portuguese intentions of asserting control over the region, and attacked the neighboring Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul near Quaraí. His influence was also felt in the north, inhabited by Brazilians. In the account of John Parish Robertson, the Banda Oriental fell into "the most unbridled disorder and horrible anarchy" and Artigas' name became "synonymous with bandit, murderer and thief"; this was the pretext now king John VI needed to once again invade the region in 1816. The new invasion, led by Carlos Frederico Lecor, was instigated and unopposed by Buenos Aires, who feared Artigas. The invading Luso-Brazilian forces repeatedly defeated Artigas and his men, with Lecor conquering Montevideo on 20 January 1817. Artigas and his forces still unsuccessfuly tried to resist, being finally defeated at the battle of Tacuarembó in 1820; with no hopes of continuing the resistance, Artigas went into exile in Paraguay, where he spent the rest of his life as a prisoner of Paraguayan dictator Rodríguez de Francia.

Brazilian rule and failure of negotiations
On 31 July 1821, the Montevideo cabildo, with representatives from all of the Banda Oriental, approved its incorporation into the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves as a province under the name of Cisplatina. The following year, when prince Pedro of Branganza openly rebelled against the Portuguese Cortes, the Brazilian government juntas in the provinces gradually joined the independence cause, with the exception of Cisplatina, whose junta, led by Portuguese-born Álvaro da Costa de Sousa de Macedo, voted to remain loyal to Portugal. Brazilian patriots, loyal to prince Pedro and under the command of Carlos Frederico Lecor, then besieged and blockaded the Portuguese troops garrisoned in Montevideo, finally defeating them in 1824.

The local population was divided on the matter; many notable natives of the province, such as Fructuoso Rivera and Juan Antonio Lavalleja, joined Lecor against the Portuguese, while others, such as Manuel Oribe, sided with Portugal; the towns and villages of the countryside, such as Colônia do Sacramento, San José, Cerro Largo and Maldonado, had also joined the Brazilian cause. Thus, once the Portuguese were defeated and left to Lisbon, the Cisplatina province remained as part of the Empire of Brazil.

Following the United Province's recognition of Brazil's independence on 25 June 1823, the country immediately began diplomatic talks with the Empire regarding Cisplatina, which the Argentine government considered theirs and wanted to gain possesion of. In 1823, the Argentines sent José Valentín Gómez to the Brazilian court in Rio de Janeiro in order to negotiate a peaceful Brazilian withdrawal from the region. The Argentine diplomatic mission made a series of proposals and, after receiving no response from the Brazilian government, demanded a reply in February 1824. The answer was given on 6 February 1824, in which the Imperial government promptly rejected any negotiations regarding the cession of Cisplatina, concluding its note by declaring:

"Therefore, on these important considerations, the Government of His Imperial Majesty can not enter with Buenos Aires on a negotiation which has for its fundamental basis the cession of the Cisplatine State, the inhabitants of which it can not abandon."

Emperor Pedro I of Brazil, who had been informed of the situation in Cisplatina by Lecor, believed the natives of the province wanted to remain as part of the Empire; however, Lecor had surrounded himself with people who were sympathetic to Brazil, which prevented him from knowing the true intentions of the province's inhabitants. Likewise, after the Brazilian patriots defeated the Portuguese and entered Montevideo, the locals swore the Brazilian Constitution in May 1824, by which Cisplatina would become part of Brazil. This situation gave off the impression the inhabitants of the province wanted to be part of the Empire. In reality, however, this was not the case: apart from Montevideo and other small cities along the coast, all the countryside, where Artigas' influence was still strong, wished for independence, with the locals disguising their intentions. According to Argentine historian, the people and the press in Argentina "ardently clamored for the vindication of the usurped property".

The outbreak of war and the blockade


When news of the Argentine diplomatic mission's failure reached Montevideo, the locals, including various of the notable leaders who had previously fought alongside the Brazilians against the Portuguese, started to conspire against Brazilian rule, wishing to unite with the United Provinces and forming a secret society named Caballeros Orientales. The conspiracy was discovered by Lecor and some of the more prominent conspirators had to flee to Buenos Aires.

On 19 April 1825, a group of 33 men known as the Treinta y Tres, or the Thirty-Three, led by Juan Antonio Lavalleja, left Buenos Aires, crossed the Uruguay River and landed on Agraciada beach with arms and ammunition, starting the rebel movement against the Empire of Brazil. In response, in July 1825 the Brazilian court sent a fleet under admiral Rodrigo Ferreira Lobo to the River Plate in order to request the Argentines to abstain from further aiding the rebels and to recall "their subjects", otherwise his imperial majesty would "repel force by force".

The Argentine government replied that it had no part in the rebellion and that "the supplies furnished from Buenos Aires had been bought either with the money, or on the credit, of private individuals in the stores of the city, which were open to all alike, whether friends or enemies". Despite this, they were covertly supporting the rebels and, as time passed, it became increasingly apparent that the message was insincere. In Carranza's words, the insurgents' "crusade" was "generously supported by donations from Argentines and Orientals [Uruguayans]".

With the rebellion gaining traction after the victories at Rincón and Sarandí, the Argentines began mobilizing for war. The Congress of the United Provinces approved, on 11 May 1825, a law that provided for the creation and maintenance of an army. This army, created by Juan Gregorio de las Heras on 13 May 1825, was named "Army of Observation" and had a predicted strength of 8,000 men. It was positioned along the Uruguay River without any notification to the Brazilian government. This act caused the protest of the Brazilian consul in Buenos Aires, Antônio José Falcão da Frota, who had been appointed for the office that same month.

On the night of 20 October 1825, the population in Buenos Aires took to the streets and attacked the Brazilian consulate shouting death to the emperor of Brazil and insulting the Brazilian consul, to which the Argentine government refused to give any satisfaction. A few days later, on 28 October, Frota wrote his last report to the Brazilian government, declaring that the United Provinces' Congress had already decided on war. Fearing for his own safety, he left Buenos Aires and returned to Brazil.

On 25 August 1825, in an Congreso de la Florida gathered in Florida, the rebels declared their independence from Brazil and their union with the United Provinces. The Argentine Congress proclaimed the Cisplatina province reintegrated into the United Provinces on 25 October 1825, declaring that it would help the insurgents against Brazil by all means; this decision was communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil by means of a note on 3 November. The following day, the Argentine government broke off diplomatic relations with Brazil, claiming that the Imperial Navy had engaged in acts of hostility in the River Plate. Faced with this situation, the Empire of Brazil then responded by formally declaring war on the United Provinces on 10 December 1825, with admiral Rodrigo Lobo declaring "all the ports of the Republic in a state of blockade" eleven days later, on 21 December. In order to effectively fight Brazil, the Argentine Congress then created the central executive power and elected Bernardino Rivadavia as the country's first president.

Blockades and international law
Blockades were a commonplace instrument of 19th-century warfare. The general rules were understood and accepted by the international community, although their interpretation differed somewhat.

A blockade was a prohibition on neutral vessels entering (or leaving) an enemy port. If a neutral vessel ignored the prohibition, she possibly might be captured by a belligerent warship and taken to a prize court. The court then had to decide whether the vessel had illegally breached a valid blockade. If she had, she was condemned as lawful prize, and was forfeited to the captor; if not, she was released and perhaps the captor might be ordered to pay compensation for unlawful detention..

Although the prize court had to apply the legal rules of its own country, those rules were broadly the same in most jurisdictions. Such disputes as there were in international law turned on interpretation of accepted international custom and, where these deviated, might result in diplomatic protest or, in an extreme case, a declaration of war by the offended neutral power.

There was no International Court of Justice and the rules, which were always evolving, were to be found in the writings of respected legal authors.

A common ground of dispute concerned the effectiveness of a blockade. A blockade, to be valid, had to be effective in practice — not merely a paper blockade. Otherwise, a belligerent might pretend to close the world's shipping just be issuing a verbal declaration.

This did not mean that the blockade, to be legally valid, must be 100% effective. (The validity of the North's blockade of the Confederate ports during the American Civil War was not denied by any European power, even though a numerical majority of blockade runners, in fact, got through.) A widely accepted test was whether blockade runners were in evident danger. Such would be the case if, for example, a belligerent warship hovered outside the port with the intent of capturing blockade runners. Again, the blockading squadron might be temporarily forced off station by a storm but that was not enough to make the blockade ineffective. In contrast, a belligerent who declared a long line of enemy coast blockaded without having enough ships to enforce it would be accused of promulgating a mere paper blockade.

What notice had to be given to neutral shipping was a matter of dispute. The British admiralty courts considered that, provided there was an effective blockade, it was sufficient to give notice of it to a neutral's government. French practice, on the other hand, was to visit, board and warn the neutral vessel, and to enter the fact in her log; thereafter, if she was caught trying to enter the port there could be no excuse.

In any case a neutral ship could be boarded anywhere to search for contraband of war. A ship that intended to breach the blockade (if this could be proved from her papers) might be captured anywhere in the world. A ship that had successfully run a blockade could be captured anywhere, but only before she reached her final destination. A ship which had purchased a cargo in a port before the blockade was imposed was entitled to leave the port.

The region's geography
The funnel-shaped body of water known as the River Plate (Sp. Río de la Plata; Port. Rio da Prata) is an estuary lying between the present-day territories of Uruguay and Argentina. It receives the waters of two major rivers, the Paraná and the Uruguay which, with their tributaries, drain one quarter of the land surface area of South America.

Generally, the River Plate is composed of fresh water and, if regarded as a true river, is the widest in the world: for most of its 290 km (180 mi) length it is too wide to see across. At its mouth, where it discharges into the South Atlantic Ocean, it is 240 km (140 mi) wide.

The water is muddy, carries a considerable streamload, and is shallow. Mostly, modern shipping is obliged to navigate in channels which must be regularly dredged by the authorities. In the early nineteenth century there was no dredging and vessels had to proceed with caution. The nautical chart reproduced in this section, if viewed at highest magnification, shows depths marked in fathoms (1 fathom ≈ 183 cm). The Spanish Empire, wishing to make Buenos Aires easily defensible, had deliberately founded the town alongside shallow water, making it inaccessible to ships, which had to stand out several miles in the roads. Even late in the 19th century travellers were conveyed from ship's boat to shore by horse and cart.

Lunar tides are not important, being far outweighed by the influence of the winds, which can be considerable, sometimes bringing major floods, at other times blowing large surfaces dry. A particular storm wind, known as the Pampero, was feared by mariners.

River trade of Argentina
In the days before railways and surfaced roads, river links were vital arteries. On the Paraná or Uruguay Rivers depended much of the trade of Santa Fe, Entre Ríos and Corrientes, provinces at the time doubtfully loyal to Buenos Aires. Hence the strategic importance of Martín García Island in the River Plate. Possession of that island — which was disputed between Argentina and Uruguay well into the 20th century — enabled a belligerent to blockade that trade.

Brazilian fleet
According to Brian Vale and Jorge Luis Toscano, Brazil was "the largest naval power in the Americas" at the time, and for this reason "it was inevitable that Brazil’s principal weapon in the struggle would be a naval blockade". Toscano estimated the Brazilian fleet at no less than 65 large ships in 1825, but noted that it doubled in size in the next three years by purchasing or incorporating ships that had been captured by lord Thomas Cochrane from Portugal during the independence war. Apart from purchasing ships, the imperial government also ordered the construction of new ones in local shipyards: two frigates, two corvettes and several gunboats and yachts. In Hélio Leôncio Martins' estimation, the Imperial Brazilian Navy was the strongest force Brazil could rely on, numbering 121 ships including two ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, 8 frigates, 7 corvettes, a lugger, 17 brigs, 24 schooners, 33 gunboats, and other vessels, with a total of 690 guns. Apart from these vessels, the Brazilian fleet also included merchant ones that had been armed and converted into warships.

The fleet's quality varied, however; the frigates were no older than eight years, but the corvettes and brigs included ships from the Napoleonic wars, such as Itaparica, Liberal and Cacique, to new ones built in North America, such as Maria da Gloria and Maceió. The ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, built in 1763 and 1771, respectively, were old and in poor condition, with the latter serving only as a prison ship while the former, despite still being in active service during the war, was in serious need of repairs.

Brazil's naval policy became the subject of criticism for the government's opposition, which were repeated by foreign observers. The former, wanting to harm the emperor's ministers, described the navy as a "naval police", saying that, instead of the large and heavy frigates bought by the government, it would have been better to acquire low draft schooners, better suited for navigation in the shallow waters of the River Plate. For John Armitage, a foreign observer present at the time, the desire of "ostentation" and to show off an "exalted idea" of its naval power to foreign nations had led Brazil to purchase and build heavy vessels, unsuited for war in the River Plate. Armitage also opined that "swift-sailing vessels would not only have been more easily equipped, but also more appropriate to the actual exigencies of the country". This was also Gustavo Barroso's opinion, for whom the Brazilian fleet was "abundant, but inadequate", as its ships "were not suited to our people, our service and the war against [our] neighbours inside their home". In turn, Toscano argued that these criticisms were "unjustified", remarking that, for a country like Brazil, with a large coast and sea trade routes to defend, having a balanced navy with both large and small vessels would be ideal; Toscano also pointed that John Armitage's remarks were "accepted without criticism in its nominal value by many historians".

When the war broke out in December 1825, the Brazilian fleet in the River Plate consisted of the frigate Tétis, the corvette Liberal, 2 brigs, a barque, 12 schooners, and 8 gunboats; the same fleet that, under the command of Pedro Nunes, had fought against the Portuguese during Brazil's independence war and also against Artigas in 1820. This squadron was promptly reinforced by two frigates, Imperatriz and Paula, two corvettes, Itaparica and Maceió, one brig and other smaller vessels.

Argentine fleet
In Jorge Toscano's words, wehn compared to Brazil's maritime power, the Argentine Navy was "insignificant and consisted of little more than a handful of small ships left aside since the independence campaign". According to Angel Carranza, at the beginning of 1826 it numbered 16 ships: a corvette, two brigs, a ketch, and 12 gunboats.

According to Alexandre Boiteux, upon creating their navy, "the Argentines did so not only in accordance with their financial resources, but also with the hydrographic conditions of the theater of operations: robust medium-draft ships, sailboats, well equipped, easily manoeuvrable". In Carranza's view, the Argentine fleet consisted of "some materially weak vessels, but that became respectable and effective by the strong spirit of their crews".

Bought the frigate O'Higgins (44 guns, renamed Buenos Aires), and the corvettes Independencia (renamed Montevideo) and Chacabuco from Chile for less than 200 thousand pesos; Buenos Aires was lost in a storm before arriving in Argentina when crossing the Cape Horn. Montevideo returned to Talcahuano fleeing the storm, never arriving in Argentina. Chacabuco was the only ship to arrive in 1826.

Extension
Duration: 21 December 1825 - 30 September 1828

Privateer attacks on Brazilian vessels
Authorization given by decree on 2 January 1826.

Eastern Naval Division

United Kingdom
Robert Gordon

Woodbine Parish

United States
Condy Raguet

France
Albin Roussin