Talk:Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow

Political issues section
In the Operation history/political issues section, there is a paragraph beginning: "In a later interview in the 1990s, Pearkes discussed these problems...".

This paragraph is uncited. It's also impossible, as George Pearkes died in 1984. I will thus remove this paragraph.--Voodude (talk) 14:54, 18 December 2009 (UTC)
 * Also political (?); here (22min) is Bill Gunston claiming that Diefenbaker wanted to use funds from Arrow to support farmers, used F-101 as replacement, Bomarc a mistake. TGCP (talk) 17:09, 28 April 2012 (UTC)
 * For Canada Bomarc was mistake because in practice, in the case of a potential approaching Soviet bomber attack it took too long for the Canadian operators to receive the necessary permissions from the US for the nuclear-armed missiles to be fired. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.11.183 (talk) 12:56, 21 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Got a source for that? James Norris Gibson, in The History of the US Nuclear Arsenal (Brompton Books, 1989, ISBN 0861245644) says the delay potential for BOMARC A was the corrosive nature of its liquid propellants, preventing it from being fueled until just before use, so there was a two-minute delay between the launch decision and actual launch while the missile was fueled for use. BOMARC B had a solid fuel booster and could launch as soon as it was erected from its coffin.
 * But as NORAD handled (and continues to handle) decisions regarding response to air defense threats, I'm not aware of any reason that release of nuclear weapons for continental air defense would have been handled outside Air Defense Command - so that the notification to crews to launch would have been simultaneous with a nuclear release decision sent down from the US National Command Authority. As soon as inbound aircraft had been confirmed enemy, the release order would have been given and BOMARC launched. loupgarous (talk) 02:17, 12 August 2017 (UTC)

Technology?
Military philosophy in the 1950's involved supersonic bombers and supersonic interceptors. As such technology like delta wings were useless in the World War 2 and Korean War. Also the Vietnam War proved such high speed aircraft as the Century series to be less effective than aircraft like the F-4 which was more maneuverable and had better pilot visibility. Designs like the F-15, F-16, and F-18 are all subsonic with a focus on performance at Mach.8 including high maneuverability, and pilot visibility.

I suggest a section be added to discuss how in the 1960's nuclear submarines replaced supersonic bombers as the primary nuclear threat and as well as the lessons learned from operating supersonic fighters by the USA in Vietnam. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.168.160.185 (talk) 01:33, 23 December 2010 (UTC)


 * I can't even begin to address all the errors and misinformation above, and am emphatic that NONE of it belongs in this article. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 01:40, 23 December 2010 (UTC).
 * Isn't noteworthy that such designs have not played were not used the in Cold War or modern warfare including the F-108 Rapier designed by North American virtually identical to the Arrow and canceled for the same reasons?
 * The above statements aren't well thought-out or written, and makes any discourse moot. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 06:46, 23 December 2010 (UTC)
 * What if the Avro Arrow was 20 years ahead of other designs what influence has it had on fighter designs from the 1970's? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.168.160.185 (talk) 15:35, 23 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Finally, a rational if mistaken statement, that I can at least address. The CF-105 represented "state-of-the-art" for the late 1950s and there were other interceptors with a similar mission profile and capability; it cannot be considered as "ahead of the curve." Just a reminder that this forum is not a free-for-all on the merits of an aircraft type, but on how to improve the article it accompanies. So far, nothing of note has been presented. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 15:41, 23 December 2010 (UTC).
 * Much as I hate to admit it, the only thing I can think of where the Arrow was ahead was FBW, & I'm not even sure on that one. All her other features were pioneered elsewhere. (Give SAAB credit for being smart!)  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  18:19, 23 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Although fly-by-wire was incorporated in the CF-105 design, earlier work using a converted North American F-100 had already proved the concept. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 19:00, 23 December 2010 (UTC).
 * The Arrow was designed at a time when the threat to Canada was massed formations of Soviet nuclear-armed bombers approaching from over Greenland at high altitude and so the Arrow was designed with a generous wing area to give good manoeuvring performance in the thinner air at high levels. Due to Canada's size, high 'dash' speed was required to allow the limited (compared to the large size of Canada they were required to cover) number of Arrows to rapidly reach the areas over which the bombers were approaching. When you face nuclear annihilation of your cities and population, you readily accept compromises elsewhere if the resulting aeroplane will do the job. The Arrow needed to be big because it needed to be able to carry all the fuel required to defend the airspace of a country like Canada, whereas the British equivalent of the period, the English Electric Lightning, was optimised for the same task but over a much smaller land area. In these situations, facing possible massed nuclear bomber attack, you optimise the aeroplane for just this one purpose, otherwise everything else is pointless. If you fail to intercept the bombers then there's no-one else left alive, see. No point in defending burnt-out cities with everyone dead in them. So you make damn-sure that your interceptor is going to do the job. It really was that important. For the Arrow normal fighter manoeuvrability was less important because it was extremely unlikely to meet Soviet fighters over Canada and because there was less need for this when the aeroplane is armed with guided missiles rather than a gun. This same principle applied for the US F-102 and F-106 and as interceptors rather than fighters they were really rather specialised for just this one role.
 * You see, during the Cold War, air defence was a bit of a gamble, where, if you bet on the wrong horse and war with the Soviets came, everyone you know and love died. So you went for the best possible solution. Often these happen to be the most expensive. The Arrow was one of these.
 * Actually as it turned out, once Stalin had died, no-one in the Soviet Union had any intention of invading the West, but their paranoia (understandable, with their history of being invaded, first by Napoleon and then by Hitler) was fuelled by a few high-ranking lunatics on Canada's side of 'the pond' who thought wiping out the Soviets might be good for their careers. Luckily, wiser councils prevailed and we in the East and West were left with our 'precious bodily fluids' both unsullied and intact.
 * BTW, I wouldn't say that Vietnam proved much about combat aircraft other than it was rather a waste of time utilizing multi-million dollar aircraft to try and bomb a Third World guerilla army in mostly empty jungle and sometimes losing two or three aircraft at $10,000,000 a-piece. But that's just MHO. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 18:17, 3 January 2013 (UTC)
 * The air combat lesson from Vietnam was that dogfighting with onboard cannon was not obsolete. F-4 was another aircraft with "interceptor" in its DNA which had to be refitted with cannon because air-to-air missiles weren't ready for prime time yet.  While air-to-air missiles now predominate in air combat, and the hope is that they'll do so beyond visual range, so stealth/low observability has value, it would be a doctrinal error to neglect dogfighting ability.
 * In the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, determined enemies exploited the US neglect of dogfighting training for its pilots. It'd be unreasonable to expect the same Russians who trained North Korea's and Vietnam's air forces not to exploit a decision among Western air forces to neglect dogfighting and create situations where dogfighting is crucial to winning fighter engagements again. loupgarous (talk) 02:40, 12 August 2017 (UTC)

Avro Arrow supporters lobbying for consideration
This is not the first time this has hapend, a proposal was put forth in 2010 and was later rejected. Further, the intro seems an inapropreate place for this information. If it truley is of relevance a seperate section would seem warranted. 70.75.81.177 (talk) 00:23, 11 September 2012 (UTC)


 * Moved down to variants, as nobody (AFIK) was suggesting building an exact copy of the 1950's fighter. Hcobb (talk) 00:38, 11 September 2012 (UTC)

Production Fantasy
This sentence is from the production section: "By mid-1954, the first production drawings were issued and wind tunnel work began, along with extensive computer simulation studies carried out both in Canada and the United States utilizing sophisticated computer programs.[35]" Wind tunnel tests, yes. I don't think anyone was doing any kind of computer simulation of aircraft in 1954. 50.43.44.229 (talk) 04:17, 10 January 2013 (UTC)


 * Actually, yes they were doing computer simulations. What set AVRO apart, was that they were using the most bleeding edge tech of their times. See Randall Whitcombs' Cold War Tech War from Apogee Books. Page 134 they were doing computational aerodynamic testing. AVRO had then state of the art mainframe computers. AVRO also had the world lead on "Heads Down Radar" which was computerized, and about at least a decade ahead of the F-14 Tomcat, which was still using vacuum tubes, AVRO was transitorized and digital, Grumman's Tomcat was analog and tube.--Abebenjoe (talk) 07:51, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Using computer simulations hardly set Avro apart; all the aerospace companies had computation departments by that time, and had them during the war. Many of these were punch-card mechanical computers, but there's no difference other than speed. But [many others had digital computers as well. As to the "state of the art mainframes", can you name the specific models?
 * The statements on "head down radar" are simply fantasy, and I assume your are simply repeating the claims made by RL Whitcomb, found here. Let me just say this; Whitcomb was a passable artist, but his understanding of many of the topics he wrote about was clearly lacking. You should take any of his claims with a very very large grain of salt.
 * For one, I can find zero references other than Whitcomb who claim the ASTRA was transistorized. Such a thing would be almost impossible at the time, as transistors of the era were extremely expensive and limited to low power. The very first transistorized computer ran for the first time in November 1953, which offers further evidence. Moreover, Whitcomb (and others) state that the ASTRA was a version of the Hughes MG-10, a tube-based analog-computer system. This seems entirely reasonable, given everything one knows about the project and the companies. Why Whitcomb would imagine that a machine based on the MG-10, and in turn on the MG-3, would be transistorized escapes me.
 * Whitcomb then goes to state that he has seen documents claiming that there was an ASTRA Mk. 2 that was a pulse-doppler version. This is entirely fantasy. Pulse-doppler systems require inter-pulse phase coherence, which in turn eliminates the use of a magnetron. Magnetrons produce pulses with different frequencies and phase relationships with every pulse. Yet every single resource that mentions the system clearly states that ASTRA used a magnetron. I have to conclude that Whitcomb was as unfamiliar with this technology as he was of basic aerodynamics.
 * So we have lots of credible references, and even some of Whitcomb's own words, that state that the ASTRA was like the MG-10, but adapted to fire the Sparrow and with a larger magnetron. This sounds entirely similar to other US designs of the era, which isn't surprising given that it was a US design of the era.
 * So finally we come to the Tomcat and how the Arrow was supposed to be decades ahead. Well, to start with, one might consider the AI.23 AIRPASS in the BAC Lightning, which successfully demonstrated all of the features claimed for the ASTRA, in 1955. The missing feature, of course, is look-down/shoot-down, which Whitcomb claims was part of the ASTRA 2.
 * So, was it? Well if you read Whitcomb's words, he makes the statement that "RCA had won, with the ASTRA 2 system, the contract to produce the radar/fire control system for the LRIX". He then goes on to describe the ASG-18. However, if one takes a quick trip over to the AN/ASG-18 article, you'll find that this system was built by Hughes, not RCA. He goes on to express some sort of surprise that this pre-dated the Tomcat (which is why I assume you mention that aircraft). But the ASG-18 was pre-dated by the AN/APQ-81 from 1958. In any event, all of these efforts start dates post-date the Arrow cancellation, so it is reasonable to conclude that Whitcomb has confused them all.
 * So basically, don't use any of Whitcomb's statements in this article without SERIOUSLY backing them up in other sources. Maury Markowitz (talk) 15:23, 30 April 2014 (UTC)

Wind tunnel testing was, and still is, the the only truthing method. Numerical simulation is a lot cheaper and quicker for rejecting shapes that have serious flaws. Primitive-equation simulation requires computer power that was not available in 1956. Parameterized simulation, usually a point-wise linearization of empirically determined dynamics, was around even before computers. (Flight Sim 2004, uses this method.)14.202.190.178 (talk) 00:20, 3 March 2016 (UTC)

What the?!
"held the promise of near-Mach 3 speeds at altitudes likely exceeding 60,000 ft"

The Arrow was primarily made of aluminum, which "goes plastic" at speeds over M2.4 due to skin friction heating. This is why almost all high-speed aircraft top out somewhere around M2-2.2 to 2.5, including the Condorde and F-15 for instance. Aircraft that go faster have to be built from other materials, typically stainless steel or titanium, and remain rare due to the costs involved/

I am aware of paper projects for a "Arrow 3" that was intended for higher performance and used alternate materials, but the LEAD talks specifically of the Mk. 2. This would have basically melted at Mach 3, and couldn't have reached that anyway due to the fixed engine inlets. Can anyone offer a non-bogus (i.e., written by an actual Arrow engineer) reason that the aircraft magically bypassed these widely-known physical limits?

Likewise, what's with the weasel words in the altitude? Was the design altitude 60k or not?

Maury Markowitz (talk) 14:17, 30 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Nevermind… looking over the edit history I see this was added by an anon who's edit was based entirely on the common-but-wrong assumption that more power = more speed. Reverted to original and entirely fine-looking numbers. Maury Markowitz (talk) 14:34, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
 * IIRC the Orenda Iroquois, de Havilland Gyron, Rolls-Royce RB106, and the Bristol Olympus were all designed aerodynamically with a view for potential use up to Mach 3.
 * BTW, the B-47 used to flight test the Iroquois was scrapped because the asymmetric thrust permanently warped the rear fuselage, making the aircraft effectively a write-off. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.130.71 (talk) 10:39, 20 February 2016 (UTC)

Not smuggled?
According to this seemingly credible author, the famed RL-206 nose cone was not smuggled out of Avro, as the page currently suggest, but deliberately moved in order to perform pressurization testing. He refers to two letters, one suggesting it was smuggled, but another from Pearkes granting them use of the nose section. Does anyone have additional information or sources? I'm inclined to believe that Pearkes trumps in this case, and the article should be updated. Maury Markowitz (talk) 11:47, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

Canadian Aviation and the Avro Arrow
This reference source is one of the truly invaluable tertiary sources that deal with the inner workings of the Avro Canada company especially at the time of the cancellation of the Avro Arrow. The original but revised bibliographic notation in the article indicated:
 * Smye, Fred. Canadian Aviation and the Avro Arrow. Oakville, Ontario: Randy Smye (self-published at CreateSpace: Amazon paperback (122 pp.) and Kindle ebook), August 2014. ISBN-10: 1500545996. ISBN-13: 9781500545994.
 * Fred Smye, did write this book as an "insider's view" and it was published in small numbers for just the senior staff, friends and family. Fred's son, Randy, made a copy available to the National Archives, I believe, so that notice of the book was recognized. Randy is a retired academic and had reserves about the use of a "self-publishsd" source, so he arbitrarily removed all the original self-published copies and instead created an E-book that was recently published via Amazon as a Kindle version. There must be a case for retaining a valuable resource, and I await a further discussion on this topic before any final determination is made about the use of material from Canadian Aviation and the Avro Arrow. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 23:41, 3 January 2015 (UTC)

SPS's are fine to use if they are written by an established expert in the field that has other publications that meet the requirements. I think Fred Smye is uncontroversial in that regard. Or am I missing something here? Maury Markowitz (talk) 23:46, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

Cruising speed claim
 Mach 1.5 cruising speed

Can anyone source this exact statement from the original source? I don't have Dow and I can't find any statement like this anywhere else. Other sources state Mach 1.5 as the operational speed, not the cruising speed, and there is a world of difference between those statements. Maury Markowitz (talk) 23:40, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

Operators

 * 🇨🇦 Canada
 * Royal Canadian Air Force – Arrow was cancelled before entering service.

The RCAF was never an operator. With the XB-70 and A-12 Avenger II, the USAF or US Navy are rightfully not listed as operators. In fact, there is no such section.

I believe the Canadian government paid for 5 prototypes but there were operated by Avro.

Possible improvements in the accuracy of this article could be:

--Operators-- (section deleted)

Operators
None

Operators
None


 * 🇨🇦 Canada The Royal Canadian Air Force was an intended user but did not order the aircraft

Proposed Operator

 * 🇨🇦 Canada
 * Royal Canadian Air Force

Operators
Avro Canada (prototypes)

These are 5 possibilities that are more accurate than the current version. Vanguard10 (talk) 03:53, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

Replacement with missiles?
In 1957 the move was from manned aircraft to missiles. I can source this for the UK from the Sandys Report, but what's the Canadian equivalent? Andy Dingley (talk) 21:22, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * That was a shift to ICBMs & such from manned bombers, & if you actually understood the issue, you'd know that. And since I don't have the recent Canadian book on the Arrow in front of me, which says it was the BOMARC plus the Arrow that was the issue, I can't cite from it; I'm not going to go get it juar to please you, since you can't tell the difference between a hidden comment & one readers can actually see. Why don't you stop trying to provoke me into an edit war by being self-righteous & ignorant?  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  22:24, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * The Bomarc, that well known ballistic missile? Andy Dingley (talk) 22:59, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * That well-known nuclear tipped cruise missile (tho it wasn't designated as such), yes, & your inability to tell the difference again demonstrates your lack of grasp of the issue.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  23:23 & 23:24, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * It was no more a cruise missile than it was a ballistic missile. Andy Dingley (talk) 23:38, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Chronology? Andy Dingley (talk) 23:50, 29 July 2017 (UTC)

Yes, the shift was to BOMARC missiles instead of bombers that needed fighter support. The purchase of BOMARCs "hastened the demise of the Arrow". Quoted from a book NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada’s Secret Electronic Air War, https://books.google.ca/books?id=DM5nHjzScJcC&pg=PA69&dq=Avro+Arrow+BOMARC+missiles&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Avro%20Arrow%20BOMARC%20missiles&f=false
 * OK, clearly I need to clarify this, because you're too pig-ignorant to know better. Bomarc was a SAM (that means surface-to-air missile, or anti-aircraft missile). It was never a ballistic missile, it was never a cruise missile. Both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are surface attack missiles, usually launched from the ground, often (now) from submarines, sometimes (rarely) from aircraft.
 * Your WP:CANVASSing for this is at User_talk:Parsecboy and at Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Aviation
 * And stop lying about other editors. Andy Dingley (talk) 00:08, 30 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Y'know what, why don't you call it a a flying pig? I no longer care. Arguing with you about it isn't worth the grief.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  00:12, 30 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, the shift was to BOMARC missiles instead of bombers that needed fighter support. The purchase of BOMARCs "hastened the demise of the Arrow". Quoted from a book NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada’s Secret Electronic Air War, https://books.google.ca/books?id=DM5nHjzScJcC&pg=PA69&dq=Avro+Arrow+BOMARC+missiles&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Avro%20Arrow%20BOMARC%20missiles&f=false

This book also confirms that though not as specifically https://books.google.ca/books?id=A8DLtmgTT9QC&pg=PA103&dq=Avro+Arrow+BOMARC+missiles&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj47Oz12q_VAhVH0YMKHfV9BNIQ6AEINjAC#v=onepage&q=Avro%20Arrow%20BOMARC%20missiles&f=false

But basically, the Arrow was too expensive to make unless they could sell hundreds to another country. And the orders were not coming. https://books.google.ca/books?id=o7-6rUT9Bq0C&pg=PA150&dq=Avro+Arrow+too+costly+BOMARC+missiles&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiVwp-Z26_VAhXlz4MKHQoiDmQQ6AEINzAD#v=onepage&q=Avro%20Arrow%20too%20costly%20BOMARC%20missiles&f=false Peter K Burian (talk) 02:18, 30 July 2017 (UTC)

J75 thrust
There are many Arrow books that talk about the much lower thrust of the J75 engine compared to the Iroquois. This appears to trace its way to a mistake made in one popular book, which listed the thrust of the J57, the J75's smaller sibling (I found the exact mention once, but that was almost two decades ago).

This article currently states the J75-P-3 used in the Mk.1 was 12,500 lbf. The Pratt & Whitney J75 article states this same engine produces 16,500 lbf. One might compare that to the early models of the Pratt & Whitney J57, which produced ~11,500 lbf. One might also note the obvious problem that the thrust in AB, 23,500, is far more than the 50% one normally achieves, whereas it is more in line with an engine of the ~16,500 range.

There are many reliable sources that state the thrust of the J75 was in the 16,000 to 18,000 lbf range, including the Smithsonian, which has a relatively complete collection. Here for instance is the P-2 model, which has 17,000, while this source mentions the replacement of the F-105's P-5 with the improved but otherwise similar P-19 of 16,200.

We need to pick a single good reference and fix this.

Maury Markowitz (talk) 13:27, 3 November 2018 (UTC)


 * The error is appears to be from The Great Book of Fighters, which lists 12,500 lbf dry and 18,000 w/a-b, not that its the only source with that error. The Engines of Pratt & Whitney: A Technical History  lists the figures for several models of the J75/JT4D, including the -P-3. I don't have it in front of me at the moment, but the dry thrust is 15,500 lbf. (I forget what the afterburner thrust was, but it's within a 1,000 lbf of 23,500.) I can add it when I'm back where the book is later tonight, but I'd like to see if others have a better source on the whole aircraft's specs. - BilCat (talk) 22:46, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
 * Most excellent. I think we should put a note on the figure for future readers, noting this common discrepancy. Maury Markowitz (talk) 18:18, 5 November 2018 (UTC)

New source
Extensive new article about both the company and the Avro Arrow: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200615-the-record-breaking-jet-which-still-haunts-a-country?utm_source=pocket-newtab -- John Broughton (♫♫) 17:55, 18 June 2020 (UTC)
 * Highly doubtful the non-specialist press has anything to add, and they are notorious for getting technical details wrong, since the people writing the stories know nothing about aircraft or the aviation industry, and probably built the story around a google search - or if we are lucky, someone's faulty memories. If they have anything useful to say, it would have been said in either a specialist book - or an article in an aviation magazine, since this isn't current news. Almost all stories like this are uninformed sensationalism and detract from the sum of human knowledge, so yes, find something that collaborates its claim - NOT quotes it. I barely made it a paragraph in, before hitting factual errors.
 * 1. It wasn't "Canada chose", but some Canadians, while other folks chose to murder it at the first opportunity.
 * 2. Canadian and American designed aircraft were already being produced for the war effort. It wasn't just Hurricanes and Lancasters.
 * 3. "Ambitious Canadian politicians" had less than zero to do with pushing Canadian aviation to the forefront, and did a tremendous amount of work stifling it.
 * 4. Skip a paragraph, and they forget the powerhouse that is Sweden (SAAB?) - or the Netherlands (Fokker), or a dozen other countries with smaller populations than Canada (in 1940 Sweden had 1/2 the population of Canada, while the Netherlands had 4/5ths), and Fokker was one of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the world at the time, while Sweden was producing world class combat aircraft.
 * Need I keep going? This is misinformed drivel at BEST, and pap for the uninformed masses. We already have much better sources for anything that can be said, and anything new it MIGHT add is highly suspect.&#32;- NiD.29 (talk) 05:03, 24 December 2021 (UTC)

Flight control design concept features, possibly misleading paragraphs?
"This resulted in a lack of control feel; because the control stick input was not mechanically connected to the hydraulic system, the variations in back-pressure from the flight control surfaces that would normally be felt by the pilot could no longer be transmitted back into the stick. To re-create a sense of feel, the same electronic control box rapidly responded to the hydraulic back-pressure fluctuations and triggered actuators in the stick, making it move slightly;" this system, called "artificial feel"

I strongly suspect this description is not technically correct or at least misleading. The stick does not require dedicated actuators to move it specifically. The flight controls operate as analog fbw in normal mode, and has a mechanical backup mode akin to many other pre-fbw-aircraft, the latter will incorporate mechanical feedback linkages at the control surface pcu´s. In the normal, fbw-mode, the feedback linkages are most likely mechanically locked (to control surface movement, to be precise). This will mean that the stick will be forced to move according to control surface movement since it is still mecanically slaved to them by the locked feedback linkages. So: stick signals fbw-system -> fbw-system moves control surfaces -> stick mechanically follows control surface movement. This would make more sense with pictures honestly. Artificial feel will then be effected simply by the fact that the electronic flight control system senses the forces on the stick and only provides the corresponding movement, no more, no less. No more artifical feel device will be neccesary in this mode since it is by definition provided by the force-respone scheduling of the fbw-system. Such devices will be neccesary in the mechanical backup mode however, and may be provided by simple spring bungees or the like. I believe i have read descriptions to this effect, but i thought i´d just put it up here for the time being if anyone thinks it is warranted to delve deeper into the matter. 90.224.29.203 (talk) 22:56, 21 May 2023 (UTC)